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The U.S government has for many years extended rhetorical and material support for civil 
society organizations in many developing country contexts. Part of this support is justified on the 
basis that it reduces civil conflicts and political violence. This dissertation features three 
empirical analyses that assess the grounds for such assumptions, including whether the strength 
of civil society influences the onset of civil conflicts, how civil conflicts unfold (i.e., 
predominantly violent or nonviolent), and the severity of violence during armed intrastate 
conflicts. The first and second papers, which employ a large-N statistical analysis complemented 
by an examination of the case of South Africa during the 1980s, draw on interdependence theory 
to explain how loss aversion incentivizes well established and economically integrated civil 
society groups to avoid civil conflict or adhere to mass nonviolent protest methods. The third 
paper evaluates whether armed rebel groups with organizational roots in civil society have 
advantages in developing rebel governance and controlling information about their operations 
that reduce their targeting of civilians and fatalities in battles with government forces. Analysis 
of armed insurgencies from 1988-2017 finds negligible support for these propositions. Together 
these essays suggest that policymakers recalibrate their broad expectations regarding civil 
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Chapter 1: U.S. Policy Toward Civil Society and Civil Conflicts 
The U.S. government spent over $3 billion dollars supporting civil society groups 
in many countries around the world from 2010 through 2016. The funds formed part of 
the Obama administration’s Stand with Civil Society Initiative. Officially launched in 
2013, this new program justified its focus on civil society for two broad reasons. First, 
civil society indirectly fuels economic development and governance capacity. “Civil 
society organizations – such as community groups, non-governmental organizations, 
labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, 
professional associations, and foundations – often drive innovations and develop new 
ideas and approaches to solve social, economic, and political problems that governments 
can apply on a larger scale.” Second, more numerous and active civil society 
organizations “contributes to stability” and prevents violent conflict. By contrast, 
President Obama explained that when civil society is suppressed “it fuels grievances and 
a sense of injustice that over time can fuel instability or extremism. So I believe 
America’s support for civil society is a matter of national security.”  
The Stand initiative was not a partisan take on the role of civil society 
organizations in stability and civil conflict, but one example of a belief that has become 
increasingly embedded in U.S. foreign policy. In substantial ways, the Stand initiative 
echoed the logic of the Freedom Agenda, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, and 
National Security Presidential Directive No. 58 that prioritized support for civil society in 
“countries at risk of conflict and civil strife,” all of which were launched by President 
George W. Bush from 2003 to 2008 (CRS 2016; Gilley 2013; Yerkes and Wittes 2006). 
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Though foreign assistance in general has been a lower priority in the administration of 
President Donald Trump, engaging with civil society organizations ranks among the 
principles of its Strategic Prevention Project and the Global Fragility Act that focus on 
violence prevention in fragile and conflict-affected states (State Department/USAID 
2019; Welsh 2019). These initiatives from Democratic and Republican administrations 
alike all aim to strengthen stability in otherwise fragile countries through expanding and 
supporting local civil society organizations. They represent what has become an article of 
faith that strong and numerous civil society organizations enhance stability and reduce 
political violence and armed civil conflict.  
These views are based on several interpretations of civil society organizations. 
First, they are often understood to be primary sites or actors through which individuals 
are able to influence or constrain their governments and address their grievances. 
“Through civil society, citizens come together to hold their leaders accountable and 
address challenges,” according to the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy, which made 
“empowering civil society” one of its headline objectives. More importantly, a strong and 
resourced civil society permits citizens to not only influence government and address 
grievances, but to do so peacefully rather than resort to violence. Former Assistant 
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Tom Malinowski explained 
in 2016 that it is “civic organizations through which citizens organize themselves against 
violent extremists, and the political movements that give people the hope that change can 
be won peacefully.” Likewise, Lorne Craner, one of Assistant Secretary Malinowski’s 
predecessors who served in the administration of President George W. Bush, stated in 
2001 during a hearing on U.S. policy in Central Asia “we will continue our support for 
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civil society…to enable them to hold their governments accountable and advocate for 
peaceful change.” The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy similarly states, “By giving 
people peaceful avenues to advance their interests and express their convictions, a free 
and flourishing civil society contributes to stability and helps to counter violent 
extremism.”  
While an emphasis on their policy influence and their peaceful approach is 
recurrent, U.S. foreign policy does not perceive civil society organizations as inherently 
quiescent or powerless. USAID’s 2013 Strategy on Democracy described civil society as 
holding “the power of citizens to sanction, impose costs or to remove government 
officials for unsatisfactory performance or actions” (USAID 2013). Along with 
references to civil society’s ability to petition governments and institutions, U.S. policy 
and policymakers occasionally identify a central role for civil society in mass-based anti-
regime protest campaigns. In the Obama administration, approaches to civil society were 
partly informed by periods of mass protest action against sitting governments, including 
during the Arab Spring and elsewhere (Lawson and Epstein 2019). The 2013 USAID 
Strategy on Democracy, which identified civil society organizations as a central 
engagement partner, explained “Examples of growing civic engagement and expression 
have emerged across the globe including in parts of the Arab world and in Burma. Where 
these openings occur USAID supports the aspirations of people to contribute to the 
decisions that shape their own lives and societies” (USAID 2013). Civil society is 
depicted as critical to conventional and institutional politics, working to advance its 
interests and policy preferences, but it is also referenced as the source of challenges to 
incumbent regimes through more contentious and extra-institutional approaches. These 
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conceptualizations are not without some inherent tension. Civil society organizations are 
viewed simultaneously as promoting stable and “normal” policy reform and political 
processes as well as more assertive and confrontational challenges to the political status 
quo – a source of civil conflict, albeit nonviolent. Whatever the technique, U.S. policy 
depicts it as promoting peaceful, nonviolent methods.  
U.S. policy initiatives like Stand and the thinking behind them raise important 
research questions. Is there a consistent relationship between civil society and peace? If 
so, why? More specifically, does variation in civil society and its characteristics influence 
the incidence of civil conflicts? When these conflicts do occur, does it affect how civil 
conflicts are waged, such as whether dissidents engage in armed rebellion or adopt 
nonviolent alternatives? Even amid armed civil conflicts, does the involvement of civil 
society influence their intensity and the level of violence that occurs, keeping them 
comparatively more peaceful?  
Answers to these questions have significant consequences for conflict prevention 
and U.S. policy. If a stronger and more capable civil society does reduce civil conflict 
onset, how they are waged, or the intensity of violence amid armed civil conflicts, then 
potentially the U.S. and other governments are underinvesting in this sector. 
Alternatively, civil society may have no appreciable effect on civil conflict occurrence, 
form, or intensity. Expectations should then be adjusted and, potentially, financial 
support reconsidered. There is also a possibility that civil society is associated with civil 
conflict onset or higher levels of violence during civil wars. Under such scenarios, U.S. 
policy may inadvertently contribute to political violence and exacerbate conflict 
dynamics. Lastly, U.S. policy views of civil society may be too sweeping. It may be that 
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certain types of civil society in certain state contexts influence civil conflict and political 
violence in unique ways. 
This dissertation aims to examine the relationship between civil society and these 
civil conflict dynamics and some of the assumptions driving U.S. policy engagement with 
civil society, thereby contributing to a clearer understanding of how to engage with these 
actors. It does so in three separate empirical analyses written as stand-alone studies. The 
first paper empirically evaluates the broader association between variation in civil society 
and the onset of civil conflicts and how they are waged – whether as armed rebellions or 
mass nonviolent campaigns. The second paper delves into a specific case, one rich with 
civil society organizations and enduring contemporaneous armed and unarmed challenges 
to the incumbent regime: South Africa during the 1980s. The South Africa case is 
particularly valuable since it has motivated U.S. policy thinking on civil society. 
Together, these two papers’ topics and approaches directly complement one another. The 
first provides a systematic large-N assessment of civil society’s relationship with civil 
conflict, testing basic propositions distilled from U.S. policy assumptions about the links 
between civil society and forms of civil conflict. The large-N technique offers breadth 
and greater external validity. The second paper examines in finer detail the precise links 
between civil society with violent or nonviolent methods of dissidence. It provides 
enhanced internal validity by specifying precise causal mechanisms that connect civil 
society with conflict behaviors and overcomes limitations of the large-N approach, 
including simple correlational evidence of causal relationships, issues of causal 
heterogeneity, and potential post-treatment bias, given the potential relationship between 
civil society and other important conflict factors such as the extent of democratization, 
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among others. For South Africa’s non-white population, there was little access to any 
democratic institutions, and so the richness of civil society and the variation in dissident 
methods therein is not a consequence of how civil society and democratic reform are 
sometimes interwoven. The third paper complements the first and second essays by 
exploring civil society’s role in another aspect of armed civil conflict. It examines the 
relationship between the origins of armed rebel groups, specifically whether they were 
founded by pre-existing civil society organizations, and the level of battle-related deaths 
and civilian victimizations that take place during a subsequent civil war.  
While U.S. foreign policy often emphasizes that civil society organizations are 
peaceful actors, it is rarely explained in detail why this is the case. In my first and second 
papers, I draw on exisiting theories of interdependence to explain why civil society 
organizations are less likely to direct their organizational resources toward violent 
methods. A major emphasis is on the cost vulnerabilities of pre-existing organizations to 
political violence and their interest in aspects of the status quo, often prevailing economic 
conditions. Civil society organizations are created to advance the interests and goals of 
their members. That they exist and produce these benefits means they have at least some 
stake in the pre-conflict status quo and the prevailing order – without it their organization 
may not exist. Therefore, when they do seek to challenge fundamental aspects of the 
prevailing political arrangement, including who is in power, they turn to methods of 
disruption that are comparatively more manageable and less likely to jeopardize their pre-
conflict social and economic standing. This encourages the adoption of mass nonviolent 
strategies, which allows them to engage in dissidence while minimizing the potential 
losses they face from generating widespread disruption. However, when organizations are 
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formed from constituencies that share fewer interests with political and economic elites, 
cost vulnerabilities and loss minimization are less salient and the comparative advantage 
of political violence to increase disruption and coercion over elites and the state 
increases. In such circumstances, civil society organizations may direct their 
organizational resources to armed challenges to the political or territorial status quo. I 
find support for this explanation in both my large-N quantitative analysis and my case 
study of South Africa. More specifically, it appears that formalized and established civil 
society organizations are associated with a sharp reduction in the probability of armed 
civil conflict onset. The relationship is as strong as a major increase in per capita gross 
domestic product, which has traditionally be one of the factors most predictive of civil 
war occurrence. In a situation of widespread dissidence, the South Africa case also 
demonstrates that more established civil society organizations, particularly those from the 
“middle class,” favor nonviolent methods over political violence. Cognizance of the 
potential negative effects of violence on their own socioeconomic standing and prospects 
appears to shape many non-white South Africans’ strategy selection. 
The third paper examines how commonly lauded aspects of civil society 
organizations may influence the intensity of armed civil conflicts. Policy engagement 
with civil society organizations often praises them for their unique knowledge of local 
conditions, their connections to pre-existing community networks on the ground, and 
their “grassroots” representation, which yields higher levels of legitimacy. In the context 
of an active armed insurgency, these could be interpreted as advantages that facilitate 
shifts to less violent tactics, enhance resources and capabilities, permit more selective 
targeting of potential opponents, and provide better protections from government 
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detection. The result should be less deadly conflicts, both in terms of the extent to which 
armed rebel groups target unarmed civilians and the battle deaths that result from combat 
with government forces. Unfortunately, an analysis of these two forms of violence in 
civil wars between 1988 and 2017 provides no clear empirical support for these theorized 
relationships. Armed groups formed by civil society organizations appear to engage 
civilian victimizations as frequently and at levels similar to other armed nonstate groups. 
Likewise, armed rebel groups that originate from civil society organizations are 
associated with no significant difference in battle-related deaths.  
These papers do not directly assess the impact of specific U.S. programs or 
support for civil society. Previous studies have conducted such examinations, though the 
focus is more often on less contentious policy reform initiatives (i.e., those with sub-
maximal objectives). The results have often been mixed, at best (Amenta et al. 2010; 
Barrett et al. 2010; Brown, Brown, and Desposato 2007; Bush 2015; Cooley and Ron 
2002; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Fox 2015; Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai 2014; 
Mendelson 2001; Sheely 2015; Spina and Raymond 2014; Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 
2012). However, civil society’s relationship with political violence – especially in civil 
conflicts – remains understudied (Chambers and Kopstein 2001; Paffenholz 2009; Stacey 
and Meyer 2005). Underlying assumptions of U.S. policy toward civil society regarding 
its violence prevention and mitigation properties have not been investigated. As 
important as it is to understand the effectiveness of specific U.S. programs and initiatives, 
the assumptions on which these programs are based should also be examined. An 
evaluation that finds that U.S. civil society support programs do not reduce political 
violence could be due to the weaknesses of program design or because they are based on 
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faulty understandings of central conflict dynamics. This dissertation aims to examine 
these underlying assumptions first, thereby informing whether continued U.S. policy 
attempts to reduce conflict and political violence through civil society are merited at all.  
From a policy perspective, the results of these doctoral essays are somewhat 
encouraging but also suggest that U.S. policymakers have overestimated the role of civil 
society in peace and nonviolence. In the aggregate, the extent and density of the 
landscape of civil society organizations is not consistently associated with nonviolent 
strategies. These features also do not appear to reduce the onset of armed civil conflicts. 
However, as noted previously, there is strong evidence that older, more established 
organizations or those that are more deeply interdependent with political and economic 
elites are more likely to forswear strategies of political violence. When these groups 
engage in political violence, however, it appears to be less no less intense and deadly. 
Efforts to work through civil society to reduce civil conflicts and violence risks would 
need to focus on older organizations. Ensuring that entities with some level of interests 
tied to elites, state institutions, or elements of the economic status quo are strong may be 
the most effective violence prevention strategy that focuses on civil society.  
In summary, the results suggest a moderation in U.S. policymakers’ and program 
implementers’ views of civil society and its ability to reduce instability and political 
violence.  Civil society may reduce civil conflict onset, particularly armed conflicts, but it 
is less commonly a source of mass nonviolent resistance. But if armed intrastate conflict 
does erupt, the involvement of civil society groups in rebellion is not likely to produce 
less severe fighting. If the intention of a policy intervention is to reduce the likelihood of 
political violence, working with established, formalized civil society organizations may 
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be the most fruitful and impactful priority. If instead policymakers are seeking to support 
nonviolent conflict and nonviolent challenges to the political status quo, the relationship 
between civil society and mass protest campaigns is less clear. 
 
What is Civil Society? 
Before finishing this introduction to these separate empirical analyses of civil 
society, civil conflict, and political violence, I lay out a definition of the concept. Though 
it is not without its shortcomings – particularly its breadth – this definition is used 
because it is common in many other studies of civil society and is reflected in relevant 
U.S. policy documents. Parts of the specific narrative, definition, and references offered 
below are repeated in parts of the subsequent empirical essays.  
Civil society is a sweeping concept. Generally, it is conceived of as a public space 
that exists between the household, state institutions, and the commercial marketplace. It 
is populated by organizations and association of citizens that work collectively to 
advance or protect shared interests. Their participation in and contributions to these 
organizations is voluntary, which distinguishes civil society from profit-driven 
participation in commercial firms or market-based transactions or the political or legal 
dynamics that govern state institutions, officials, and the civil service. The types of 
organizations and associations that comprise civil society are variegated. They include 
labor unions and professional associations, faith-based and religious organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, student groups, advocacy and special interest 
organizations, and a wide variety of recreational, social, cultural, and other entities 
founded and maintained voluntarily by citizens. In developing countries, more traditional 
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institutions, such as village associations and chiefdoms, are also considered to constitute 
associational life. Civil society is often described as strong and vibrant when participation 
in associations and organizations is high and encompassing.   
This conceptualization of civil society as constituted by voluntary organizations 
and associations – associational life – is “the most common of the understandings” of the 
concept (Edwards 2009, 19–20). The same conceptualization is regularly used in 
empirical studies that examine the relationship between civil society, democracy, and 
governance (Bernhard 1993; Boulding 2014; Bratton 1989; Diamond 2016; Fish 2001; 
Howard 2005; Kew 2016; Schofer and Longhofer 2011). Each of these emphasizes 
voluntary, self-governing organizations or associations that are autonomous of state 
institutions and the commercial marketplace. Likewise, similar conceptualizations have 
been applied in analyses of civil society’s role in civil conflict termination and post-
conflict development. In an analysis of the role of civil society in peace negotiations, one 
scholar identifies it as “as separate from the state and political parties, and consists of the 
wide range of voluntary organizations in society such as religious associations, women’s 
organizations, human rights groups, and trade unions” (Nilsson 2012, 246). Another 
study of civil society’s influence on military rule identifies it as “the arena where 
manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, women’s groups, 
religious groupings, and intellectual currents) and civic organizations from all classes 
(such as lawyers, journalists, trade unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute 
themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and 
advance their interests” (Stepan 1988, 4). Other empirical work that examines how civil 
society may interrelate with inter-communal conflict, individual attitudes toward 
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violence, and the dynamics of armed conflict draw on these same understandings of the 
concept (Belloni 2001; Bhavnani and Backer 2007; J. M. Braithwaite and Cunningham 
2020; Chapman 2008; Della Porta 2017; Kew and Wanis-St. John 2008; Nilsson 2012; 
Orjuela 2003; Paffenholz 2009; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; Tesfaye 2016; Varshney 
2001). There are points of divergence, typically over how “political” civil society is, with 
some definitions including political parties while others ostensibly excluding any entities 
with ambitions to rule the state or state institutions. Overall, the consequential operative 
features of the definition are some sort of routinized and persistent collective or 
organization in which members voluntarily provide resources and time so as to protect or 
advance shared material or value-based interests.   
U.S. policy embraces this same conceptualization of civil society. Citing most of 
the usual suspects, President Barack Obama identified “community groups, non-
governmental organizations, labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, 
faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations” as the various 
types of civil society organizations that his administration sought to provide support as 
part of larger U.S. initiative to strengthen civil society (White House 2014). Often, a 
focus on the organization as the primary actor within civil society is emphasized. In its 
2013 Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, which outlined a plan of 
“robust support to civil society organizations globally,” USAID defines them as “formal 
non-government organizations (NGOs) as well as formal and informal membership 
associations (including labor unions business and professional associations farmers’ 
organizations and cooperatives and women’s groups) that articulate and represent the 
interests of their members engage [sic] in analysis and advocacy and conduct oversight of 
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government actions and policies” (USAID 2013). The Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor at the State Department, which is another major U.S. funding agency 
in the civil society space, offers a similarly encompassing definition of the concept: 
“Civil society is the collection of social organizations, formed voluntarily by citizens to 
advance shared goals or interests. This includes independent public policy research 
organizations, advocacy organizations, organizations that defend human rights and 
promote democracy, humanitarian organizations, private foundations and funds, 
charitable trusts, societies, associations and non-profit corporations. It does not include 
political parties” (DRL 2020).  
U.S. policy and programming embraces a definition of civil society similar to that 
of most academic and empirical studies of the concept. It emphasizes that organizations 
are the central element of civil society, they are based on voluntary membership, they 
generally seek to advance or protect an array of material and value-based interests, and 
they are autonomous from the formal institutions of the state and the marketplace. This 
definition is not without problems, particularly how broad-based and inclusive it is. The 
variety of organizations that would fall under it includes some with vastly different 
resources and interests. Arguably, this complicates their comparability and the ability to 
generalize about their relationship with certain forms of behavior in civil conflicts (or 
other political and economic matters). My papers seek to incorporate both the broad-
based definition, particularly in the large-N analyses, as well as unpack how different 
organizations and their features more precisely influence their behavior. The latter is 
done in the analysis of the South Africa case. 
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There are other definitions of civil society, which do not apply here but can be a 
source of confusion. In some uses, civil society refers to anti-government or opposition 
forces in society. On occasion it is used to refer to protesters and protest organizations. 
This is sometimes referred to as the “Gramscian” view of civil society (Foley and 
Edwards 1996, 1998). It is less common in conceptualizations adopted in policy 
documents and programs nor does it align with how civil society is typically discussed in 
various academic literatures, which prefer less overtly political and contentious 
definitions (Bratton 1989). For that matter, it is also less interesting or relevant to explore 
the relationship of this type of civil society on civil conflict and mass nonviolence since 





Chapter 2: Mobilizing Structures and Contentious Action:  
Does Civil Society Influence Civil Conflict Onset and Method of 
Dissidence? 
 
Abstract: Many developed country governments provide extensive donor 
funds and diplomatic support to civil society organizations as a way to 
prevent the onset of internal armed conflicts or support the adoption of 
nonviolent alternatives when political and territorial incompatibilities 
emerge. Such policies are partly informed by anecdotal and case study 
work on nonviolent action and social movements that demonstrate the role 
of pre-existing social organizations as key resources for mobilizing large-
scale anti-regime and secessionist protest campaigns. However, studies of 
armed civil conflicts have demonstrated that social organizations are also 
crucial to the mobilization of armed insurgency for similar goals. This 
paper contributes two possible explanations, partly distilled from policy 
assumptions about civil society, for how pre-existing social and civil 
society organizations might reduce the onset of conflicts in general or 
promote the use of mass nonviolent campaigns over armed insurgency. It 
assesses these explanations using multinomial logistic regression and 
state-level data on four different attributes of civil society from the 
Varieties of Democracy initiative. The results provide no support for 
propositions that civil society influence the adoption of mass nonviolence, 
but older more established organizations are associated with a reduction in 
the onset of armed civil conflict and the potential effect is substantial. The 
results suggest that civil society plays a more narrow but still important 
role in the onset of civil conflicts and their subsequent forms.   
 
Social organizations and networks that pre-date civil conflicts are often mobilized 
and recruited into their executions (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Mark I. Lichbach 
1994). Their involvement in contentious action has been studied in armed insurgency 
(Bultmann 2018; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Petersen 2001; Staniland 2014; 
Weinstein 2007; E. J. Wood 2015) as well as mass nonviolent campaigns (P. Ackerman 
and Kruegler 1994; Boulding 2014; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; McAdam, McCarthy, 
and Zald 1996; Morris 1981). However, whether the structure and landscape of social 
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organizations influence the onset of contentious action and the form it takes has not been 
systematically examined. Do the number and composition of pre-existing social 
organizations and networks influence the onset of civil conflicts or how they are waged?  
Policymakers often debate these same issues but in different terms. In recent 
decades, the potential of a “strong” civil society composed of many citizen organizations 
and associations to prevent conflict or promote nonviolent action has been embraced by 
many decisionmakers and donor agencies in developed country governments. 
Accordingly, increasing amounts of donor funds and diplomatic support has been 
extended to various women’s and youth organizations, labor and professional groups, 
sports or cultural associations, and other advocacy and nongovernmental groups in many 
countries. Such engagement seeks to expand the number of and popular participation in 
civil society organizations and associations. In the latter half of President Obama’s 
administration, billions of dollars were provided to such entities as part of a stand-alone 
initiative to support citizen-led civil society organizations (CRS 2016). Among a variety 
of political and development objectives, such funding was justified as a means to prevent 
political violence and instability or ensure that when conflict occurs it is waged 
nonviolently.   
Many examples from past episodes of contentious action appear to support and 
inform the purported importance of pre-existing social organizations and networks in 
mass nonviolent campaigns. For example, religious organizations were essential 
contributors to anti-regime protest campaigns in Iran in 1979, the Philippines in 1986, 
and South Africa during the 1980s (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005). Labor 
unions were a major force in protests in Poland and Zambia during the 1980s (Larmer 
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2006; Schock 2005). Groups of amateur soccer leagues and fans contributed to the 
peaceful anti-regime protests in Egypt in 2011. Beyond these examples, there are others 
in which citizen organizations either engage in routine advocacy and institutionalized 
politics to improve government transparency or human rights policies, among similar 
efforts in other issue areas. These and other common examples are often referenced to 
explain how well-organized and strong citizen-led organizations open alternatives to 
armed conflict for redressing grievances. “Through civil society, citizens come together 
to hold their leaders accountable and address challenges that governments cannot tackle 
alone,” according to a speech given by then U.S. President Barack Obama in 2014. 
There are, however, examples of similar social organizations supporting more 
violent analogs. Religious groups in Algeria during the early 1990s (Hafez 2000), in Sri 
Lanka during the 1990s (Orjuela 2005), and in Iraq during the 2000s (Pirnie and 
O’Connell 2008) all played central roles in armed rebellions. A large labor union served 
as a primary source of recruits for the armed National Liberation Movement in Uruguay 
in 1965 (Brum 2014), unions were mobilized during the Spanish civil war (Balcells 
2010), and a well-organized labor sector did not appear to prevent civil war in 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Della Porta 2017). Amateur sports leagues formed the 
backbone of at least one Serbian militia during the war in the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s (Schlichte 2009), and many members of the Gaelic Athletic Association 
contributed to the armed Easter Rising revolt in Ireland. The future head of the PKK in 
Turkey was once a member of a progressive student organization (O’Connor and 
Oikonomakis 2015), and many university students fled into the jungles of Thailand in the 
1980s to form militias against the government of Myanmar (P. Ackerman and DuVall 
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2000). Anecdotally at least, civil society organizations sometimes appear to be associated 
with armed conflict.  
This paper seeks to systematically examine the relationship between the structure 
and landscape of civil society, conflict onset, and the form such contentious action 
assumes. Its findings have implications for core precepts that are motivating critical 
foreign policy decisions and contribute to ongoing debates in relevant academic 
literatures about pre-existing social organizations and contentious action. It is divided in 
four parts. First, it reviews how previous studies of social movements, nonviolent action, 
and armed insurgencies have examined the role of pre-existing social organizations and 
civil society in contentious action, and some of the shortcomings of the explanations 
therein. The paper then offers additional theoretical contributions for why variation in 
civil society and social organizations may be associated with a reduction in the incidence 
of armed conflict and an increase in the adoption of nonviolent alternatives. Data from 
the Varieties of Democracy initiative is then used to empirically evaluate this 
relationship. Finally, the policy and research implications of the results are discussed. 
Results suggest that the relationship between civil society and civil conflict onset 
resides primarily in older and more established groups. By contrast, few of the often-cited 
civil society attributes, such as participation, diversity, or size, appear to influenced the 
onset of civil conflicts, whether armed or nonviolent. However, older and more 
established civil society organizations are negatively associated with the occurrence of 
violent civil conflicts, suggesting that a more formalized and mature civil society can 
prevent violent conflict. Overall, the analysis here provides negligible support for the role 
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of civil society in promoting alternatives to armed conflict. It suggests a deeper critical 
review of foreign policies that seek to support and strengthen civil society is warranted.   
 
 
Literature Review: Civil Society and Civil Conflict 
A number of existing studies have explored the relationship between civil society 
and contentious action, sometimes using different terminology for the same concepts.1 I 
examine them briefly in three groups: research on armed civil conflict, on social 
movements, and on nonviolent action. First, I offer a definition of civil society, and then 
demonstrate the theoretical contributions and some shortcomings of these literatures.   
Civil society is generally defined as a public space that exists between the 
household, formal state institutions, and the commercial marketplace. Empirically, it 
consists of the organizations and associations of citizens that populate this space and that 
work collectively to advance their shared interests. Participation in and contributions to 
these organizations is voluntary, which distinguishes civil society from profit-driven 
participation in commercial firms or remunerated participation in political or legal offices 
that govern the state. The types of organizations and associations that comprise civil 
society are variegated. They include labor unions and professional associations, faith-
based and religious organizations, nongovernmental organizations, student groups, 
advocacy and special interest organizations, and a wide variety of recreational, social, 
cultural, and other entities founded and maintained voluntarily by citizens. In developing 
countries, traditional institutions such as village associations and chiefdoms are 
sometimes considered to comprise civil society (Bratton 1989; Varshney 2001). Civil 
                                                
1 These terms include social endowments, social institutions, social organizations, civil society 




society is often described as strong and vibrant when participation in associations and 
organizations is high and encompassing and bridges ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other 
divides (Bratton 1989; Kew 2016; Putnam 2001).  
This conception of civil society as constituted by voluntary organizations and 
associations is “the most common of the understandings” of the concept (Edwards 2009, 
19–20). It is also consistent with the explicit treatment of civil society in previous 
research on armed and unarmed conflicts. In an analysis of the role of civil society in 
peace negotiations, one scholar identifies it “as separate from the state and political 
parties, and consists of the wide range of voluntary organizations in society such as 
religious associations, women’s organizations, human rights groups, and trade unions” 
(Nilsson 2012, 246). Another study of civil society’s influence on military rule identifies 
it as “the arena where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, 
women’s groups, religious groupings, and intellectual currents) and civic organizations 
from all classes (such as lawyers, journalists, trade unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to 
constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves 
and advance their interests” (Stepan 1988, 4). There are points of divergence, typically 
over how “political” civil society is, with some definitions including political parties 
while others ostensibly exclude any entities with ambitions to rule the state or state 
institutions. Overall, the consequential operative features of the definition are some sort 
of routinized and persistent collective or organization in which members voluntarily 
provide resources and time.  
A principled embrace of nonviolence is not a defining feature of civil society 
(Chambers and Kopstein 2001; Stacey and Meyer 2005). While individually some civil 
 
 21 
society organizations and their members may adhere to normative preferences of 
nonviolence, it is not commonly shared across civil society organizations. In fact, 
analysis of individual attitudes have shown that there is no consistent negative 
relationship between participation in civil society organizations or associations and 
support for political violence (Bhavnani and Backer 2007; Chapman 2008). Likewise, 
civil society organizations have been found to support illiberal and divisive political 
agenda, such as the strong support that German citizen associations provided the Nazi 
party in 1930s (Berman 1997) and how a leading architect of South Africa’s apartheid 
system, the National Party, “built up its strength with the support of a plethora of 
Afrikaner cultural and economic organizations” during the 1920s and 1930s (Thompson 
2001, 162). There are no inherent ideological or attitudinal leanings within the concept of 
civil society that predispose it toward certain political visions or strategic courses of 
action (i.e., nonviolent protest). Regardless, if there were definitional requirements that 
civil society be nonviolent and pro-democracy, the question of how civil society 
influences the adoption of violence or nonviolence would be less interesting or relevant. 
Several studies of the dynamics of armed conflict have examined how civil 
society organizations influence the onset or character of political violence, though they 
often use different terminology. Drawing on Robert Putnam’s classic study of civil 
society in Italy (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994), Weinstein (2007) argues that the 
ability of conflict entrepreneurs to recruit through and mobilize pre-existing “social 
endowments” resolves principal-agent problems and enhances the performance of armed 
insurgent groups. Staniland (2014) similarly argues that the structure of pre-existing 
“social institutions” influences the sustainability and performance of armed groups by 
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increasing information flows, resource management, innovation, and resilience. In his 
analysis of armed rebellion in the Baltics during and after World War II, Petersen (2001) 
attributes the onset and sustainability of organized armed militancy in various villages 
and towns to the existence of strong community organizations. Though these authors 
disagree in important ways regarding how social organizations and civil society influence 
the intensity, duration, or viability of armed conflict, pre-existing organizations and 
associations become important ways to reduce the costs of mobilizing and sustaining 
armed insurgency. By implication, they may have some impact on the viability of 
contentious action and the appeal of various strategic choices when conflict entrepreneurs 
or major political and territorial incompatibilities arise. 
These arguments – and the social organizations referenced therein – resemble 
many studies in social movement literature and those of nonviolent action. According to 
the resource mobilization theory of social movements, the availability of pre-existing 
social organizations and “mobilizing structures” reduce the costs of mobilizing support 
for an anti-status quo agenda (Boulding 2014; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; 
Morris 1981; Tilly 1978). Such pre-existing organizations allow for “bloc recruitment” of 
entire collectives of people and can simplify coordination of many participants by 
supporting meso- as opposed to micro-level mobilization (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; 
Oberschall 1973). They also simplify information flow and coordination, and prompt 
cascades of protest participation (Granovetter 1973, 1978). Related research on 
nonviolent action has similarly pointed to the importance of religious organizations, labor 
groups, professional associations, and various other social organizations to the origins 
and prosecution of major anti-regime and secessionist nonviolent protest campaigns (P. 
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Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Sharp et al. 2005). 
Nonviolent strategists “need to plan to utilize and extend existing social groups and 
institutions to engage the widest possible participation” (P. Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, 
29). The availability of such social organizations serves as a form of latent power that can 
dramatically influence the adoption of nonviolent contentious action: “questions of social 
organization and political technique converge. There may be a causal connection between 
the relative concentration or diffusion of power in the society and the technique of 
struggle – political violence or nonviolent action – relied upon to maintain or to change 
the social system” (Sharp et al. 2005, 427). The role of these social organizations is 
critical in nonviolent action, since such efforts require far more participation than armed 
insurgencies to be viable.2 
Generally speaking, these works on armed insurgency, social movements, and 
nonviolent action share a central logic: pre-existing social organizations reduce the costs 
of mobilizing contentious action and executing campaigns. They do so by partially 
resolving the central challenge of mounting any rebellion, the problem of collective 
action and overcoming an individual’s rational preference to free-ride on the efforts of 
others to produce public goods (Mark I. Lichbach 1994; Olson 1971). Since they are 
voluntary, pre-existing civil society and social organizations have already resolved this 
collective action problem and have available selective incentives and sanctions to 
maintain commitment and cohesion in their collective efforts. They therefore may be 
very helpful in launching viable and effective rebellions, which demand equal amounts if 
not greater cohesion and commitment.  
                                                
2 Not all scholars agree about the critical value of pre-existing social organizations. See Pearlman (2020). 
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There are several shortcomings in these arguments. First, the mobilization 
benefits of tapping into pre-existing civil society and social organizations appear to 
accrue equally to violent and nonviolent efforts. They do not resolve whether pre-existing 
social organizations may be more inclined to adopt one form of contentious action over 
another, or if other structural features of civil society and the organizations that comprise 
it may reduce armed conflict while increasing nonviolent action, or vice versa. Rather, 
the same social organizations are mobilizing into very different forms of contentious 
action. And yet the organizational origins of insurgent groups appears to indicate that 
civil society organizations rarely form the backbone of nonstate armed actors. According 
to data from Braithwate and Cunningham that identifies the “parent” organizations of 
various armed rebel groups, student and youth organizations, labor unions, and religious 
organizations – three types of organizations consistently identified as central elements of 
civil society – comprise fewer than 10 percent of the foundational organizations of armed 
insurgencies (see Figure 1) (J. M. Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020). Civil society 
organizations appear to be rare contributors to armed insurgencies.  
Second, to explain the role of pre-existing civil society and social organizations in 
armed insurgency or mass nonviolence, most studies do not employ large-N analysis that 
adequately selects on the independent variable but rather rely on single or comparative 
case analysis. There are exceptions to this, including studies that have focused on 
explaining the origins of mass nonviolence (Boulding 2014; Butcher, Gray, and Mitchell 
2018a; Butcher and Svensson 2016; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). These studies limit 
their analysis to nonviolent outcomes and exclude armed insurgencies, however. They 
also focus on specific types of organizations, rather than the full breadth of social 
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organizations that comprise civil society. A more limited number of studies have 
systematically studied the correlates of both armed conflict and mass nonviolent 
alternatives (Asal et al. 2013; D. E. Cunningham et al. 2017; K. G. Cunningham 2013b; 
Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Thurber 2018). These studies, however, rarely incorporate 
measures of civil society as explanatory factors in the occurrence of contentious action, 
but instead use simple proxies such as economic activity in the manufacturing sector or 
counts of international nongovernmental organizations that are headquartered in 
developed countries. Better explanations and more systematic focus on the domestic 
landscape of social organizations are necessary to clarify the role between common 
conceptions of civil society, civil conflict onset, and the form of contentious action. 
Figure 1. Counts of “Parent” or Pre-Existing Organizations 








Theory: Alternatives to Violence – Advocacy and Loss Minimization 
 Pre-existing social and civil society organizations represent a mobilization 
resource for rebellion, whether armed or unarmed. But there are several reasons why a 
stronger civil society may reduce the incidence of armed insurgency and possibly favor 
the adoption of nonviolent mass action as well. There are two in particular, and both 
involve how variation in civil society affects the viability of strategic alternatives to 
coercive violence. The first I term the “advocacy alternative,” in which pre-existing 
organizations increase the viability of institutionalized and semi-institutionalized political 
work as opposed to contentious action. The second I call the “loss minimization 
alternative,” in which civil society organizations opt for nonviolent conflict over 
comparatively more transformational and risky violent alternatives. Both of these broad 
propositions are rough distillations of two (sometimes competing) logics that accompany 
policy support for civil society, with the former justifying support for the purported 
conflict prevention properties of civil society while the latter emphasizes the ability of 
civil society to promote alternatives to violence. In this section, I first lay out the logic 
behind each of these propositions and then detail specific hypotheses that will be tested. 
Advocacy Alternative 
 Civil society is likely to reduce the onset of civil conflict and contentious action, 
whether violent or nonviolent, because the presence of many active social organizations 
furnishes the aggrieved with viable means to pursue their political or policy preferences 
through conventional political methods. This may occur through formal and observable 
institutional channels, such as the use of legal strategies, advocacy efforts, political 
endorsements to advance various state reforms, or small-scale protest efforts to call for 
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the removal of sub-national officials from positions of power. Influence can also be 
wielded through less observable but still impactful tacit negotiations and bargaining with 
states and state institutions.  
Previous studies of social movement organizations, including more conventional 
organizations that exclude protest strategies, have found that they are often successful in 
achieving a range of reforms related to labor, environmental, women’s rights, or other 
issue areas short of maximalist, anti-regime campaigns (Amenta et al. 2010; Htun and 
Weldon 2012). Elsewhere, civil society organizations have been critical in lobbying 
governments to establish national human rights institutions and support their autonomy in 
monitoring government performance in Malaysia, Nepal, and the Philippines, among 
other states (Renshaw 2012). The quality of the content and implementation of access to 
information laws in Mexico, South Africa, Bulgaria, and other countries across Latin 
America and Eastern Europe have been attributed to the strength and assertiveness of 
civil society organizations (Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006; Puddephatt, 2009). 
With regard to elections, the endorsement and work of pre-existing civil society 
organizations was critical to elections where entrenched incumbents were defeated, 
including in Senegal in 2012 and Nigeria in 2015 (Koter 2013; Suberu 2018), or, for that 
matter, in Germany in the 1930s (Berman 1997) and South Africa during the same period 
(Thompson 2001).  
Civil society organizations may also have less observable but still influential sway 
over government decisionmakers and policy. Studies of local government in China have 
found that large encompassing social organizations are associated with higher levels of 
local government spending on critical social services and better overall governance (Tsai 
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2007). Furthermore, local and village associations in Colombia and Nepal have also been 
able to influence and resist the activities by both nonstate armed groups and state security 
forces (Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Kaplan 2017). More generally, national 
leaders on down to regional and local bureaucrats often find that they need to engage 
with pre-existing social organizations in the implementation of their preferred political 
and policy agenda, and this need to instrumentalize existing social organizations to 
mobilize support and resources provides the organizations with some leverage over the 
state and bureaucracy (Migdal 2001). In many ways, then, higher numbers of civil society 
and social organizations may be able to influence and constrain state behavior to advance 
preferred policies that lessen the likelihood that an incompatibility may prompt civil 
conflict. Indeed, some studies have found evidence that pre-existing social and civil 
society organizations can reduce the likelihood that states will engage in inter-state armed 
conflict through formal and semi-formal forms of “social accountability” (Håvard Hegre, 
Bernhard, and Teorell 2019).  
 Policymakers often cite the ability of civil society organizations to advance 
“reform agendas” as a rationale for extending their support. By extension, civil society 
facilitates more conventional political processes as opposed to contentious action. In 
2019, the U.S. Agency for International Development justified its support for a “vibrant 
civil society sector” thusly: “Because civic action and engagement with government can 
result in political reform, USAID emphasizes support for civil society organizations 
whose advocacy efforts give voice to citizens and increase their inclusion in the political 
process” (USAID 2019). Similarly, the European Endowment for Democracy extends 
financial grants to many new and older civil society organizations as part of its 
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engagement with civil society. Describing one such program in Belarus, it explained that 
recipient civil society groups “are defending citizens’ interests, launching local platforms 
for civic dialogue and advocating very practical areas of legislative reform” (European 
Endowment for Democracy 2015, 34). It also describes many grantees and civil society 
groups more generally as “champions of change” and “reformist groups” that set or 
advance policy agendas even in less-than-open political contexts. From this perspective, 
civil society organizations enhance institutional methods over more confrontational and 
contentious alternatives, thereby reducing civil conflict in general – whether violent or 
nonviolent. 
Loss-Minimization Alternative 
 Policy engagement with and support for civil society organizations also frequently 
alludes to the role these entities play in mass protest campaigns. In this way, a strong civil 
society can be interpreted as helping ensure that grievance-driven civil conflicts remain 
nonviolent as opposed to violent. For example, an analysis of European support for civil 
society organizations in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey noted that among such 
groups there “is a general trend toward more informal activism and more explosive mass 
protests” (Youngs 2020), and that the EU should engage with such assertive civil society 
actors. Likewise, U.S. policy documents on civil society reference protest-led regime 
change and reform efforts. Speaking in May 2011 shortly after the dramatic changes of 
the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, President Obama declared, “Across the region, we 
intend to provide assistance to civil society, including those that may not be officially 
sanctioned, and who speak uncomfortable truths... For the fact is, real reform does not 
come at the ballot box alone” (White House 2011). Echoing this statement years later in a 
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separate speech at a roundtable on civil society issues, President Obama remarked, “civil 
society led the fight to end apartheid in South Africa.  It led the fight to bring freedom to 
Eastern Europe” (White House 2013), referencing two waves of mass nonviolent regime 
change in the 1980s. While policy engagement with civil society is often justified on the 
basis of its ability to advance advocacy, reforms, and more conventional politics, it also 
references the purported role of civil society organizations in the onset of mass 
nonviolent civil conflicts and anti-regime protest campaigns. 
There are two potential problems with this perspective. First, it seems internally 
incongruent, since civil society is embraced as a way to prevent civil conflict by 
supporting conventional advocacy efforts, yet it is acknowledged and even lauded as a 
crucial actor by which nonviolent conflict emerges. Strictly speaking, this places policy 
support for civil society in the uncomfortable position of supporting civil conflict, albeit 
nonviolent conflict. Second, it is rarely made clear why civil society organizations 
gravitate toward nonviolence as opposed to violent strategies. As discussed in the 
preceding literature review, the appropriation of pre-existing social organizations into 
armed insurgency can produce benefits in terms of performance and sustainability. Policy 
support for civil society organizations rarely explains why these groups do not direct their 
organizational resources toward violent strategies.  
I propose an explanation that is rooted in the observation that most voluntary 
organizations like civil society groups likely have inherent or functional value for their 
members – why else would such voluntary organizations exist? – and that these members 
would act to protect the organization if its continued existence is threatened. Adopting 
violent strategies and tactics, however, poses such a threat by requiring dramatic internal 
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transformation. Mounting an armed insurgency is a process that involves dramatic 
changes that may be difficult to reverse for some pre-existing organizations. Most 
voluntary civil society and social organizations are not organized in a manner that is 
immediately conducive to executing an armed insurgency. New specialized skills must be 
acquired, new organizational forms may be necessary for operational coordination, and 
fundamental aspects of the lives and experiences of an organization’s participants will be 
changed. Launching an armed insurgency involves transformational processes that 
“reconfigure social networks in a variety of ways, creating new networks, dissolving 
some, and changing the structure of others, as when the local clients of a patron are 
mobilized into an armed network with a new central figure” (E. J. Wood 2008, 540). Pre-
existing social hierarchies and long established norms and values are often entirely 
changed as armed insurgencies emerge and become dominant forces in a social context. 
To maintain themselves, armed groups “cut their activists’ other social ties and 
connections or subdue and integrate the respective social institutions” and attempt to 
“eliminate competing loyalties” (Schlichte 2009, 155).  
From the perspective of a civil society or social organization, this prospect must 
be very unappealing. Meso-mobilization into armed insurgency potentially poses an 
existential risk. The organization and the purpose it previously served may be wholly 
undermined by its transformation into an armed group, or by the emergence and 
prosecution of an armed conflict against the government that makes assembly and normal 
function impossible. This may incline groups to avoid violent mobilization, and this 
inclination may be even more heightened among more mature, embedded, and formalized 
civil society and social organizations. Such was observable in the different courses of 
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action that newer Kenyan civil society organizations pursued during the armed Mau Mau 
rebellion of the 1960s compared to similar but more established social groups in the 
Philippines that prosecuted a nonviolent uprising in the 1980s. “In Kenya, few 
established political associations existed on the eve of the [Mau Mau] episode,” 
compared to the Philippines where the long-established church was able to support a 
mass nonviolent campaign in 1986. This may be because “formal organizations may be 
more inclined to avoid violence…. The assumption here is that formal organization tends 
to imply some greater stake in the system and, thus, less willingness to deploy violence in 
the service of movement aims” lest that stake be jeopardized (McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly 2001, 121). 
 The adoption of mass nonviolence is less transformational for the organizations 
that comprise a nonviolent movement. Organizations that are mobilized into supporting 
campaigns of mass protest and noncooperation are able to return to their pre-conflict 
social settings and organizational forms with comparatively less disruption or loss of 
social structure. For instance, the church groups in the Philippines, the labor unions in 
Zambia, or the civic organizations of 1980s South Africa returned to their normal 
operations after those nonviolent conflicts ceased. The difference between the 
organizational continuity in violent and nonviolent conflicts is perhaps most 
demonstrable in the fact that not a single nonviolent conflict has prompted a 
“demobilization and reintegration” program. Nonviolent campaigns do not require 
demobilization, and in fact many remain integrated into their pre-conflict civil society 
and social organizations. When political and territorial incompatibilities do emerge, ones 
that cannot be managed through available institutional modes or forms of advocacy, the 
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comparatively less transformational nature of nonviolent methods should make them a 
more preferable alternative to armed insurgency for pre-existing civil society groups. 
 These factors imply several hypotheses about the relationship between the 
strength of civil society and the onset and form of political conflict. They are detailed 
below and divided based on whether they exemplify an “advocacy alternative” or a “loss-
minimizing alternative” explanation of civil society’s influence on contentious action. 
First, a strong civil society composed of many organizations and widespread participation 
by citizens in such organizations should reduce the onset of armed insurgency and 
increase the adoption of mass nonviolent action in the event that deep political or 
territorial incompatibilities emerge. 
 
 Armed Conflict Nonviolent Campaigns 
Advocacy 
Alternative 
Higher participation in civil society 
organizations should decrease the 
probability of armed conflict onset 
Higher participation in civil society 
organizations should decrease the 




Higher participation in civil society 
organizations should decrease the 
probability of armed conflict onset 
Higher participation in civil society 
organizations should increase the 
probability of mass nonviolent action 
 
  
The avoidance of armed conflict and preference for nonviolent alternatives is also 
likely a function of how well established such civil society organizations are.  The more 
mature and formal these entities, the more likely they are to fear the transformational 
effects of mobilizing into violent rebellion. Therefore, the older and more established the 
landscape of civil society organizations is, the less likely that armed conflict is to occur 





 Armed Conflict Nonviolent Campaigns 
Advocacy 
Alternative 
Higher numbers of more established 
civil society organizations should 
decrease the probability of armed 
conflict onset 
Higher numbers of more established 
civil society organizations should 
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The avoidance of armed conflict and adoption of nonviolent alternatives, 
however, may be influenced by some core attributes of civil society and the organizations 
that comprise it.  Homogenous groups that are comprised of single or few identity groups 
are disconnected from other social organizations and networks. As a consequence, the 
requisite mobilization potential necessary for the adoption of mass nonviolence may be 
more costly. Without broad-based connections that are inclusive of other groups, 
nonviolence may indeed be a less viable alternative method of challenging the political or 
territorial status quo. Exclusion or marginalization of identity groups may also form the 
basis for an incompatibility, or such social cleavages may be reflected in existing political 
institutional divisions that incentivize rebellion (Oberschall 1973; Putnam 2001). Thus, 
more inclusive and diverse membership in civil society organizations should reduce the 
adoption of armed insurgency and increase the use of nonviolent methods when 
incompatibilities emerge. 
 Armed Conflict Nonviolent Campaigns 
Advocacy 
Alternative 
Higher inclusivity of membership in 
civil society organizations should 
decrease the probability of armed 
conflict onset 
Higher inclusivity of membership in 
civil society organizations should 
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decrease the probability of armed 
conflict onset 
Higher inclusivity of membership in 
civil society organizations should 






 A modicum of cohesion across civil society organizations may also be a 
component of civil society’s ability to mitigate the onset of armed conflict and promote 
the viable execution of mass nonviolent campaigns. Previous research has identified that 
fragmentation of mass movements between competing sub-units often leads to the 
adoption of political violence. Such fragmentation has been a recurring source of the 
onset of armed conflict in the occupied territories of Palestine (Pearlman 2011) as well as 
the emergence of violence in Francophone Africa (Lawrence 2010). Moreover, 
competition between organizations for adherents and members has also led to the 
adoption of dramatic tactics and spectacles, including violent attacks, so as to “outbid” 
one another and emerge as a leading organization within a larger political conflict 
(Bloom 2004). This suggests that when larger organizations comprise civil society, there 
is likely a higher level of cohesion and unity within and across civil society that prevents 
such violence-inducing fragmentation. Similarly, a greater degree of pre-existing 
cohesion and unity should lower coordination problems and costs within a prospective 
nonviolent anti-status quo campaign. 
 
 Armed Conflict Nonviolent Campaigns 
Advocacy 
Alternative 
When larger organizations 
predominate in civil society, the 
probability of armed conflict onset 
should decrease 
When larger organizations predominate 
in civil society, the probability of 
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Data and Methods 
 To explore the relationship between civil society and contentious action, new 
cross-national data on civil society is combined with previously available data on armed 
conflict and mass nonviolent campaigns. Multinomial logistic regression is employed to 
analyze any association between these phenomena at the country-year level of analysis.  
 Data on civil society is obtained from version 10 of the Varieties of Democracy 
(VDEM) initiative (Coppedge et al. 2018). The VDEM dataset features over 450 
variables that capture dozens of different facets of political and social life in more than 
200 countries and autonomous regions annually from 1900 through 2017. The variables 
are calculated based on the aggregation of survey responses from country experts. Some 
of these survey questions capture country-expert perceptions of the quality and extent of 
civil society (Bernhard et al. 2017). The VDEM instructions incorporate a broad 
definition of civil society, which is consistent with previous discussion: “Civil society is 
populated by groups of citizens organized to act in pursuit of their interests, broadly 
conceived (both material and ideal). We refer to these groups of self-organized interested 
citizens as civil-society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means limited 
to, interest groups, labor unions, religious organizations, foundations, think-tanks, social 
movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental 
organizations” (Bernhard et al. 2017, 346). Specific ideological preferences or normative 
leanings toward nonviolence are not a definitional requirement of civil society in VDEM. 
A reasonably straightforward proxy for overall popular participation in civil 
society organizations is available. VDEM features a variable on a four-point ordinal scale 
that includes response options that range from negligible civil society participation, to 
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minimal participation and few organizations, to minimal participation and many 
organizations, to frequent participation among many organizations. This variable is 
recoded as a dichotomous variable, in which “frequent participation” is coded as 1 and all 
other responses are collapsed into 0. This should directly assess whether a more 
populated and dense set of civil society organizations is associated with lower levels of 
armed conflict onset or to launching mass nonviolent campaigns. Country-year scores for 
this variable are used to test the first set of hypotheses related to participation in civil 
society and contentious action. 
To test the second set of hypotheses regarding the maturity or longevity of civil 
society organizations, a new dichotomous variable is coded based on the participation 
variable. If participation remains at or above a score of 2 (“many organizations and 
minimal participation”) for five consecutive years, then this dichotomous variable is 
scored as a 1. This variable is used to examine whether a well-established, more 
formalized civil society reduces the likelihood that violent methods are adopted and/or 
increases the probability that nonviolence is employed in the event of a civil conflict. 
Several analytic techniques are used to ensure that this variable does not interfere with or 
correlate too closely with the variable from which it is derived. These are detailed in the 
results section. 
Capturing the inclusivity of membership within civil society organizations to test 
the third set of hypotheses is more complicated. No VDEM survey question explicitly 
asks whether participation in CSOs regularly includes representation across ethnic, racial, 
linguistic, or other identity groups within a country. However, country experts are asked 
to provide scores for the extent to which women are excluded from civil society 
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organizations. This score ranges on a five-point ordinal scale from almost always to 
almost never. This variable is recoded as a dichotomous variable in which scores of 
“about half the time” or higher (2 or higher) are scored as a 1, and all other options are 
collapsed as a 0. This dichotomous variable is used as a proxy to test hypothesis 2. This is 
not an ideal proxy for inclusivity of membership, but it may suffice in lieu of alternatives. 
According to the VDEM dataset, women’s civil liberties index scores and measures of 
the level of equal protection of civil liberties across all ethnic, race, or identity groups at 
the country-year level are highly correlated (ρ=0.72). Given this correlation, I assume 
that the inclusion of women in civil society organizations demonstrates overall inclusivity 
of identity-group membership across civil society. 
The VDEM dataset also features a variable that captures the typical scope or size 
of civil society organizations. One survey question asks country experts to determine 
whether “large CSOs” predominate, and their answers are averaged into a continuous 
score from 0 to 1.0. This variable is used to test the fourth set of hypotheses. The 
influence of the scope of CSOs may be contingent on the overall rate of participation in 
civil society. Thus, participation is interacted with this variable to explore this possible 
conditional effect. 
 Data on armed conflict onsets is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). Only internal or intra-state conflicts are included 
while inter-state and extra-systemic wars are excluded. An onset of an armed internal 
conflict is defined as the year when a country experiences at least 25 battle-related deaths 
in fighting between a nonstate armed group and the security forces of an internationally 
recognized state government. The violence must also be the result of a contest over the 
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political control of the state or its territorial boundaries. Data on mass nonviolent 
campaigns is obtained from version 2.0 of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and 
Outcomes (NAVCO) initiative. Under NAVCO coding thresholds, an onset of mass 
nonviolence occurs when at least two coordinated nonviolent events such as protests or 
strikes occur within 12 months of one another, each involves 1,000 or more participants, 
and the same claims or agenda are advanced at both events (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). 
 The unit of analysis is the country-year, and all available observations from the 
year 1950 through 2004 are used. According to data from the Peace Research Institute of 
Oslo, there are 7,585 country-year observations across this time period. Several issues 
reduce the number of observations available for analysis to 5,864. First, all country-years 
that feature an ongoing armed conflict or nonviolent campaign were eliminated from 
analysis to minimize potential endogeneity. Roughly 700 observations feature ongoing 
armed conflict and just under 100 involve an ongoing nonviolent campaign. Second, data 
on key control variables, such as GDP per capita, population, and regime type, are 
unavailable for approximately 600 observations and data on civil society is unavailable 
for nearly 500 some country-years. Observations often are missing for several variables 
at once. In total, this reduces available data by approximately 1,700 observations to 
5,864. 
   The loss of observations due to the exclusion of ongoing conflict years and 
missing data also results in a loss of some conflict onsets. According to the UCDP data, 
approximately 302 armed groups emerged to challenge the political or territorial status 
quo of a internationally recognized state between 1950 and 2004. However, 47 of these 
groups emerged in the same year as another armed group in the same state, and 56 other 
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armed groups emerged during an armed conflict that was already underway. Since these 
armed groups were launched during an ongoing armed conflict or contemporaneously 
with another conflict onset, they are excluded from analysis. This leaves only 199 armed 
conflict onsets from the UCDP data that are used. Of these, another 20 onsets are lost due 
to missing data among one or more independent variables, leaving just 179 armed 
conflict onsets available for analysis.  
Similar challenges lead to the exclusion of some nonviolent conflict onsets. In the 
NAVCO 2.0 data, 100 nonviolent campaigns were launched between 1950 and 2004. 
Only 63 of these were anti-regime or secessionist campaigns, and therefore are 
comparable to conventional inclusion criteria that define armed conflicts as 
incompatibilities over political control of a government or a state’s territorial boundaries. 
Anti-colonial or anti-occupation campaigns (i.e., extrasystemic conflicts) or protests over 
sub-maximal policy reforms are excluded. Additionally, 12 nonviolent campaigns were 
launched during an ongoing armed conflict, and therefore were excluded. Finally, due to 
missing data for independent variables, 4 additional nonviolent campaign onsets were lost 
for a final figure of 47 nonviolent campaign onsets used in analysis here. 
 Several other macro-level factors are included as control variables in the analysis. 
Per capita income and population have been among the most robust predictors of the 
onset of armed conflict (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; Håvard Hegre and Sambanis 2006), 
and data on these variables are drawn from the latest 2014 release from Gleditsch (2002). 
These variables are transformed to the log scale. Additionally, regime type and whether a 
country shares a border with another state experiencing armed conflict are also included 
to capture other important structural or diffusion effects (Goldstone et al. 2010; H. Hegre 
 
 41 
2014). Data on these variables are drawn from the Polity IV and the Major Episodes of 
Political Violence (MEPV) datasets, respectively. The Polity2 index variable from the 
Polity IV dataset is used and transformed into two dichotomous variables. Country-years 
with a score of 5 and above are coded as a democracy, country-years with a score 
between -5 and 5 are coded as an anocracy, and autocracies with a score less than -5 are 
held as a reference group. A count of bordering countries currently experiencing some 
“ethnic or societal” conflict is used from the MEPV dataset. This controls for the 
diffusion of armed conflict, which may lower the costs of mounting an armed insurgency 
(Salehyan 2007). Many nonviolent campaigns appear to be inspired by or receive direct 
transmission of skills and resources from nearby and recent protest movements (P. 
Ackerman and DuVall 2000; D. E. Cunningham et al. 2017), such as the color 
revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan or the Arab Spring civil resistance 
campaigns in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere. To capture this influence a variable 
codes the number of nonviolent campaign onsets in a world region (i.e., “Western 
Africa,” “South-East Asia,” “Oceania”, etc.)  using the 19 different regions delineated by 
the United Nations Statistics Division. Coding by region will better capture the ability of 
nonviolent campaigns to spread not just across shared borders but throughout a wider 
geopolitical space, such as the spread of the Arab Spring from Tunisia, to Egypt, and then 
into the Arabian peninsula in 2011 or the expansion of Georgia’s Rose Revolution to 
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004. Dissidents may also learn from past campaigns 
within their country. I include a count of the years since a termination of a past violent or 
nonviolent campaign in each country to factor in such effects. I also add a square of this 
count since the influence of such past experiences may reduce quickly over time.  
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 Two variables from VDEM are used to control for some of relational dynamics 
between the government and civil society. For example, governments often try to repress 
civil society organizations, from intimidation, detention, or the use of physical force 
against members of organizations to the use of to quasi-legal restrictions on the ability of 
organizations to register, fundraise, or operate (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). 
Such efforts, particular more forceful repression of civil society activism, may prompt 
organizations to substitute nonviolent strategic approaches for ones that draw on violent 
repertoires regardless of participation, size, or other prevailing attributes within civil 
society (K. G. Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010; Mark Irving Lichbach 1987; Pinckney 
2016). To account for contentious action that may be driven by government repression, 
VDEM’s civil society repression variable is included in modeling analysis. By contrast, 
certain government leaders or institutions may be more inclined to proactively engage 
with civil society in policymaking, effectively making the choice to institutionalize civil 
society regardless of its strength or structure. VDEM features a variable that accounts for 
how frequently civil society is included in policymaking, and this is also used to control 
for a government’s outward inclusion of civil society.  
To reduce issues of simultaneity, all variables other than the count of years since 
past conflicts are lagged two years. For all country-year observations, dummy variables 
are coded per Hegre and Sambanis (2006) for each decade and for geopolitical region to 
control for factors that may influence onset or type of contentious action separate from 
other included controls. Descriptive statistics for civil society and key control variables 





Table 1.1.  Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory and Control Variables 
 
 Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl (25) Pctl (75) Max 
 CSO Participation 5,864 0.222 0.416 0 0 0 1 
Sustained CSO Participation 5,864 0.462 0.499 0 0 1 1 
CSO Inclusivity/Diversity (Gender) 5,864 0.763 0.425 0 1 1 1 
Large CSOs Predominate 5,864 0.309 0.260 0.000 0.111 0.500 1.000 
CSOs Consulted in Policymaking 5,864 0.722 0.756 0 0 1 2 
Gov Repression of CSOs 5,864 1.668 1.352 0 0 3 4 
Democracy (dichotomous) 5,864 0.387 0.487 0 0 1 1 
Anocracy (dichotomous) 5,864 0.144 0.351 0 0 0 1 
Armed Conflicts in Bordering States 5,864 0.689 1.024 0 0 1 7 
Nonviolent Campaign in Region 5,864 0.053 0.247 0 0 0 3 
GDP Per Capita 5,864 8,142.59 20,651.39 132.82 1,461.35 9,354.08 632,239.50 
Population (1,000s of persons) 5,864 26,310.15 94,663.08 118.21 2,523.10 17,855.25 1,263,413.00 
  
 A multinomial logistic regression technique is employed for analysis. This is 
consistent with previous theoretical work that has conceptualized armed rebellion, mass 
political protest, engaging in conventional politics, or abstaining from any form activism 
as separate courses of action whose adoption may be influenced in part by structural 
conditions (Chenoweth and Lawrence 2010; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Sharp et 
al. 2005). Since many conflicts are nonviolent and do not feature armed insurgency, and 
others feature only armed rebellion without mass nonviolent tactics, there appears to be 
no natural ordering of these types of contentious action. With multiple possible outcome 
variables and no clear rank arrangement among them, the multinomial technique is most 
appropriate (Long 1997). It also aligns with previous analysis that has explored how 
factors might affect the adoption of violent and nonviolent methods, albeit most of these 
test different explanatory variables and/or operate at a different levels of analysis (Asal et 
al. 2013; Butcher and Svensson 2016; D. E. Cunningham et al. 2017; K. G. Cunningham 
2013b; Thurber 2018). The three possible outcomes in the multinomial model include the 
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onset of a nonviolent campaign, the onset of an armed conflict, or the absence of either. 
The latter may signify several possible outcomes, including satisfaction with the 
prevailing political or territorial status quo, a preference for institutionalized politics to 
advance preferred reforms or changes, or a decision to disengage from politics despite 
existing grievances. 
 The analytic approach used here does have important limitations. First, the 
analysis focuses on a high level of aggregation, contrary to some trends in conflict studies 
to concentrate on dyads of state and nonstate actors or on specific insurgent organizations 
(Cederman and Gleditsch 2009; D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). 
However, it does allow for a focus on the conditions that may influence conflict onset as 
opposed to the dynamics of ongoing conflict or existing dyads of contention. The analysis 
may overlook important sources of causal heterogeneity within civil society. By lumping 
together many different types of organizations, potentially with different interests and 
capabilities, salient differences may be overlooked or counteract one another, producing 
null results where important causal effects are present. Nonetheless, the approach may 
unearth important structural features of civil society, shared sources of influence that are 
present across many types of civil society organizations, and test broad assumptions 
about the relationship between civil society and civil conflicts.  
 
Model Output and Analysis 
 Model results provide only some support for the influence of civil society on civil 
conflict onset or the form of contentious action. I review them in three parts. First, I 
evaluate the coefficient estimates produced from the multinomial logistic regression 
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output. Second, to more rigorously evaluate their potential relationship on the onset of 
armed conflict and nonviolent campaigns I use a bootstrapping procedure to estimate the 
marginal effects of several civil society variables on these outcomes. The results indicate 
that only the existence of an established and mature collection of civil society 
organizations consistently affects the onset of armed insurgency. No other variable of 
interest appears to positively or negatively influence the incidence of nonviolent 
campaigns or armed conflict. Lastly, I discuss several procedures used to check the 
robustness of the model output. 
 Output from several multinomial logistic regression model specifications is 
displayed in Table 1.2 and a plot of coefficient estimates from the preferred specification 
that includes all explanatory and control variables is available in Figure 1.2. Geographic 
and temporal control variables are not displayed but were included in all model runs. To 
establish baselines for comparison and reveal whether loss of observations due to missing 
data was skewing results, initial models were run first with control variables only (M1) 
and then with all civil society variables and no controls (M2). Output in M1 is fairly 
consistent with previous empirical analyses of the onset of nonviolent campaigns and 
armed conflict (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; K. G. Cunningham 2013b; Håvard Hegre 
and Sambanis 2006), suggesting that loss of data due to missing observations is not 
skewing results. The third model in Table 1.1 (M3) features a specification containing all 
civil society and control variables together. Coefficient estimates for most civil society 
and control variables are fairly consistent across M1, M2, and M3, though there are three 
notable exceptions. Across the models the statistical significance and the calculated value 
of the participation coefficient on armed conflict onset increases, while the coefficient 
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value and statistical significance of the diversity/gender variable on nonviolent campaign 
onset falls. These shifts could be an indication of bias or inefficiency resulting from 
collinearity. However, the changes in the coefficient values are small and may be a result 
of the inclusion of appropriate controls. Further detailed analysis of collinearity is 
discussed below, though for the most part the modeling output appears stable. 
Figure 1.2 contains coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for M3. Few of 
the estimates display a statistically significant relationship with the onset of mass 
nonviolent campaigns. An increase in popular participation in civil society organizations 
is not consistently associated with an increase in the log odds of a nonviolent conflict 
onset. Even when participation is sustained and formalized in more established 
organizations, nonviolent campaign occurrence appears no more likely. Neither do 
predominantly large civil society organization reduce the probability of a nonviolent 
campaign occurrence, nor when these organizations feature high participation (interaction 
term). Only the degree of inclusivity among civil society organizations approaches a 
consistently positive relationship with the onset of mass nonviolence campaigns, though 
this estimate does not cross even low levels of confidence (! = 0.10). Overall, the model 
results appear to contradict claims that a stronger civil society lays the basis for or 
influences the adoption of nonviolence.  The initial model output does not provide 
support for the “lesser-evil alternative” hypotheses.  
 The output provides mixed support for the potential of civil society to mitigate 
political violence. A mature and established civil society does reduce the likelihood of 
armed conflict onset. However, inclusivity and the size of civil society do not 
consistently reduce the probability of armed conflict onset. This runs contrary to 
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theoretical expectations. More concerning is the potential that high levels of participation 
in civil society are associated with the onset of armed conflict, though the coefficient 
estimate for this variable is significant at only a low level (! = 0.10) and appears 
somewhat unstable across model estimates. Additional techniques below further explore 
this relationship. Overall, no civil society variable appears to simultaneously influence 
the onset of armed conflict and nonviolent campaigns, a further indication that variation 
in civil society may not prompt a shift in methods of contentious action and a lack of 
support for the “lesser-evil alternative” explanation offered here.  
A bootstrapping procedure combined with the observed-values approach of 
calculating predicted probabilities was employed to calculate the marginal effect of each 
civil society variable on the onset of contentious action (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). 
This procedure can provide a more precise assessment of the relationship between 
explanatory variables and observed outcomes, potentially revealing significant and 
substantive effects that are lost when the uncertainty around coefficient estimates are 
ignored or control variables are held at mean values to calculate marginal effects. Table 
1.3 displays the difference in the mean predicted probabilities of armed conflict or 
nonviolent campaign onset for a simulated one-unit increase in each civil society variable 
using the bootstrap procedure. Since most variables are dichotomous, this is a simulated 
increase from lowest value to highest for each civil society variable. The “Large CSOs” 
variable is continuous, and so the marginal effect here is calculated as a simulated one 
standard deviation increase in the observed value of this variable. All other variables are 
held at observed values.  Figure 1.3 provides a visualization of these calculated marginal 
effects of changes in civil society on civil conflict onset for several variables.  
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Table 1.2. Output for Multinomial Logistic Regression Models 
 M1 M2 M3 
  









CSO Participation   
0.598 0.261 0.819* -0.101 
  (0.410) (0.926) (0.456) (1.028) 
       
Sustained CSO Participation   
-0.572*** -0.420 -0.602*** 0.055 
  (0.197) (0.408) (0.201) (0.460) 
       
CSO Inclusivity (Gender)   
-0.160 0.931** -0.010 0.827 
  (0.181) (0.466) (0.191) (0.515) 
       
Large CSOs Predominate   
0.465 0.447 0.512 0.381 
  (0.368) (0.712) (0.394) (0.734) 
CSOs Consulted on Policy 
  -0.333* -0.615 -0.351* -0.294 
  (0.172) (0.379) (0.181) (0.403) 
Gov Represses CSOs 
  -0.030 0.181 0.059 -0.196 
  (0.088) (0.180) (0.097) (0.228) 
Participation: 
Large CSOs (Interaction) 
  -0.967 -2.367 -1.636 -1.547 
  (0.904) (2.102) (0.998) (2.400) 
Armed Conflict in Bordering 
States 
0.098 0.073   0.089 0.091 
(0.074) (0.166)   (0.075) (0.168) 
Nvlt Campaign in Region 
0.348 1.106***   0.367 1.138*** 
(0.260) (0.271)   (0.260) (0.273) 
GDP Per Cap (log) 
-0.322*** 0.076   -0.291
*** 0.065 
(0.109) (0.257)   (0.113) (0.265) 
Democracy  
-0.192 -2.532***   0.421 -2.524
*** 
(0.225) (0.612)   (0.281) (0.847) 
Anocracy 
0.488** -0.036   0.731
*** -0.181 
(0.192) (0.409)   (0.216) (0.459) 
       
Population (log) 
0.324*** 0.327**   0.306
*** 0.308** 
(0.059) (0.128)   (0.061) (0.135) 
       Years Since Nvlt 
Termination  
0.022 -0.037   0.029 -0.046 
(0.044) (0.089)   (0.045) (0.093) 
Years Since Armed Conflict 
Termination 
-0.077* 0.090*   -0.086** 0.083 
(0.040) (0.054)   (0.040) (0.054) 
Years Since Nvlt 
Termination (Sq) 
-0.001 -0.003   -0.0003 -0.003 
(0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Years Since Armed Conflict 
Termination (Sq) 
-0.0003 0.002   -0.0003 0.002 
(0.001) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 
-3.366*** -7.738*** -2.831*** - 5.000*** -3.561
*** -7.624*** 
(1.052) (2.442) (0.391) (0.810) (1.150) (2.598) 
 Observations 5,864 5,864 5,864 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,101.881 2,101.881 2,205.832 2,205.832 2,042.249 2,042.249 





Only one civil society variable demonstrates any significant or substantive impact 
on conflict onset. Sustained CSO participation reduces the onset of armed conflict by 
1.71 percentage points. This reduction is substantial considering that the probability of an 
armed conflict in most country-years is often well under 10 percent. This effect is 
displayed in the upper right corner of Figure 3. The calculated effect is actually greater 
than a one standard deviation increase in the real GDP per capita of a country-year, which 
only reduces armed conflict onset by 1.5 percentage points. The existence of a well-
established network of active civil society organizations in a country appears to have a 
strong negative relationship with the onset of armed conflict. An established civil society 
does appear to have conflict mitigating or prevention properties. However, the existence 
of these same organizations is not associated with the incidence of mass nonviolent 
campaigns. The change in the probability of a mass nonviolent campaign from an 
increase the existence of a sustained and established group of civil society organizations 







Table 1.3. Marginal Effects (Difference in Mean Values of 
Bootstrapped Probabilities) of Civil Society on Conflict Onset, With 95% CIs 
 Armed Conflict Nonviolent Campaign 











Participation 1.58% -0.95% 4.10% -0.20% -1.52% 1.12% 
Inclusivity/Diversity -0.07% -1.23% 1.09% 0.56% -0.10% 1.22% 
Sustained Participation -1.71% -2.78% -0.63% 0.11% -0.79% 1.01% 
Large CSOs 0.27% -0.34% 0.88% 0.10% -0.34% 0.53% 
Participation:Large 
CSOs (Interaction) 0.49% -1.52% 2.49% -0.35% -1.69% 1.00% 
 
Figure 1.3. Histograms Comparing Marginal Effects of  
Select Civil Society Variables on Civil Conflict Onset, Form 






 No other civil society variable displays a strong influence on the onset of civil 
conflicts, whether armed or nonviolent. However, the effect of high participation in civil 
society on armed conflict onset is somewhat puzzling. In Figure 1.3, the distribution of 
bootstrapped probabilities of armed conflict onset amid high levels of civil society 
participation is highly positively skewed – especially when compared to the far more 
normally distributed probabilities with low levels of civil society participation. Several 
explanations are possible for this. A certain subset of the sample of observations with 
high levels of participation in civil society may also include variables that increase the 
predicted probability of onset, such as low levels of GDP per capita, high population, or 
anocratic governance systems. However, a brief comparison of the distribution of these 
variables across observations with and without high-predicted probabilities of onset amid 
high civil society participation does not indicate that these are different. Relatedly, 
problems of collinearity may lead to inflated parameter estimates for certain variables, 
which in turn produces high predicted probabilities of armed conflict onset. 
Several approaches were employed to explore such collinearity and the robustness 
of model output in general. First, variance inflation factors were calculated for the M3 
model. No scores were in excess of 10 for any civil society variable, suggesting 
collinearity is not strongly influencing coefficient estimates. Still, there is a degree of 
inevitable collinearity in a model that contains interaction terms, particularly those that 
feature dichotomous components. Indeed, when a version of M3 is rerun excluding the 
interaction term, the coefficient estimate for the effect of civil society participation on 
armed conflict decreases substantially and becomes non-significant. This may explain the 





indicates that civil society participation does not consistently influence the onset of armed 
civil conflicts. 
Aspects of civil society may correlate with one another or with other prevailing 
political conditions within a state, such as regime type or degree of modernization and 
wealth. To test whether this may be a source of collinearity that affected coefficient 
estimates, I ran several alternative model specifications. First, I ran versions of M3 
without regime type variables, and none of the results produced significantly different 
coefficient estimates. I then used specifications that excluded GDP and population data. 
These estimates for the civil society variables were also largely similar to M3. Civil 
society attributes may correlate with one another, and so I ran several model 
specifications that included just a single civil society attribute along with all control 
variables. I also ran specifications with no regime type variables and just single civil 
society variables. None of these results produced coefficient estimates that differ 
substantially from M3. Overall, collinearity does not appear to be influencing modeling 
output. Relevant model output is included in an appendix. 
Several other model robustness checks were also employed. Using the same 
specification as model M3, the multinomial logit procedure was rerun using the higher 
1,000-battle-deaths threshold of civil war onset common in other studies of armed 
conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Goldstone et al. 2010). Most coefficient estimates do 
not change as a result, though the significance of established and sustained civil society 
organizations decreases. This does align with my theory, however. Formalized and 
established civil society groups seek to reduce the onset of any armed conflict but may be 





groups may have already been dispersed as preceding violence approached 1,000 battle 
deaths. Another model specification was employed to explore whether the small number 
of nonviolent campaigns included in the dataset was producing skewed results. 
Specifically, the conditions around one or several campaigns may have been exerting 
high leverage or influence over the coefficient estimates. Model M3 was rerun 46 
separate times with one campaign excluded in each iteration to explore whether specific 
campaigns were skewing coefficient estimates. None of the resulting coefficient 
estimates changed in the statistical significance across any of the 46 sets of model output. 
In summary, the model output was robust to several different model specifications.  
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 Two broad explanations were offered for the potential influence that civil society 
and pre-existing social organizations exert on the onset of armed conflict or the adoption 
of mass nonviolent campaigns. First, a strong civil society may support forms of 
institutional and semi-institutional advocacy efforts to advance political and policy 
reforms, thereby reducing the need to engage in contentious action. In this sense, a strong 
civil society prevents civil conflict in all its forms. Second, in the event that grievances 
and circumstances do prompt some form of contentious challenge to the political or 
territorial status quo, the transformational consequences of adopting armed insurgency 
should prompt pre-existing civil society and social organizations to apply their 
mobilization resources toward mass nonviolent methods as a “loss-minimization” 





 Systematic analysis of the role of civil society in civil conflicts provides very 
limited support for either of these explanations. Table 1.4 reviews the attributes of civil 
society examined here, their hypothesized effects on civil conflicts and contentious 
action, and the resulting findings. Only one aspect of civil society – how mature or 
established civil society organizations are – appears to reduce the occurrence of armed 
civil conflicts. However, no other variable is associated with a change in the probability 
of either armed conflict and nonviolent campaign onset. More surprisingly, none are 
associated with both a reduction in armed conflict and an increase in nonviolent methods. 
The possible broad-based effects of civil society on nonviolent campaigns in particular 
remain negligible. Together, these findings yield no clear support for either the 
“advocacy” or “loss minimization” explanations of how civil society influences 
contentious action. An established civil society appears to consistently reduce the onset 
of armed civil conflicts, but it neither consistently increases nor decreases mass 
nonviolent action. 
 
Table 1.4. Summary Model Results, Hypotheses, and Theoretical Explanations 
 
Variable 















Sustained CSOs - - - None Mixed Support 
Inclusivity - None - None Unsupported 
Large CSOs - None - None Unsupported 




Sustained CSOs - - + None Mixed Support 
Inclusivity - None + None Unsupported 






This relationship may occur as the result of several possible causal mechanisms. 
First, established civil society organizations may be opting for advocacy efforts to 
advance their reform or regime change preferences. With more experience and age, these 
organizations may have already developed stronger connections with or leverage over 
state institutions and/or officials, thereby increasing their preference to lobby preferred 
issues through institutional or semi-institutional channels. If operative, however, this 
mechanism should likely be reducing the onset of nonviolent campaigns as well. Second, 
these organizations opt not to resort to armed rebellion due to the broader disruption and 
losses this would entail to their status as well established civil society organizations. This 
does not forestall the ability of other dissident groups to rebel. These more established 
organizations may actively work to prevent other aggrieved constituencies from resorting 
to political violence. Perhaps through their membership or broader legitimacy these older 
organizations are able to isolate and ostracize would-be rebel leaders or undermine their 
ability to mobilize support and resources. By redirecting resources away from armed 
rebellion, they spare themselves the wider negative consequences of civil war onset. 
Under all three possible causal mechanisms, experienced and older organizations may be 
incentivized to eschew or reduce armed conflict given the organizational gains they have 
developed in an environment free from the widespread disruption that accompanies 
political violence. Regardless of its causal operation, the negative relationship between 
these established civil society organizations and a lower likelihood of armed civil conflict 
is fairly robust. 
Such a finding should encourage advocates of policy engagement with civil 





society groups may reduce the onset of political violence more than even large increases 
in per capita income. But there are additional findings that should give such advocates 
pause. Contrary to expectations, participation in civil society organizations is not 
associated with conflict onset reduction. In fact, high participation in civil society is not 
entirely without risk, however. Based on the bootstrapping technique, high levels of civil 
society participation may be associated with higher probabilities for armed civil conflict 
in certain but unclear conditions.  
Another finding that runs contrary to indications from other case study work 
(Pearlman 2011; Thurber 2018) is that neither the size of civil society organizations nor 
their inclusivity or diversity bears any consistent relationship with either form of 
contentious action. Even large civil society organizations with high participation do not 
seem to influence the onset of mass nonviolent campaigns, though such a resource would 
seem critical to the high-mobilization demands of mass protest strategies. While the 
inclusivity and diversity of organizations would also seem to create recruitment pathways 
to larger pools of the population, this factor does not appear to influence the emergence 
of nonviolent dissident campaigns. At least two possible reasons may explain these 
ambiguous results. First, as has been pointed out by others, structural factors may prove 
less critical to mass nonviolent campaigns than agentic or at-the-moment strategic 
decisions of nonviolent dissident leaders (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder 2017; Sharp et al. 2005). This is still hard to reconcile with claims from many 
nonviolent action scholars that good nonviolent dissident leaders ally with pre-existing 
social organizations to mount successful campaigns (P. Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; 





operationalization of the underlying concepts. The use of gender inclusion as an overall 
proxy for inclusivity and diversity in civil society organizations may be an inappropriate 
one. Better data on civil society is needed to truly evaluate broader forms of inclusivity 
regarding religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other commonly salient identity features. Still, 
that gender inclusion does not appear to influence forms of contentious action in the 
modeling here contradicts findings in other studies that explore how inclusion serves as a 
normative and ideological constraints on the targeting of others with violence and 
suggests the need for further examination (Asal et al. 2013). Overall, much of the 
modeling output does not reinforce policy expectations about civil society and 
contentious action. Policymakers may benefit from revisiting their engagement with civil 
society with regards to conflict prevention and management. The linkages at the macro 
level are less clear than is often assumed. 
One additional implication from the model output is less directly related to civil 
society’s relationship with civil conflict and contentious action. The results from M3 and 
several other analyses of armed and nonviolent civil conflicts all indicate that democratic 
forms of governance have a strong negative association with mass nonviolent campaigns 
when compared to autocratic states, but that no concomitant relationship between 
democratic governances and armed conflict exists (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; K. G. 
Cunningham 2013b). The measured effect of democratic governance on nonviolent 
campaigns is also far greater than any other variable, suggesting how important this 
feature is for mass nonviolence. The results imply that many of those who would employ 
nonviolent strategies to challenge the political or territorial status quo of a state are 





institutions and conventional politics. By contrast, the lack of a significant effect of 
democracy on armed insurgency suggests that would-be armed actors may be less willing 
or able to operate through democratic institutions if the opportunity exists. The presence 
of democracy seems less pertinent to their behavior. Why? One possibility is that the 
groups that gravitate toward armed insurgency are different from those that employ 
nonviolent strategies in important ways. They may have different views of the feasibility, 
accessibility, or efficacy of operating through democratic institutions when they are 
available. Additionally, if these groups are different in how they view the viability of 
conventional politics and democratic institutions, then it is possible that they also view 
armed insurgency and nonviolence as less interchangeable or comparable than is often 
assumed in many theoretical or empirical analyses, including this one.  
It should be reemphasized that contrary to trends in conflict studies, the analysis 
here operates at the macro level. The data codes civil society attributes as static state-
level aggregates, and this may overlook important nuances, including variation in civil 
society participation within the state and interaction among civil society groups and with 
their opponents. For example, it may be that in some states high civil society participation 
could be concentrated in areas where grievances remain low, while organization is less 
common in marginalized and alienated communities. By contrast, in other states 
organization may be prevalent in certain high-grievance geographical areas and 
increasing the ability of aggrieved actors to engage in nonviolent or armed rebellions. 
The data here would not be able to adequately capture these substantive differences and 
would instead indicate that there is no consistent relationship between civil society 





of specific civil society organizations, but only to the overarching landscape of civil 
society groups. And how CSO-government relations evolve during iterative interaction 
cannot be examined with this data and analytic technique. While the robustness checks 
employed ensure that the results are valid to different model specifications and 
sufficiently free from any influence associated with collinearity, they do not compensate 
for potential variation within the state, across civil society groups, or relational dynamics. 
The tests and level of analysis used in the model are congruent with the assumptions 
voiced by policymakers, but important linkages between civil society and violent and 
nonviolent conflict remain unexamined.     
 The ambiguity in some of the modeling output could be improved with more 
detailed data. More precise information on the composition of civil society and social 
organizations may alter the results. If different social organizations are inclined toward 
different forms of contentious action, then this causal heterogeneity may be contributing 
to some of the mixed or inconsistent results produced here. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that different types of organizations interact differently with distinct types of 
political environments (Schofer and Longhofer 2011). Variables that decompose civil 
society by the balance of youth, women’s, labor, or professional associations, to name a 
few common examples of civil society organizations, and the degree of participation 
within these groups would furnish the ability to better understand how types of civil 
society organizations and combinations thereof contribute differently to forms of 
contentious action. Additionally, the VDEM data often lumps distinct aspects of civil 
society into single variables. More precise and focused data on the number of participants 





organizations would allow for clearer analysis. Currently these two aspects are combined 
into one variable. While VDEM includes data on the size and breadth of CSOs, additional 
information on their geographic concentration or spread particularly across urban and 
rural areas, the frequency with which they cooperate or collaborate with other CSOs, and 
how often they autonomously lobby state institutions would help unpack some previously 
noted important dynamics they could influence how civil society influences the incidence 
and form of civil conflicts.  
More precise outcome variables would also increase the ability to isolate how 
variation in civil society influences different forms of political behavior, specifically 
whether they engage in contentious action such as armed conflict or mass nonviolent 
campaigns, resort to advocacy efforts and institutional politics, or disengage in general 
and opt not to act on their political preferences. The data used here is less able to 
differentiate between these possible explanations. A more precise and discerning 
outcome variable is needed to do so, one that includes options for armed insurgency, 
mass nonviolence, or conventional politics alongside a “do nothing” base case.   
Such data improvements would provide greater insights into the relationship 
between civil society and forms of contentious action. The results here do provide some 
support for policy engagement with civil society organizations as a means to prevent 
political violence, but also caution policymakers from imbuing these entities with 






Chapter 3: Interdependence and Methods of Resistance in Civil 
Conflict: The Influence of Loss Aversion in the Case of 1980s 
South Africa 
 
Abstract: Studies of dissident behavior have identified a variety of factors 
that may influence the adoption of nonviolent over violent strategies and 
tactics. One popular explanation draws on concepts of interdependence to 
argue that politically excluded constituencies are more likely to use mass 
nonviolence amid civil conflict because economic ties and shared interests 
with elites avail them of powerful latent noncooperation capabilities. This 
paper argues that this is an insufficient explanation for the adoption of 
nonviolence. It extends the interdependence model and argues that an 
additional causal mechanism underlying interdependence motivates the 
adoption of mass nonviolence and discourages the use of violent 
strategies: loss aversion. The paper employs process tracing to 
demonstrate empirically the operation of this causal mechanism on the 
forms of anti-regime methods and strategies used by multiple voluntary 
organizations during South Africa’s anti-apartheid movement of the 
1980s.  
 
Why are some insurgencies waged as violent armed internal conflicts while others 
draw primarily on strategies of mass nonviolent action? Previous studies of nonviolent 
action campaigns and armed insurgencies have offered a variety of explanations for the 
initiation of such conflicts and the strategies adopted to execute them. One common 
explanation among them draws on interdependence theory to argue that certain 
constituencies in society can leverage pre-existing economic relationships with political 
and economic elites to engage in effective nonviolent noncooperation. For example, 
many industrializing states have large, labor-intensive, and concentrated manufacturing 
sectors and therefore a pre-formed network of organized labor. Because of its importance 
to industrial and overall economic output, these labor organizations can more easily 





This, in turn, allows labor constituencies to coerce significant structural reforms and 
political accommodations without resort to armed conflict.  
While interdependence offers a plausible theoretical framework for explaining the 
adoption of nonviolence in civil conflicts, I argue that previous interdependence models 
of dissident behavior are incomplete. Specifically, the logic and causal mechanism 
implied in these explanations – noncooperation viability – still leaves open several 
pathways to violence. I propose an additional, complementary causal mechanism to 
complete the applicability of interdependence theory to nonviolent civil conflict: loss 
aversion. Among many constituencies with high economic interdependence and political 
grievances, there is often not only a substantial capability for disruptive nonviolent tactics 
such as strikes and boycotts but also high cost vulnerabilities to the adoption of armed 
militancy. As a consequence of this combination of capabilities and vulnerabilities, these 
constituencies adopt nonviolence and avoid violence. In the absence of a loss aversion 
mechanism, however, noncooperation viability is insufficient for explaining the 
avoidance of violent strategies and tactics given many assumptions about dissident 
behavior common in nonviolent action and armed insurgency scholarship. I argue that 
this expanded interpretation of interdependence and the complementary mechanisms of 
noncooperation viability and loss aversion better explain the sole adoption of and 
adherence to nonviolent strategies.  
To explain these mechanisms empirically, I employ process tracing to analyze the 
behavior of various sets of social organizations in the case of South Africa during the 
1980s. South Africa’s experience during the 1980s offers useful within-case variation. 





as well as periods of more emergent violent protests all seeking to displace the incumbent 
government and apartheid system of governance. Additionally, while more than three 
quarters of all South Africans were politically excluded from the apartheid system, within 
this group there were significant differences in terms of employment status and economic 
position. By examining how various social organizations and constituencies within the 
politically excluded population of black South Africans engaged in different strategies of 
resistance, it is possible to compare and isolate the causal mechanisms that influenced 
which anti-regime strategies were adopted: violent, nonviolent, or a mixture of both.  
Broadly speaking, constituencies and organizations composed of black South 
Africans who were more economically integrated in terms of their income, assets, and 
employment prospects, and therefore more interdependent with political and economic 
elite interests, were not only better able to engage in noncooperation but also disinclined 
to participate in or materially support violence. By contrast, some constituencies that 
were less economically integrated engaged in impactful noncooperation but also 
supported different forms of violence, including armed insurgency. Others, particularly 
youth organizations whose members were primarily unemployed, often self-mobilized 
into armed insurgency, were regular participants in violent protests, or founded local 
militia. Among those groups that adhered predominantly to nonviolence, both 
noncooperation viability and loss aversion were activated by high levels of 
interdependence with elites.  
This paper is organized in seven parts. First, I review previous explanations of the 
adoption of nonviolent methods over armed insurgency in anti-regime and secessionist 





one of these previous theories. Specifically, it lays out the role of loss aversion within 
models of interdependence and strategy selection in civil conflicts. The third section 
explains the selection of South Africa as a case, the suitability of process tracing to 
analyze this case, the data used in analysis, and the precise outcomes of interest and 
operationalization of interdependence. The fourth section provides descriptive 
background on the various anti-regime campaigns in South Africa during the 1980s and 
the fifth section discusses the prevailing economic conditions for black South Africans. 
The sixth section comprises the bulk of the analysis. It explains how differing economic 
positions and levels of economic interdependence among black South African 
constituencies and social organizations influenced whether they materially supported 
armed insurgency. It emerges that loss aversion was an important inhibiting factor among 
groups that focused solely on nonviolence, but even some groups that were plausibly 
capable of noncooperation still extended some material support to violent groups. The 
sixth section also engages with potential alternative explanation of behavior during this 
period, drawing on the arguments laid out in the literature review. The seventh section 
concludes by proposing some possible policy implications of this research as well as 
remaining unanswered lines of inquiry.   
 
Literature Review:  Nonviolence, Disruption, and Inconsistent Assumptions 
This section reviews previous studies and explanations of mass nonviolent action 
and armed insurgency to achieve three goals. First, it describes two shared assumptions 
that underlay many studies of nonviolent action: 1) nonviolent campaigns are coercive 





and 2) they are strategic, rational actors that use nonviolence for instrumental and amoral 
reasons. I argue that these assumptions are difficult to reconcile with these campaigns’ 
singular reliance on nonviolent methods of resistance. Second, I review three possible 
explanations for this reliance on nonviolent methods that are common in nonviolent 
action literature: 1) the participation advantage; 2) pre-existing social organization; and 
3) interdependence. Some possible limits within these explanations are then discussed. 
Third, I review two other common explanations of nonviolent protest onset that are 
common in broader literature on civil wars, political violence, and social movements. I 
summarize this section with a table covering all five of these theoretical explanations, 
their related causal mechanisms, and some relevant limitations. 
During the 20th century and the first few decades of the 21st there have been 
dozens of primarily mass nonviolent campaigns seeking to unseat incumbent 
governments, to oust occupying forces, or to alter the territorial boundaries of 
internationally recognized states through the use of peaceful protests, boycotts, strikes, or 
sit-ins. Prominent examples include successful protest movements in the Philippines, 
Zambia, Guatemala, and Ukraine, among others. By one measure, about half of these 
nonviolent campaigns achieved their goals (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). These 
campaigns have been described as “functional equivalents” of armed insurgencies 
(Schock 2013), given that they broadly share maximalist anti-status quo objectives. 
While some of these campaigns appear to mix tactics, drawing on both nonviolent 
repertoires as well as more purposely violent and destructive methods, many more – over 
80 campaigns since 1945 – have maintained more a less a singular focus on mass 





comparative impacts of these campaigns and their origins (A. Braithwaite and 
Braithwaite 2018; Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Nepstad 2015).  
Before reviewing previous scholarship on nonviolent action, it is worth reviewing 
the fuzzy temporal scope condition of this concept. An increasingly common unit of 
analysis or observation when studying nonviolent action is the campaign (Chenoweth and 
Lewis 2013). A campaign features repeated use of nonviolent tactics often by a named 
organization or leadership cadre in an effort to advance demands against the political or 
territorial status quo of an internationally recognized state. This requires explaining not 
just the adoption of nonviolence at the moment of campaign onset but why and how 
actors reevaluate their campaign and remain nonviolent through the course of a civil 
conflict. Without this more expansive explanation, arguments about nonviolent action 
risk focusing on just those factors influencing the selection of tactics for a single event, 
not a campaign. As a result, the arguments advanced here and many of the relevant 
scholarly works reviewed sometimes emphasize the origins of nonviolent campaigns 
while others identify factors that influence switching from nonviolent to violent strategies 
during ongoing civil conflicts. Considering both onset and the dynamic process of civil 
conflict is required to better understand the salient features that lead to the adoption of 
nonviolent methods. The subsequent theory section provides a diagrammatic explanation 
of these scope conditions and the relevant outcomes of interest and explanatory processes 
that are investigated in the analysis here.  
The most prominent theoretical and empirical works on nonviolent action share 
several core assumptions (P. Ackerman and DuVall 2000; P. Ackerman and Kruegler 





al. 2005; Zunes, Asher, and Kurtz 1999). First, studies assume that these nonviolent 
campaigns are driven by a strategic, rationalist logic rather than a normative one. 
“Strategic nonviolent resistance can be distinguished from principled nonviolence, which 
is grounded in religious and ethically based injunctions against violence” (Stephan and 
Chenoweth 2008, 10). The adoption and application of nonviolent strategies is instead 
more commonly driven by a focus on objectives, effectiveness, and functionalism. “In 
most cases, people who wage nonviolent struggle are doing so instrumentally, rather than 
because of a moral commitment to avoid arms” (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 
273). Ackerman and Kruegler similarly explain that a rationalist logic grounds nonviolent 
campaigns: “most of the known cases of nonviolent struggle have been motivated by the 
need to defeat a particular opponent with the most effective and least costly means at 
hand” (1994, 4). Schock described the majority of instances when nonviolent strategies 
were adopted as the “pragmatic approach” to the conflict (Schock 2005, 37). Nonviolent 
strategies and tactics are adopted because of their perceived efficacy and efficiency, not 
because their users are pacifists or inherently opposed to the use of force and violence. 
More specifically, the adoption of and adherence to nonviolent strategies is a strategic 
one that focuses on ends and means and is compatible with rational actor assumptions 
and explanations of behavior.  
Another central assumption of these works is that nonviolent strategies achieve 
their objectives by generating disruption, thereby coercing their opponents to 
accommodate their demands or to collapse entirely (Sharp 1973). “If violence works 
because it is disruptive, and since nonviolent action has the potential to be as disruptive 





some context” (Schock 2005, 48). Chenoweth and Stephan also explain “Although 
nonviolent resistors eschew the threat or use of violence, the ‘peaceful’ designation often 
given to nonviolent movements belies the often highly disruptive nature of organized 
nonviolent resistance. Nonviolent resistance achieves demands against the will of the 
opponent by seizing control of the conflict through widespread noncooperation and 
defiance” (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 10). They continue elsewhere by explaining 
that, rather than relying on arms, “the systematic application of nonviolent sanctions by 
large numbers of people allow nonviolent campaigns to maximize leverage over their 
adversaries, even when their adversaries appear to have an advantage in terms of military 
prowess, resources, and other forms of power…The results of sustained disruption 
include the failure of the government to perform basic functions, a decline in GDP, 
investment, and tax revenues, loss of power by government elites, and the breakdown of 
the normal order of society” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 41). This characterization of 
the disruption nonviolent action seeks to generate is remarkably similar to that of armed 
insurgencies, which aims “to discredit [the incumbent regime], isolate it, wreck its credit, 
undermine its economy, overextend its resources, and cause its disintegration” (Taber 
2002, 16). Both nonviolent campaigns and violent armed insurgencies seek the same 
intermediate strategic objectives: win by causing disruption. Other scholars of 
nonviolence similarly emphasize the centrality of disruption to the logic of nonviolent 
action. In describing the effectiveness of the civil rights protests against policies of racial 
subjugation in the United States during the 1960s, Ackerman and Duvall explain that 
“mass civic disruption broke it down through sit-ins, boycotts, and marches, driving the 





2006, 36). Gene Sharp explicitly drew comparisons between nonviolent disruption and 
armed conflict, noting “the general similarities of nonviolent action to military war. 
Nonviolent action is a means of combat, as is war” (Sharp 1973, 67). Notions of coercion 
and collapse are recurrent in Sharp’s descriptions of nonviolent action. Martin Luther 
King Jr. also famously explained in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail that his strategy 
involved creating a situation that was “crisis packed” in order to compel accommodations 
to the civil rights movement’s political demands. Disruption, coercion, and generating 
costs for opponents are central to the logic of nonviolent campaigns, as they are in armed 
insurgency and political violence.  
These two assumptions – that campaigns 1) are largely rational actors that 2) 
focus on generating disruption to achieve their objectives – are difficult to reconcile with 
nonviolent campaigns’ sole adherence to nonviolent strategies. An instrumentalist or 
functionalist approach to conflict should be more willing to consider alternative strategies 
or mixtures of tactics to optimize the ability to generate disruption. With no normative 
objections to sets of tactics, groups that are seeking to maximize disruption should be 
drawn to the potential of violence to further increase disruption and costs for their 
opponents. Tactical innovation and diversification has also been emphasized in previous 
analyses of nonviolent campaigns (K. G. Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017; Schock 
2005). “The more diverse the tactics and methods implemented, the more diffuse the 
state’s repressive operations become, thus potentially lessening their effectiveness” 
(Schock 2005, 52). Despite the importance of tactical diversification and an emphasis on 
the importance of generating disruption, many campaigns remain persistently nonviolent. 





continue for years – have remained overwhelmingly reliant on nonviolent strategies 
(Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Past experience has 
demonstrated that in many campaigns this commitment to nonviolence is a choice made 
through careful deliberations. Some campaigns have publicly declared their adherence to 
nonviolence. Political groups in Nepal debated the value of nonviolent strategies after 
years of protests during the 1960s against the government (Thurber 2019), and West 
Papuan activists collectively analyzed the relative costs and benefits of nonviolent and 
violent strategies prior to launching their own campaigns against the government (K. G. 
Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017). Based on these debates and broader environmental, 
situational, or resource conditions, many campaigns launch and maintain a reliance on 
nonviolent methods.  
By contrast, many common explanations of political violence and armed 
insurgency do not require or expect such campaigns to adhere to one set of tactics. Like 
studies of nonviolent campaigns, these explanations assume that actors are rational and 
focus on disruption (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Fearon 1995; Walter 2009). On the basis 
of these same assumptions, however, these theories argue that nonstate organizations may 
be incentivized to use more extreme and violent tactics to signal greater strength and 
resolve to their opponents, improving their bargaining position and ability to coerce 
accommodations. And many nonstate armed actors have also mixed nonviolent tactics in 
with their overall strategy to generate disruption. Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Ibish 2018), 
militia groups in Iraq (Craig and Majeed 2011), the Irish Republican Army (Power 1972), 
and armed insurgents in El Salvador (E. J. Wood 2003), among others, have all 





insurgency within their overarching anti-regime campaigns. This introduces a puzzle 
regarding the predominant adherence to nonviolent tactics in many maximalist anti-
regime and secessionist campaigns. Why do supposedly rational and strategic dissident 
organizations focused on generating disruption limit their tactical focus to nonviolent 
methods?  
This puzzle is further confounding when one considers how nonviolent campaigns 
generate disruption. It is true that nonviolent protest is disruptive. Large numbers of 
people marching through a street can interrupt normal economic, political, and social 
activities, generating costs for political leaders and other elites. Frequently, scholars like 
to point out that there is a wide variety of available nonviolent tactics. Most often cited 
are the 198 nonviolent methods detailed by Gene Sharp (Sharp et al. 2005), and many 
nonviolent scholars explain that the list is actually “limitless” due to the innovativeness 
of nonviolent activists (Schock 2005, 16).  These tactics are grouped into three types: 
protest and persuasion (e.g., street marches), noncooperation (e.g., labor strikes), and 
intervention (e.g., sit-ins and nonviolent occupations). However, the list includes many 
actions for which the disruptive potential is highly questionable. “Letters of opposition or 
support,” “symbolic sounds,” “stand-in,” “ride-in,” and “wade-in,” among other 
examples from Sharp’s 198 methods, may be more consistent with conventional political 
activities than extra-institutional contentious action. Realistically they impose only 
negligible direct costs or consequences for an incumbent government and its institutions. 
Of course, these tactics may serve mobilizing and solidarity functions, but the claim that 
they are part of a disruptive effort is debatable. Indeed, Sharp has acknowledged that 





nonviolent intervention it “may not be possible to maintain these methods for long 
periods of time. Casualties may be severe” (Sharp et al. 2005, 44). The menu of options 
for nonviolent campaigns to generate disruption may be more limited than is often 
discussed, and in particular are limited to noncooperation. This further compounds the 
puzzle of why campaigns restrict themselves to these strategies if many of their 
disruptive effects are limited and unsustainable.  
Scholars of nonviolent action have offered several possible explanations for why 
organizations and actors may singularly focus on nonviolent tactics in their anti-regime 
and secessionist campaigns, several of which will be considered in the analysis here. 
First, a strong adherence to nonviolence generates a “participation advantage” for anti-
status quo campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). “The moral, physical, 
informational, and commitment barriers to participation are much lower for nonviolent 
resistance than for violent insurgency” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 10). Thus, because 
nonviolence does not require persons to contravene common moral barriers to physically 
harm or kill others and requires few of the specialized skills, physical demands, or risky 
clandestine activities of guerilla warfare, it naturally draws a larger number of persons 
from a wider pool of potential participants (i.e., the elderly, physically less able, etc.). A 
participation advantage is especially critical, because the per participant disruptive effect 
of violence is higher for violent strategies than nonviolent ones. “A single person with a 
gun is sufficient to execute an attack. A tiny cell of militants can carry out terrorism that 
alters the course of a conflict decisively. A small group of people going out into the 
street, however, does not make a protest event, much less a protest campaign” (Pearlman 





cumulative disruptive effect of nonviolence to greatly surpass violence, which can 
include only so many people because of its inherently limited pool of participants. “If 
they [i.e., nonviolent protesters] do this [i.e., protest] in sufficient numbers for long 
enough, that government or hierarchical system will no longer have power” (Sharp 1973, 
64). By this logic, it makes sense to limit a campaign’s tactical focus to nonviolent 
methods since it draws more resources, support, and participants to the campaign, which 
cumulatively generates larger disruptive effects.  
Empirically, it is not clear that nonviolent campaigns do generate higher 
participation levels than violent ones (Wittels 2016), but even theoretically the 
relationship between nonviolence and participation is questionable. Participation comes 
in many forms. A study of 80 different armed nonstate actors found that "It is almost 
always impossible to draw a clear line between members and non-members of 
insurgencies as forms of participation differ appreciably” (Schlichte 2009, 19). Indeed, 
armed guerilla fighters and other violent nonstate actors rely on the contributions of many 
unseen noncombatants for their effectiveness and performance, not just those who carry 
and fire a weapon. “The [armed] guerilla…fights with the support of the noncombatant 
civilian populace: It is his camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his 
communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service” (Taber 2002, 
12). Many of these noncombat roles are essential force multipliers for armed nonstate 
actors, and they have far lower physical and moral barriers given that they are not 
frontline positions. The support of business and local community groups has been critical 
to successful militia groups in Somalia (Ahmad 2015) and broader social and familial 





Lebanese armed nonstate groups (Parkinson 2013). In El Salvador’s civil war during the 
1980s, many campesinos who were unable to serve in armed insurgent groups extended 
support in other ways. One activist explained: “There were roles for those too old to take 
up arms. Those who could not join the organization [the FMLN] formed cooperatives” to 
provide resources and intelligence to the rebels (E. J. Wood 2003, 173). Many different 
forms of individuals and social organizations can contribute critical “rear area” resources 
and functions to support armed insurgencies without the moral or physical demands of 
actual combat. Nonviolent action may hold less of an inherent “participation advantage” 
than is often claimed, given the broad array of ways in which individuals and 
organizations can contribute to armed insurgencies. 
Other studies have emphasized the importance of organization in nonviolent 
action campaigns, both in terms of the extent of organization within the campaign itself 
and the campaign’s ability to recruit and appropriate pre-existing social organizations. 
The role of organization works by enhancing cohesion, facilitating mobilization, and 
preventing fragmentation, all of which are intertwined and conceptually overlapping. 
These mechanisms increase the likelihood that a civil conflict remains a nonviolent 
campaign as opposed to a violent armed insurgency. Cohesive organizational structures 
with “some leadership and an institutional framework” are what “facilitates mass 
mobilization. To the degree that a movement has a unifying sense of collective purpose, it 
will be more capable of rallying a broad base of the population rather than merely narrow 
sectors or select recruits…Mass mobilization is more critical for strategies such as civil 
disobedience and labor strikes than for armed struggle” (Pearlman 2011, 11). Similarly, 





norms of reciprocity) in contributing to organizational cohesion and the availability of 
pre-existing social organization as critical for efficient and sustained recruitment in 
nonviolent campaigns (P. Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; 
D. E. Cunningham et al. 2017; Morris 1981; Oberschall 1973; Sharp et al. 2005; Sutton, 
Butcher, and Svensson 2014; P. B. White et al. 2015). Organization also promotes 
resilience and discipline in the face of repression, reducing the likelihood that the 
campaign will resort to violent strategies when facing detentions or casualties or fracture 
into more militant factions (Pinckney 2016; Schock 2005). By contrast, a fragmented and 
less organized opposition movement or one that is effectively fragmented through 
repression is likely to turn to armed struggle. Empirical analyses have found evidence 
that supports arguments that smaller groups are more prone to “radical” agendas or that a 
fractious opposition will struggle to communicate shared goals, resulting in bargaining 
failures with the government (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; K. G. Cunningham 
2013a; Lawrence 2010; Pearlman 2011; Regan and Norton 2005).  
While the importance of organization to mounting effective nonviolent campaigns 
is understandable, the causal role of organization on strategy selection remains unclear. 
Organization may stimulate (or simply be an observable indication of) political and 
operational cohesion or social capital, but its existence alone does not necessarily suggest 
why certain tactics are used and others avoided. Leadership, institutional frameworks, 
cohesion, and resilience are useful for any difficult or complex enterprise, whether 
violent or nonviolent. At most, the existence and extent of cohesive social organization 
within an already nonviolent campaign may explain why the adoption of violence is 





Likewise, mobilization does not accrue solely to nonviolence. The availability of social 
organization has been critical to the effectiveness of and recruitment into armed insurgent 
groups, as has been demonstrated in empirical studies of Eastern Europe conflicts, the 
Kashmiri and Sri Lankan armed insurgencies, and in previous civil wars in Uganda and 
Peru, among other contexts (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Petersen 2001; Staniland 
2014; Weinstein 2007). Cohesion, social capital, fragmentation, and similar 
organizationally-oriented explanations do not appear to offer a complete explanation for 
the adoption of and adherence to nonviolent strategies by rational actors seeking to 
maximize disruption.  
Another set of explanations of the adoption and persistence of nonviolent 
strategies draws on interdependence theory. The concept of interdependence, which 
describes relationships of mutual exchange or dependence between two or more parties, 
is often applied to interstate relations (Keohane and Nye 2011). It is typically framed in 
terms of the level of trade between two or more countries, with countries that engage in 
large amounts of international trade said to be highly interdependent. Such trade 
purportedly creates unique constraints or incentives that shape how states behave during 
disputes (Copeland 2015; Gartzke and Li 2016; Mansfield and Pollins 2001; Maoz 2009; 
Milner and Moravcsik 2009). When extended to civil conflicts, interdependence between 
aggrieved constituencies and political or economic elites create opportunities that reduce 
the likelihood that civil conflicts turn violent (Butcher, Gray, and Mitchell 2018b; 
Butcher and Svensson 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973). 
Specifically, organizations that are interdependent with elites may be able to access latent 





disruption. “Organizations that the regime depends upon have higher leverage, usually 
because the individuals mobilized by these organizations produce economic, social, or 
symbolic resources that the regime needs. … Thus, organizations that are interdependent 
with the regime socially or economically are most useful for nonviolent forms of dissent” 
(Butcher, Gray, and Mitchell 2018, 304, emphasis in original). For example, large labor-
intensive manufacturing sectors with substantial unionization create the opportunity for 
highly impactful forms of nonviolent noncooperation, specifically boycotts or strikes. In 
such circumstances, “the state is likely to be dependent upon either trade (domestically or 
internationally) in manufactured goods or on the wage earnings of manufacturing 
workers, as the size of the manufacturing sector grows in relation to GDP. These 
dependencies can be leveraged through strikes and boycotts, in addition to participation 
in rallies and tax noncompliance” (Butcher and Svensson 2016, 318). In other words, 
high levels of economic interdependence make possible effective forms of 
noncooperative strikes and boycotts. Such noncooperation is disruptive and costly for 
elites, and therefore nonviolent methods are more viable for organizations and 
constituencies that are interdependent with elites.  
The interdependence explanation offers additional clarity on how specific 
organizational types or constituencies may be better placed to generate disruption through 
nonviolent noncooperation. Threatening the profits and wealth of economic elites or the 
tax revenues that state institutions rely on should be highly costly and disruptive to a 
regime in power. This option may only be available to constituencies or organizations 
that can leverage such interdependent relationships, rendering their involvement a critical 





same organizations do not seek to diversify or optimize their ability to generate 
disruption. Why not engage in strikes and boycotts as well as support armed attacks on 
the state? The per-participant disruptive effect of such violent strategies may be greater 
than that of noncooperation tactics. Nor would business, labor, or consumer groups, to 
cite three possible examples, need to directly involve themselves in such attacks. They 
could instead merely support armed attacks materially or indirectly, thereby signaling 
higher resolve and greater abilities to their opponents in power. The existence of 
interdependence makes effective noncooperation tactics viable, but it does not explain 
why these are the only methods adopted by rational actors seeking to maximize 
disruption and costs for the state. And yet it appears correct that many organizations that 
enjoy high levels of interdependence and latent noncooperation leverage are rarely linked 
to strategies of armed insurgencies. According to the Foundation of Rebel Group 
Emergence dataset, of 430 armed nonstate groups active from 1946 through 2011, only 6 
involved a labor union at their initiation. Current applications of interdependence theory 
to the onset of mass nonviolent campaigns explain why they are viable, but not why these 
campaigns remain predominantly nonviolent and eschew violent strategies. 
There are additional common explanations of how nonviolent and violent 
strategies unfold or alternate during civil conflicts. I briefly review two here so that they 
may be referred to later in the paper as additional rival explanations against which case 
data is assessed. These are repression and ideology. Repression has been argued to 
influence methods of resistance in several ways. First, it can promote substitution of 
nonviolent protest for violent armed attacks (K. G. Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010; 





encounter recalcitrant and aggressive security force responses, they abandon nonviolence 
and adopt more extreme and disruptive violent tactics. Repression can fragment larger 
nonviolent campaigns into smaller factions that are more prone to radical, militant 
agendas, including those that employ violence (Della Porta 1996, 2017; Lawrence 2010; 
Pearlman 2011; Pinckney 2016; Young 2013). However, repression of nonviolence has 
not always led to fracturing of a campaign or to the adoption of violent strategies 
(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005). Sometimes it stimulates the so-called 
“punishment puzzle,” in which repression leads to the breakdown and radicalization of 
nonviolent campaigns in some cases while in others it only catalyzes further and broader 
mobilization (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Davenport 2007; Kurzman 1996; R. 
W. White 1989). Regardless, the role of repression on violent and nonviolent campaigns 
in South Africa will be assessed.  
Ideological explanations of resistance methods are rooted in the notion that 
certain beliefs reduce normative constraints on the use of violence more than others. For 
example, campaigns that hold strong religious- or leftist-based ideologies may view their 
opponents as intrinsically different and irredeemable, and therefore are less restrained 
from targeting opponents with armed violence to advance their goals. By contrast, groups 
that share a more inclusive ideology may feel stronger normative restraints on the use of 
violence (Goodwin 2007; Sanín and Wood 2014; Thaler 2012). Some evidence suggests 
that ethnopolitical organizations in Middle Eastern countries that hold more gender 
inclusive perspectives are less likely to use violence, supporting the role of ideology in 
the adoption of resistance methods (Asal et al. 2013). However, armed rebellions that 





groups seeking to advance democratic aims, ethnic homogeneity, human rights, or leftist 
and Marxist ideologies. While it does appear that there are more armed nonstate actors 
that advance exclusionary ideologies than mass nonviolent anti-regime or secessionist 
campaigns, ideological perspectives do not appear to preclude organizations from 
employing violent or nonviolent methods.  
There have been dozens of episodes of mass nonviolent campaigns seeking to 
oust incumbent regimes or secede from internationally recognized sovereign states. 
However, most explanations of why these campaigns remain nonviolent are somewhat 
incomplete. These theories and their shortcomings are summarized in table 2.1. In the 
next section, I build on these theories, starting with several of their core assumptions, to 
provide a modified explanation of why rational, strategic actors seeking to maximize 
disruption would limit their tactical focus to mass nonviolent methods. 
 
Table 2.1. Explanations of Selection of Nonviolent Methods in Civil Conflicts 
Theory / Explanation Causal Mechanism(s) Shortcomings 
Nonviolence  
(Inherent advantages) Participation advantage 
Narrow view of 
“participation” 
Organization 
Cohesion Observable in nonviolent and violent campaigns 
Resilience Observable in nonviolent and violent campaigns 
Social capital Observable in nonviolent and violent campaigns 
Interdependence Noncooperation viability 
Incomplete; does not meet 
rational actor, disruption 
maximization assumptions 
Repression Tactical Substitution “Punishment puzzle” Organizational Fragmentation “Punishment puzzle” 








Theory: Loss Aversion and Nonviolence 
 This section builds on and expands previously detailed interdependence 
explanations of nonviolent methods adoption. It proposes that a critical additional causal 
mechanism activated by interdependent relationships better explains why some 
organizations and actors rely solely on mass nonviolent methods during civil conflicts: 
loss aversion. I argue that this modified explanation helps clarify the selection of 
nonviolent dissidence and is more consistent with assumptions of rational actors seeking 
to maximize disruption and minimize costs amid civil conflict, assumptions that underlay 
most nonviolent action scholarly work. Given this modified explanation, I then detail 
expectations of how it operates among dissident organizations within a civil conflict. This 
lays the basis for how the case of South Africa is later analyzed. 
 First, I identify several assumptions and scope conditions for my argument. I seek 
to explain how actors select between violent and nonviolent strategies in civil conflicts, 
which are disputes in which organized nonstate actors make demands for changes to the 
political and territorial status quo of internationally recognized sovereign states and 
employ extra-constitutional methods to advance those claims. These are similar to the 
phenomena explained in most studies of mass nonviolent conflict and armed intrastate 
conflict (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). Violent methods 
include the intentional use of force against the state, its institutions, or supporters to 
advance political or territorial claims. This can include armed insurgency, the use of 
terrorist-style tactics, violent riots, or other forms of violence that are used for a political 





political or territorial objectives. A third possible strategy of dissidence mixes these sets 
of tactics or strategies.  
The adoption of a dissident strategy is an ongoing process that begins at the onset 
of civil conflict and persists through dynamic interaction with the state as the conflict 
unfolds. To better explain this process, I draw on and expand conceptual models used in 
previous analyses of nonviolent and violent methods adoption in civil conflict (D. E. 
Cunningham et al. 2017; P. B. White et al. 2015). Figure 2.1 lays out this multi-phase 
sequence of civil conflict. First, actors, often social organizations or collectives of 
individuals, become aggrieved over aspects of prevailing political, economic, or social 
arrangements in their country. These actors or organizations then announce a public 
claim against the status quo, seeking some political or territorial change or 
transformation. Once this demand is made, these actors or organizations subsequently 
adopt and employ some method by which they seek to coerce the state to accede to their 
demands. In this last step, aggrieved actors and organizations can select between 
primarily nonviolent strategies, violent methods such as armed insurgency, or some 
mixture of these strategies. As strategies are put into practice a threshold (i.e., 1,000 
nonviolent protestors in two separate coordinated actions per Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011) or 25-battle related deaths in a year (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002)) of disruption is 
crossed, a civil conflict has begun. Prior to this, there are many opportunities for conflict 
to be avoided, including decisions by the aggrieved not to make a public claim, to not act 
on a claim that has been made public, to adopt purely institutional and conventional 
methods (i.e., petitioning for change through existing institutions, fielding candidates for 





also accede to the claim once it is made but before coercion is employed, though this 
seems unlikely. After onset, most civil conflicts involve repeated interaction between 
nonstate actors and state institutions or forces, and so there are numerous opportunities 
for nonstate actors to shift strategies or adopt new tactics as they assess their resource 
positions or the effects of the conflict on their interests or that of their opponents. Thus, 
my theory and accompanying empirical analysis attempt to explain both the strategy 
adopted at the onset of civil conflict as well as the continued reliance on nonviolent 
methods during the course of conflict. My theory focuses on the second and third phases 
of civil conflicts: I seek to explain how actors assess their resources, capabilities, and 
interests and adopt and maintain a dissident strategy at the onset of a civil conflict – more 
specifically a consistently nonviolent set of dissident methods. However, grievances, 
claims, and their origins are not explained, nor why or how civil conflicts end.  
 















































I argue that interdependence largely explains the adoption of a strategy of 
predominantly nonviolent methods. As discussed in the previous review of literature, 
interdependence is understood as relationships of mutual dependence or reciprocal effects 
between two or more parties. In domestic contexts, this literature has pointed out that 
political and economic elites are often dependent on certain constituencies because of 
their importance to continued economic growth, state revenues, and overall financial and 
business stability.3 The classic example is labor groups in the manufacturing sector of 
export-oriented economies. Nonviolent action scholars have argued that these actors have 
significant noncooperation leverage that can be used to coerce elites to accommodate 
political demands. Without the continued compliance and production of labor groups, 
political and economic elites face resource constraints and instability. Interdependence 
thus activates a noncooperation viability mechanism during civil conflicts that may lead 
to the adoption of mass nonviolent methods. However, nonviolent scholars have not fully 
emphasized that the relationship is interdependent, and therefore these same groups and 
constituencies are dependent on elites. Labor constituencies, for example, require a 
modicum of order and stability so that manufacturing can continue and their 
comparatively more prosperous and stable positions in society can be maintained. They 
too are vulnerable to significant disorder. This interdependence and vulnerability 
activates an additional causal mechanism, loss aversion, which influences the behavior of 
these actors when they engage in dissidence. This mechanism is discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Interdependence is a broad concept, but when applied to analysis of interstate 
relations various measures of international trade (i.e., absolute value of bilateral trade, 
                                                





value of bilateral trade as proportion of GDP, value of all trade as proportion of GDP, 
etc.) are used as a common proxy. In domestic contexts, income or 
occupational/professional status, which should strongly correlate with one another, 
should capture the degree of interdependence between various constituencies and groups 
and political and economic elites that dominate the state. In the example of labor groups 
in developing country contexts, these are often in-demand jobs because of their relatively 
decent wages. Interdependence between groups or constituencies with even higher 
earnings and high professional status (i.e., doctors, lawyers, managers, etc.) with elites 
may also be stronger, given that the former are already in high demand (as indicated by 
their higher wages) and may be more difficult to fill and replace in many developing 
countries. Higher levels of income and professional status should therefore proxy for 
levels of interdependence between various constituencies, societal groups, or social 
organizations and political and economic elites.  
As is common in nonviolent action scholarship, I assume that prospective 
dissidents are rational actors. The selection of nonviolent, violent, or mixed strategies of 
resistance against the state is therefore a product of at least a rough cost-benefit analysis 
of each alternative. Indeed, some dissident groups have expressly engaged in cost-benefit 
analyses when considering their options for confronting the state (K. G. Cunningham, 
Dahl, and Frugé 2017; Thurber 2019). As a result of such analyses, the alternative with 
the highest net benefit should be adopted. For dissidents the “benefit” of a method is the 
amount of per-participant disruption generated, which can act to coerce the state and 
elites to accommodate to dissident demands or to collapse outright. This disruption 





caused by specific attacks or protest events and the medium term losses if the attacks or 
events destroy or disable essential infrastructure, personnel, or confidence in the state for 
months or even years. The costs of a dissident method also have two components: the 
short-term immediate costs to dissidents of executing an attack or nonviolent event and 
any subsequent costs that undermine the interests of dissidents that accrue in the months 
or years after the attack or event.  
This simple cost-benefit formula is detailed in formula 2.1, and includes expanded 
details in terms of immediate and medium-term benefits and costs in formula 2.2. The 
“benefit” in this equation is the disruption generated, and so in formula 2.2 this is denoted 
by “D” and costs by “C.” For each aspect there is an immediate (!) and medium-to-long-
term (! + 1) component. “NVA” designates nonviolent action, “V” designates violent 
strategies, and a mixed strategy is not featured for simplicity’s sake. These figures depict 
a situation in which the net benefit of nonviolence is higher and therefore it is selected 
over violence. No formal model of strategy selection is implied here and the formulas are 
used merely to structure the proceeding narrative.  
 
!"#"$%&!"# −  !"#$!"# >  !"#"$%&! −  !"#$! (1.1) 
 
(!!  +  !!!!)!"# − (!!  +  !!!!)!"# > (!!  +  !!!!)! − (!!  +  !!!!)!   (1.2) 
 
I first discuss the relative levels of disruption generated by each method. Violent 
strategies and tactics have obvious advantages over nonviolent methods. Per participant, 
armed actors are able to create far more disruption than individual nonviolent protestors. 
An armed attack, a bombing, or other violent tactic also has more enduring disruptive 





therefore losses mount in the interim. Indeed, armed insurgency potentially generates 
severe and lasting losses. Countries that experience civil wars face significant 
contractions in their gross domestic product (GDP), capital flight, and increases in 
inflation (Collier 1999). The destruction is also persistent. Post-civil war GDP growth 
rates typically remain depressed relative to comparable countries that experience no 
conflict at all, and for countries that endure a lengthy and violent civil war, average 
growth rates remain negative for years after the end of fighting even when pre-conflict 
economic performance is included in the analysis (Kang and Meernik 2005). The 
economic costs of civil war are observable not only at the macro-level. During post-war 
recovery, individual businesses in war-affected regions tend to be smaller and find it 
more difficult to hire skilled employees than those in regions less affected by war-related 
violence (Collier and Duponchel 2013). Job prospects and wages in general are likely 
similarly affected. Beyond direct macro- and micro-level economic losses, civil wars 
worsen post-conflict mortality and disability rates and can lead to higher youth and old-
age dependency ratios, creating additional socioeconomic burdens for working-age 
populations (Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Hoddie and Smith 2009).    
By contrast, the per-participant disruptive effects of a nonviolent protest or a labor 
strike are often lower, particularly in the medium and longer term. To be sure, a large-
scale march can generate disorder and can signal to political leaders that a significant 
segment of the population is willing to take action on dissatisfaction with leadership and 
policies. Forms of noncooperation, such as strikes and boycotts, may be even more 
disruptive and costly for elites, depriving them of vital revenues and resources, than 





are employed by well-positioned laborers or comparatively well-heeled consumers – they 
have more to withhold or withdraw. In other words the same number of participants in 
noncooperation tactics can have a higher disruptive impact on elite interests the higher 
their interdependence with elites. This may explain why so-called “middle class” 
participants are seen as particularly important to and impactful for nonviolent campaigns. 
For example, successful anti-regime protests in Guatemala in 2015 were organized and 
initiated by a group of middle class professionals (ICG 2016; Nolan 2015), and in Sudan 
repeated protest events and political violence over the last decade were unsuccessful but 
“the protest movement [in 2019] that ultimately forced [President] al-Bashir to fall was 
led by a new group, the Sudanese Professionals Association, which was born of Sudan’s 
frustrated middle classes” (D. Walsh and Goldstein 2019). It is also the logic of the 
“noncooperation viability” mechanism highlighted in nonviolent action literature. As 
disruptive as such nonviolent events may be, however, the per-participant disruption 
generated remains lower than violent strategies. For example, nonviolent campaigns have 
been shown to produce no detectable change in foreign direct investment flows when 
compared to states experiencing no civil conflict at all, while countries that experience a 
civil war onset register on average a 15 percentage point decline in foreign direct 
investment (A. Braithwaite, Kucik, and Maves 2014). The effects of mass nonviolent 
tactics or events are largely confined to the immediate event itself and do not endure into 
the medium or long term. Normal economic and social activity can resume shortly after 
nonviolent strikes, boycotts, or other events finish.  
 The costs of executing these strategies also influences which is selected. For the 





skills (i.e., familiarity with small arms), resources (i.e., weapons), and training (i.e., 
operating in units). These are not insignificant costs. Many nonviolent methods, such as 
protest marches and strikes, are comparatively intuitive though they may still require 
some transportation, communication, and other costs. The immediate per participant costs 
of a nonviolent event should be lower than violent attacks, and these should diminish as 
participation increases as well.  
To summarize the cost-benefit analysis so far:  
• The immediate per participant disruption of nonviolent tactics is generally 
lower than violent alternatives; (!!  +  !!!!)!  is always greater than 
(!!  +  !!!!)!"#. 
• Nonviolent disruption may be a function of the type of participants in the 
nonviolent event; per participant (!!  +  !!!!)!"#  is higher when 
participants are more interdependent with elite interest. 
• Medium-term disruption of nonviolent strategies may be negligible; the 
value of (!!!!)!"# is low and may be near zero. 
• The immediate costs of mounting a violent strategy may be somewhat 
higher than employing nonviolent methods.  
Even factoring in the relatively higher immediate costs of violent tactics, the comparative 
net benefit of these strategies appears to lean in favor of violent strategies. 
The medium-to-long-term costs of violent and nonviolent methods, however, 
differ substantially, are often a function of interdependence, and may exert a very strong 
influence on the adoption of nonviolence. This is where the loss aversion mechanism is 





widespread disruption to economic activity and social life. In many civil wars, few 
corners of the economy or society are unaffected. For prospective dissident actors who 
have a stake in such economic activity and social life, such widespread disruption leads 
to severe blowback. In other words, (!!!!)! directly raises (!!!!)!. This is especially true 
for actors and organizations that are interdependent with elites and whose interests are to 
some extent reciprocal. An effort to disrupt elite interests therefore results in shared 
losses and sacrifices. In many cases, (!!!!)! for dissidents may be larger than (!!!!)!. In 
many developing country contexts, even relatively higher wage earners or those who 
enjoy comparatively better professional status may be more exposed to sudden shifts in 
economic fortunes than elites. For example, even as the so-called “middle class” has been 
expanding in many developing countries around the world, many members of this group 
remain vulnerable to backsliding (Ravallion 2010). “Being a new member of the global 
middle class is a precarious thing. An illness, a recession, an ecological or natural disaster 
can all plunge new middle-class members back into poverty” (Desai 2018). The same 
precariousness is also likely in the event of an armed insurgency. Elites may be harmed 
by losses associated with any disruption generated by a violent insurrection, but non-
elites may be pushed to the brink. Factory workers may lose jobs as production is 
shuttered, merchants and traders may experience disruption to their supplies, 
professionals such as doctors and lawyers face reduced demand for their services, and 
inflation rapidly erodes the value of what meager assets or bank deposits are held. To the 
extent that members of “middle class” occupations comprise the politically aggrieved 
networks that are challenging the political or territorial status quo, methods of political 





continued quality of life relies on a modicum of order for the broader economic system. 
As a consequence, they may be deterred from employing violence to advance their anti-
status quo claims and will seek out alternative strategies. Fortunately, as other nonviolent 
scholars have pointed out, by dint of their comparably better position in society – their 
interdependence with elites – they are also more able to engage in impactful nonviolent 
noncooperation. Interdependence becomes a simultaneous form of power 
(noncooperation viability) and vulnerability (loss aversion).  
The same may not be true for groups that are less interdependent with elite 
interests, such as the under or unemployed or groups who face continued or even further 
marginalization and losses in the future regardless of the effects of political violence or 
instability. These groups may be less deterred by any medium- or long-term costs 
resulting from violent strategies. In other words, (!!!!)! is naturally low for these groups. 
They therefore may be more drawn to the higher disruptive and coercive benefits of 
violent strategies, and less averse to any associated losses.  
In sum, for dissident organizations and groups that are interdependent with elite 
interests: 
• (!!  +  !!!!)! − (!!  +  !!!!)! drops rapidly as (!!!!)! rises and potentially 
surpasses (!!!!)!. 
• (!!  +  !!!!)!"# − (!!  +  !!!!)!"# increases as interdependent actors have 
inherently higher leverage over elite interests. 
This logic informs the primary hypothesis of this theory: higher levels of 
interdependence between dissident organizations and elites increase the likelihood that 





resistance. More specifically, the primary causal mechanism at work within this 
hypothesized relationship is not just noncooperation viability – it is not simply that these 
groups can engage in impactful strikes and boycotts because of their unique access to 
leverage over elite interests – as argued by other nonviolent action scholars. Rather, 
interdependence also activates the causal mechanism of loss aversion. Groups and 
organizations are deterred from employing violence because of its potential to harm their 
own medium- and long-term interests. If correct, this mechanism should produce 
particular dynamics within dissident networks during civil conflicts. These include: 
• Groups may be reluctant dissidents, delaying their involvement in dissidence and 
limiting it to nonviolence  
• Groups should express concern about the use of violence in strategic debates 
about dissident methods.  Their concerns should be rooted in the possible costs of 
violence. 
• Groups should attempt to constrain or restrain other dissidents that appear to lean 
toward or adopt violent methods, out of concern for the disruptive effects of such 
action will negatively impact their interests. Groups will not even support 
violence against their opponent for which they could plausibly deny responsibility 
out of fears of the braoder consequences of such violence.  
• Groups should be observed to be protecting or advancing the interests they share 
with elites, even while engaging in efforts that seek to support their anti-status 
quo political or territorial objectives. 
Stricter tests for the importance of loss aversion to the adoption of and adherence to 





organized dissident groups that have plausible noncooperation leverage (i.e., something 
to withhold from elites) may engage in or support anti-regime violence if their interests 
are already low or are likely to be threatened in the future regardless of their dissidence. 
Additionally, differences between groups that do and do not engage in violent and 
nonviolent methods should not be fully attributable to different perceptions of or 
experiences with repression, ideology, organization, tactical “participation advantages,” 
or other common alternative explanations of dissident strategy adoption. 
This theory of the adoption of and adherence to nonviolent methods during civil 
conflicts provides several contributions to previous literature on nonviolent action. First, 
it builds on and is consistent with central assumptions in much nonviolent scholarly 
work: dissidents are rational actors that rely on disruption to coerce their opponents to 
accede to their goals. The emphasis here on interdependence and loss aversion provides 
additional clarity for why such rational and strategic actors focused on disruption would 
eschew highly impactful and efficient tactics, including violence. It is also a simple and 
intuitive extension of previous explanations of nonviolent methods that stress 
noncooperation and interdependence. The theory does have limits, however, including its 
inability to explain the origins of grievances or how attributes of grievances may 
influence strategy selection. Interdependence itself is also plausibly related to grievances, 
since those who are more intertwined with the interests of elites may be less dissatisfied 
overall. Likewise, interdependence offers less clarity on how groups select between 
predominantly violent strategies and a mixture of violent and nonviolent tactics. Its 







Data, Methods, and Outcomes of Interest 
In this section of the paper I identify the outcomes of interest and behavior I am 
seeking to explain, the evidence I use in my analysis, the rationale for the process-tracing 
approach, and the selection of South Africa as my case.  
My dependent variable includes three types of anti-regime dissident behavior that 
predominated in South Africa during the 1980s: mass nonviolent action, organized armed 
insurgency, and a mixture of political violence and nonviolence. Mass nonviolence 
includes the coordinated and repeated use of various nonviolent action methods, such as 
street protests, demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins. This outcome corresponds to the 
definition of nonviolent campaigns used by Chenoweth and Stephan and related data 
initiatives (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Armed 
insurgency involves the use of force by a nonstate armed organization whose stated goal 
is to alter the political or territorial status quo of a country. The definition largely 
corresponds with concepts from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Nonstate 
Actor data initiative (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013; Harbom, 
Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). Mixed repertoires include those that support or 
participate in both mass nonviolent campaigns and actions by armed insurgent 
organizations. Additionally, I consider other forms of mixed repertoires, such as groups 
that participate in mass nonviolence but also engage in targeted violence against state 
institutions but do not formally affiliate with an armed insurgent organization or groups 
that form local militia to support a central armed insurgent organization but do not 
become integrated into its structures. In South Africa, these three outcomes of interests – 





strategies employed by the nonviolent United Democratic Front, the MK armed rebel 
group, and the events that transpired in certain communities during the 1984-1986 
township revolts, respectively. More details on these actors will be provided in the next 
section.  
My unit of analysis is the social organization, such as a named voluntary 
organization or association initiated and collectively maintained by individuals. Studies 
of conflict dynamics and contentious politics often assume that pre-existing organizations 
are central actors (Mark I. Lichbach 1994; Tilly 1978). In South Africa during the 1980s, 
there were also myriad different types of such local and regional organizations that were 
founded and maintained by independent citizens. These groups, which included so-called 
“civics”, youth congresses, various ethnically-defined organizations (i.e., the Natal Indian 
Congress), or labor unions, were created to protect or advance the shared interests of their 
members. Such organizations were nodes of opposition politics during this period: 
 
The early 1980s were a time of organizational effervescence, as well as political 
alienation. The period witnessed a veritable explosion in associational life. It 
gave birth to new organizations of every variety – community, youth, women’s, 
labor, student, political – which by mid-decade honeycombed the social fabric of 
all but the smallest and most remote townships… These new organizations while 
serving somewhat different geographical, class, gender, or functional 
constituencies, shared a central and all-important feature – they mobilized their 
members in opposition to the limited form of inclusion that was Pretoria’s vision 
of a reformed South Africa (Price 1991, 160). 
 
I seek to explain how interdependence shaped whether these various organizations 
directly engaged in or extended material support to either of the three forms of anti-
regime dissidence that serve as my outcomes of interest: nonviolent, violent, or mixed 
strategies. By engaged I mean that an organization was a direct participant in the 





UDF, attacks or bombings carried out by MK, or various forms of violence prosecuted by 
ad hoc groups during the township revolts. By material support I mean that an 
organization intentionally and knowingly provided resources to supplement these various 
dissident efforts. For example, material support to the MK could involve the provision of 
information that would enable or enhance attacks, the storing or transporting of weapons 
or personnel, or the facilitation of recruitment. 
In interstate relations, a country’s trade relative to its overall economy, its relative 
dependence on trade vis-à-vis other countries, or the price elasticity of traded goods and 
services are the primary ways in which interdependence is operationalized (Mansfield 
and Pollins 2001). Potential analogs in domestic contexts might be the occupations and 
wages/income of various aggrieved constituencies. Those groups that earn higher 
incomes from higher-status occupations are presumably in higher demand by major 
industries and producers, and may also be an important source of tax revenue and broader 
economic stability from the perspective of the state. Minimal systematic data is available 
on wages and professional positions of blacks in South Africa during the 1980s (see 
below). The analysis here relies on references to occupational status, income, and/or 
behaviors associated with wealth (i.e., home ownership, private schooling, etc.) in 
available surveys, historical accounts, or interview data to determine level of 
interdependence with political and economic elite interests.   
Process tracing was chosen as the analytic approach for three reasons. First, data 
on the South Africa case and many of the consequential actors during the conflicts of the 
1980s is limited. Specifically, though it is commonly accepted that there were at least 





Africa during the 1980s there is no reliable systematic information on their dates of 
origin, scope, membership, purpose, location, issue areas, objectives, or other critical 
attributes (Kessel 2000; SA Scholar 2 2019; Seekings 2000b; Swilling 1988). 
Documentation from these organizations is also extremely limited and not easily 
accessed, with existing studies relying on interview data and contemporaneous accounts 
(Adler and Steinberg 2000). More broadly, there remains no comprehensive event data on 
the location of MK attacks or peaceful protests, boycotts, or other forms of nonviolent 
actions. Data on MK membership also remains unavailable to the public,4 making it 
difficult to get a sense of the demographic profiles, geographic origins, or social networks 
of recruits. Given their marginalization by the state, surveys of the political, economic, or 
social behaviors or preferences of black South Africans were irregular and usually 
conducted at the initiative of academics (Mariotti and Fourie 2014; Seekings and Nattrass 
2005). In short, systematic analysis of various organizations and how salient attributes, 
including interdependence with elite interests, influence behavior is not possible. Second, 
what data is available is spread across different, incommensurate types of sources: 
contemporaneous journalistic accounts, interview transcripts, historical analyses, and 
episodic surveys. Such diverse forms of evidence and data are far more conducive to 
process-tracing techniques (Brady and Collier 2010; Gerring 2007). Lastly, the process-
tracing technique privileges internal validity. It permits a more in-depth assessment of the 
linkages between phenomena and the precise reasons why behavior occurs as opposed to 
broad associations or average effects estimates. Process tracing is more suited to an 
                                                
4 South Africa’s Council of Military Veterans Organizations has repeatedly delayed a definitive answer to 
requests for access to information on MK structures and membership during the time of demobilization in 





examination of what causal mechanisms influenced the behavior of social organizations 
in South Africa during the 1980s.  
To support my arguments about the behavior of these various organizations, I 
draw on an array of sources and data. These include: contemporaneous accounts and 
analyses from journals such as the Indicator South Africa, the South Africa Labour 
Bulletin, the South African Institute of Race Relations, and several other related sources; 
contemporaneous surveys conducted by South Africa’s Human Sciences Research 
Council, the Bureau of Manpower Research, and South Africa’s Department of Labour 
Statistics; historical accounts of the UDF, MK, civics, labor groups, and youth 
congresses; interview transcripts made available from previous research; and 10 original 
interviews conducted by the author with either South African activists involved with the 
UDF, MK, civics, and related organizations or South African scholars who have 
researched the era.  
I chose the case of South Africa during the 1980s for several reasons. First, it is 
commonly upheld by proponents of nonviolent resistance given the strength and brutality 
of the apartheid regime that sought to oppress non-white South Africans and the breadth 
and resilience of efforts by nonviolent groups during this period (P. Ackerman and 
DuVall 2000; Schock 2005; Zunes 1999; Zunes, Asher, and Kurtz 1999). Additionally, 
the country experienced several distinct forms of anti-regime resistance, each of which I 
argue below is sufficiently partitioned to allow comparison of how various groups viewed 
and engaged with them. That these campaigns all unfolded within the same state during 
the same period controls for important structural factors, including state strength and 





of nonviolent resistance and civil society during civil conflicts, particularly in the United 
States. In a speech discussing a new multi-billion dollar initiative to support civil society 
organizations in various countries around the world, then President Obama explained that 
“civil society led the fight to end apartheid in South Africa,” while going on to cite other 
nonviolent protest movements in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia (White House 
2013). A deeper and more critical analysis of civil society organizations and how they 
engaged in dissidence in South Africa can help inform more nuanced and calibrated 
policy support for such groups. 
 
Background: South Africa’s Civil Conflicts 
This section provides background on the anti-regime campaigns in South Africa 
during the 1980s. It briefly reviews the general political arrangement in South Africa, 
including the political exclusion that laid the basis for political grievances among non-
white South Africans. It also reviews the origins and approaches of the United 
Democratic Front, MK, and more emergent, ad hoc forms of political violence during the 
township revolt of 1984-1986. The information provides useful context for subsequent 
discussion of how different organizations and constituencies adopted distinct forms of 
dissidence.  
The system of apartheid in South Africa was one of racially based political 
exclusion and economic control in which whites held near total control of the state 
apparatus. There were four basic population groups identified under government policy. 
In the 1980s, black Africans constituted just over 70 percent of the population of South 





percent, so-called “coloureds” of mixed-race individuals were about 8 percent of the 
population, and Asians of predominantly Indian origin comprised 3 percent. 5  The 
traditional system of apartheid (an Afrikaner word loosely meaning “apartness”) that had 
developed over the course of the 20th century was embodied in the Group Areas Act, 
influx control regulations, and racially-based job reservation policies that strictly 
controlled where non-white South Africans could live, work, or start a business and 
whether they were able to move or travel. In addition to being economically marginalized 
and dominated, non-whites were excluded from voting and political institutions in 
general.  
During the late 1970s and early 1980s a series of targeted reforms were instituted 
to the apartheid system that attempted to respond to already shifting economic 
relationships while largely maintaining political exclusion. The various initiatives were 
called the “Total Strategy” and were designed by the government of Prime Minister P.W. 
Botha, newly elected in 1978. They aimed to combine light economic integration of some 
parts of the non-white population with an increase in repression of politically active 
blacks and exiled opposition groups in an effort to forestall broader opposition to 
apartheid (R. H. Davies, O’Meara, and Dlamini 1988; Gerhart and Glaser 2010; E. J. 
Wood 2000). The economic aspects of the Total Strategy were driven in part by labor and 
skills shortages in the manufacturing, mining, and services industries, while the focus on 
repression was based on fears that the collapse of the Portuguese colonial authorities in 
1975 in neighboring Mozambique and Angola created new opportunities for rebel 
sanctuaries. Additionally, a major student uprising in the latter half of 1976 that left 
                                                
5 During this time period, the term “black” referred to any non-white South African, including Asians and 
coloureds. “Black African” referred more specifically to individuals whose ancestry was more deeply 





hundreds of black South Africans dead during security efforts to regain control of restive 
townships fueled a belief that opposition sentiments needed to be confronted more 
proactively (Price 1991). Lastly, constitutional reforms passed by whites in 1982 created 
a new tri-cameral parliament with legislative chambers for whites, coloureds, and Asians. 
These reforms were partly designed to dampen criticism from international trading 
partners and allies. However, seats were reserved at a ratio of 4:2:1 for whites, coloureds, 
and Indians, ensuring white domination. During this period, a newly enacted Black Local 
Authorities Act instituted elections for local councilors in African townships. Beyond 
this, however, African populations could not vote, and all non-whites were still subject to 
restrictions on where they could live or travel.6 For all intents and purposes, non-whites 
remained excluded from state institutions and politics. 
As these reforms unfolded, an armed insurgency reemerged. Beginning in 1977, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation”) or MK renewed its operations in South 
Africa after more than a decade of near complete inaction within the country. Attacks 
ramped up over the subsequent decade and surged to over 200 per year in 1985 until a 
ceasefire was declared in August 1990 (see Figure 2.2). The dramatic increase in attacks 
in 1984 coincided with a shift in strategy from a focus in 1977-1983 on armed 
propaganda, including dramatic bombing attacks on major economic infrastructure, 
military installations, and government offices, to one of guerilla warfare involving hit-
and-run attacks on security forces in 1984-1990 (Lodge and Nasson 1991; Slovo 1983). 
In an explicit attempt to replicate the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, MK launched in 
1986 a multi-year operation to secretly embed senior MK leaders as well as arms caches 
throughout South Africa to prepare for a large-scale, multi-location attack on South 
                                                





African authorities (Barrell 1993; Maharaj 1990; O’Malley 2007). MK has been 
described as a modest armed insurgency that fared very poorly in infrequent engagements 
with South African security forces (Barrell 1993; Cherry 2012). However, it also 
attracted numerous and eager recruits, with a force of nearly 10,000 by the time it 
demobilized in the early 1990s, was able to infiltrate security institutions, and executed 
several large-scale attacks on critical infrastructure and security installations (Mashike 
2008; Motumi 1994; Williams 2000).  
Figure 2.2. Annual Attacks Attributed to MK 
 
Source: Adapted from (Lodge and Nasson 1991, 178). 
 
In August 1983 in Cape Town, tens of thousands of people attended the official 
launch of the United Democratic Front, an umbrella organization representing 545 civic, 
youth, student, women’s, religious, labor, and political organizations from across South 





transportation, or education services as well as labor unions seeking improvements in 
working conditions and wages had changed local and regional politics in South Africa (R. 
H. Davies, O’Meara, and Dlamini 1988; Karis and Gerhart 1997; Lodge and Nasson 
1991; Maree 1987; Marx 1992; Price 1991; Swilling 1988). A diverse array of these 
organizational types attended the UDF launch (see Table 2.2). Labor unions were a 
central focus of the UDF, and would later become critical when they merged efforts in 
1988 as the Mass Democratic Movement. At its height, the UDF would claim a 
membership of over 700 organizations with 2 million members (Kessel 2000). In his 
keynote address at the launch of the UDF, Alan Boesak, the president of the World 
Alliance of Reformed Churches, declared that the UDF would pursue its goal through the 
“politics of refusal.” Boycotts, strikes, stayaways, and other forms of noncooperation 
would eventually become tactical mainstays of the UDF and its affiliates (Lodge and 
Nasson 1991; Seekings 2000b). While certain UDF members were eventually linked to 
incidents of violence, the organization, its main leaders and founders, and its strategies 
emphasized various forms of mass nonviolent resistance (Schock 2005; Seekings 2000b). 
Table 2.2. Counts of UDF Organizations and Region of Origin at  
UDF Launch, August 1983 
 Transvaal W. Cape Natal Other Total 
Civic 29 27 24 2 82 
Student 10 23 9 4 46 
Youth 14 36 15 14 79 
Women’s 7 20 3 2 32 
Labor 7 2 4 4 17 
Religion 2 4 5 6 17 
Other 22 12 17 5 56 





Though the UDF and MK were the central actors7 in the decade’s civil conflict, 
other major consequential episodes occurred without any direct impetus from either 
group. The Vaal uprising and subsequent township revolt was the most significant 
example. In mid-1984, the Vaal Civic Association and local affiliates of the Congress of 
South African Students (COSAS), a UDF affiliate led by secondary school students, 
called for stay-aways from school and work in protest of poor educational services, rent 
increases, and dissatisfaction with the local municipal councilors. As the stay-aways 
intensified, some local youths enforced them aggressively, which prompted police to 
intervene. Several youths were killed, and street demonstrations turned violent. Battles 
with police unfolded, buildings were burned, and mobs attacked municipal councilors, 
killing several (Lodge and Nasson 1991, 178). The uprising spread to townships across 
the country, prompting the government to deploy the army to retake control of some 
townships and to declare a national state of emergency. Both the UDF and MK were 
caught unaware by the township revolt. Internally, MK leaders lamented the lack of 
sufficient prepositioned arms to distribute to the many people involved in the chaotic 
events (Kasrils 1989; Maharaj 1990). In internal memoranda, the UDF lamented that it 
was “trailing behind the masses” and had not foreseen or supported the township revolts 
(Seekings 1992). There was substantial violence employed during the revolts, much of it 
directed at government institutions or government agents. However, most townships also 
erected “Organs of People Power” that provided rudimentary governance after state 
institutions were displaced and were seen as another form of mass nonviolent resistance 
(Cherry 2012, 2013; Seekings 2000a). The result was often a mixture of violent and 
                                                
7 There were other marginal anti-regime groups, such as the Pan African Congress and its militant wing or 
the National Forum, which was a rival of UDF, but they were of minimal influence and initiated at most a 





nonviolent forms of resistance. However, the revolts were independent of the coordinated 
resistance of MK’s armed insurgency or the predominantly nonviolent UDF. Such 
episodic or ad hoc violence represented a parallel form of anti-apartheid dissidence and 
resistance.  
 
South Africa’s Changing Economy and Labor Dynamics 
This section explains several changes to South Africa’s economy and labor sector 
that unfolded during the 1970s and early 1980s.  These changes had a major impact on 
many groups of non-white South Africans. These include: significant increases in the 
numbers of non-whites in white collar, semi-professional, and semi-skilled occupations; 
wage and benefit improvements that were concentrated in these occupations among non-
white constituencies; and the emergence of a “dualistic” labor market within non-white 
constituencies with high demand for skilled occupations and stagnant demand for low-
skilled labor and increasing numbers of unemployed individuals.  
While South Africa’s economy is most often associated with mining of primary 
commodities such as gold and diamonds, this changed significantly in the postwar period. 
By 1950, the manufacturing sector surpassed the mining sector in terms of its share of the 
economy and by 1970 it was larger than the agricultural and mining sectors combined (J. 
Nattrass 1981). Nearly half of all employees in South Africa worked in the 
manufacturing, commerce and finance, and services sectors in 1970 (J. Nattrass 1981, 
54). A period of steady growth from the 1960s through the mid 1970s also led to 
increasing demand for labor, particularly in these growth industries. In the immediate 





existed substantial numbers of unemployed and poor white South Africans, fed these 
growing industries with labor. During the 1960s and into the 1970s, however, employers 
encountered difficulties as apartheid-based job reservation statutes limited their ability to 
fill positions and available whites became scarce and more expensive (Hofmeyr 1994). 
As a result, non-whites were increasingly absorbed into South Africa’s growth industries. 
The labor shortages led to the relaxing of race-based job reservations, which were 
removed entirely in 1979, the same year that non-white labor unions were recognized and 
allowed to participate in industrial councils and bargaining frameworks (Maree 1987; J. 
Nattrass 1981). The government and employers also responded to this labor shortage by 
emphasizing mechanization and productivity over a reliance on labor (Crankshaw 1993; 
N. Nattrass and Seekings 2011).  
The composition of employment changed accordingly. Many non-whites 
experienced occupational upward mobility, albeit within various legal and cultural limits 
fostered by South Africa’s apartheid system. The emphasis on mechanization in 
manufacturing also fed a rising need for semi-skilled positions (i.e., heavy/complex 
machine operators) but demand for unskilled manual labor stagnated. Many new semi-
skilled openings were filled by blacks and specifically black Africans. In 1965, only 38 
percent of machine operator positions were held by Africans, but by 1989 Africans filled 
77 percent of these jobs (Crankshaw 1993). Non-white South Africans also saw gains in 
white collar, supervisory, and specialized positions (N. Nattrass and Seekings 2011). In a 
detailed analysis of South Africa’s biennial Man Power Survey, which catalogues 
employment across 600 occupational types, Owen Crankshaw found large increases in 





the proportion of positions held by Africans in semi-professional jobs (i.e., nurses, 
technicians assistants, teachers, medical assistants) increased from 24 to 41 percent; in 
white collar employment (i.e., cashiers, general clerks, office machine operators) rose 
from 15 to 30 percent; and in frontline management positions (i.e., supervisors, foremen) 
increased from 13 to 30 percent (Crankshaw 1996). These numbers likely undercount 
non-whites in these positions, since they exclude coloureds and Indians, who typically 
were better educated and historically less affected by job reservation statutes. Even in so-
called professional positions, such as attorneys, doctors, and accountants, Africans held 
11 percent of all such jobs by 1989. While still vastly disproportionate to their 
representation within the broader population, these changes were significant nonetheless. 
By contrast, unskilled manual labor positions, which would have served as entry-
level positions for many poorly educated or under-skilled non-whites, shrank. In 1965, 
28.5 percent of all positions were unskilled, but by 1992 these occupations comprised 
only 18 percent of employment (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). Numerous Africans 
worked as low-paid domestic servants or in agriculture in the rural areas as well. But 
these opportunities were not growing. In fact, the rate of African unemployment grew 
between the late 1960s into the 1980s, even as many non-whites moved into higher-
skilled positions (Crankshaw 1996). Non-whites in semi-skilled and “middle class” 
positions were in demand and saw rising opportunities in the 1970s and early 1980s while 
the unskilled and unemployed faced comparatively tenuous circumstances or shrinking 
fortunes.  
Wage improvements and overall changes to quality of life also appeared to favor 





early 1980s, Africans in these positions tended to see the highest real wage increases 
among all employed Africans (Hofmeyr 1993). Wages among unskilled workers 
stagnated or fell. The situation was even more precarious for workers outside of the 
manufacturing and services industries. For example, laborers in the construction and 
building sector, which employed many low-skilled Africans, saw falling real wages in the 
1980s. Figure 2.3, drawing on randomized surveys conducted by South Africa’s Human 
Sciences Research Council in non-white communities in 1975 and 1985, demonstrates 
the strong positive relationship between occupational skill level and wage increases 
among non-white South Africans. Non-white unskilled workers saw essentially no 
increases in wages for a decade. Gains for higher-status occupations became more 
modest amid instability of the mid-1980s anti-apartheid campaigns, but even semi-skilled 
positions held by Africans continued to see marked improvements, partly as a 







Figure 2.3: Change in Average Annual Income of  
Non-White South Africans, 1975-1985
 
Source: Data drawn from Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa (UNISA). All figures 
adjusted to 1985 rand values using inflation data from the South African Reserve Bank. Occupational status 
as identified in survey instrument. Unemployed respondents are excluded.  
 
Among those who experienced such wage gains and upward occupational 
mobility, new opportunities emerged. First, while many non-white South Africans 
outside the homelands lived in squatter shacks or rental units operated by state-run local 
housing authorities, more well-off non-white South Africans were able to purchase their 
own homes. Restrictions on landownership by non-whites outside the homelands made 
home ownership difficult, but these were relaxed in the 1980s and commercial lending to 
non-whites began during the middle of the decade. By 1991, between 60 and 75 percent 
of African foremen, training officers, and clerks (so-called “white collar” and supervisory 
positions) owned homes purchased through the private market, according to one union 
survey (Crankshaw 1993). The rates may have been higher for non-whites in skilled and 
professional positions given their higher wages. A third of Africans in semi-skilled 





purchase their own homes (Crankshaw 1993). In general, during the 1980s “in the 
townships, an emerging black middle class was able to buy, improve, or build higher-
quality housing” (Goodlad 1996, 1634). Home ownership in townships like Soweto and 
Alexandra were not uncommon in the 1980s (Marks 2001; Mayekiso 1996). Likewise, 
comparatively more affluent black South Africans began to send their children to private 
schools during the 1980s. The South African government funded public education for 
non-whites, but at low levels. Even though the gap between funding for white and non-
white educations institutions closed during the 1970s and 1980s (N. Nattrass and 
Seekings 2011), schools remained crowded and the quality of education remained poor. 
Many black “middle class” households switched to private alternatives. By the end of the 
1980s, some Africans, Indians, and coloureds were able to send their children to white 
private schools, and many more began sending their children to new private “street 
academies” that began emerging in major cities (Parnell and Webber 1990). These were 
of lower and more variable quality compared to many white private schools, but they 
were often better than publicly funded alternatives. They also remained very popular and 
over-subscribed by non-whites. 
Taken together, these changes in South Africa’s labor market and economy led to 
sharply bifurcated experiences among non-whites. Many experienced upward 
occupational mobility, rising real wages, and the ability to acquire homes or purchase 
private education for their children, even while they remained politically marginalized 
and excluded. In 1993, 63 percent of households in South Africa’s ninth income decile 
and 24 percent of those in the 10th decile were non-white (Table 2.3a). There were 





deciles as there were white households (Table 2.3b). Meanwhile, many unskilled and 
unemployed non-whites saw stagnant or falling wages, struggled under high inflation, 
and remained comparatively more dependent on low-quality public housing and 
schooling that struggled to serve a rapidly growing population. Due to apartheid’s 
racially-based restrictions and oppression, South Africa was a highly unequal society 
with wealth concentrated among the white population and millions of extremely poor 
non-white (mostly black African) households. However, by the end of the 1980s, 
inequality within non-white groups was as high as that across all racial groups (Mariotti 
and Fourie 2014; N. Nattrass and Seekings 2011, 562). There was an increasingly 
“dualistic labour [sic] market in which a smaller number of people were permanently 
employed, increasingly in semi-skilled, better-paid employment, whereas others were 
excluded entirely” (N. Nattrass and Seekings 2011, 557). This dualism, in turn, 
influenced how non-whites resisted apartheid and pressed claims for changes to the 
political status quo. 
 
 
Table 2.3a. Composition (%) of Income Decile population by Racial Group, 1993 
 
Income Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 















African 95 97 93.5 94 89 87 80 66 37 11 
Coloured 3 1.5 4 5 7 7 11 14 18 5 
Indian 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 2 3 5 7 8 
White 2 1 2 0.5 3 3 6 14 37 77 








Table 2.3b. Approximate Number of Households by  
Racial Group And Income Deciles, 1993 
Income Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 















African 2,642,790 2,032,773 1,082,109 733,131 410,998 81,459 
Coloured 78,682 133,297 116,635 155,513 199,945 37,027 
Indian 9,257 16,662 32,398 55,540 77,756 59,243 
White 46,284 38,878 58,317 155,513 410,998 570,213 
 




30% 24% 14% 12% 12% 8% 
Source: Counts approximated from Seekings and Nattrass (2005, 190 & 198) using population and 
demographic data from Statistics South Africa’s October Household Survey, 1996.  
 
 
Analysis: Noncooperation Viability, Loss Aversion, and Forms of Resistance  
This section examines how three different sets of social organizations or 
constituencies in South Africa engaged in anti-regime dissidence. First, it examines how 
the organizations that founded and led the United Democratic Front typified South 
Africa’s “black middle class” and that this status empowered them to adopt nonviolent 
strategies, discouraged them from more disruptive violent approaches, and incentivized 
them to try and reduce certain violent challenges to the government. Contemporaneous 
documents, survey data, and interview material indicate the strong relationship between 
the economic position of these groups and their preference for nonviolent methods. 
Second, two highly similar trade unions are examined. The comparatively restrained 
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), which was initially suspicious of 
political nonviolent militancy but later became the backbone of union-based political 
dissidence, is contrasted with the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU), which 





third set of organizations reviewed are students and youth groups, including the 
university-based Azanian Students Organization (AZASO), the secondary-school based 
Congress of South African Students (COSAS), and various local youth congresses that 
represented school-leavers and unemployed youths. Within these sets, I demonstrate that 
those most economically integrated with relatively high current or likely future earnings 
prospects were the most likely to adhere to nonviolence and resist forms of violence. 
Those with lower and weaker prospects were drawn to violent strategies or mixed 
repertoires. Other factors, such as ideological orientation, experience with repression, the 
existence of pre-existing social organization, membership age, or political access cannot 
explain the divergent behavior within these sets of organizational types. Rather, 
organizations that adhered to nonviolence were strongly influenced by a sense of threat to 
their economic interests and interdependence with elites.  
 
Civics and UDF Foundational Organizations  
The UDF was a coalition or umbrella group comprised of hundreds of affiliated 
organizations. Among these were a core group that helped found and shape the UDF’s 
early efforts and made up its leadership, including early civics and several Indian and 
coloured organizations. These included the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the Transvaal 
Indian Congress (TIC), the Transvaal anti-SAIC Committee (TASC), the Soweto Civic 
Association (SCA), the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO), and the Cape 
Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC).  
These organizations and the UDF leadership as a whole represented South 





chairman of the Soweto Civic Association (SCA), tended to come from a middle-class 
background” (Lodge and Nasson 1991, 55). In 1987, Motlana formed a business with 
other Soweto notables to purchase assets of foreign companies that were leaving South 
Africa as a consequence of sanctions and instability (Lodge and Nasson 1991, 130). The 
Eastern Cape and Western Cape UDF leadership had some more working class roots, but 
leadership among key organizations like PEBCO and CAHAC also had strong middle 
class links. The first PEBCO board included doctors, lawyers, and other professionals 
(PEBCO activist 2020). The leadership of CAHAC, a highly centralized umbrella group 
representing dozens of civics in the coloured communities in the Cape Town area, “came 
from working-class backgrounds, but their families’ standard of living had steadily 
improved in the 1970s whilst they themselves had studied at the universities of the 
Western Cape (UWC) or Cape Town” (Seekings 2000b, 79).  
Among the UDF’s founding organizations and leaders, coloured and Indians were 
over-represented as a proportion of their population in South Africa. In general, at the 
UDF’s launch “there were more organisations [sic] from coloured and Indian areas, or 
with predominantly coloured and Indian members, than predominantly African 
organisations (although some of the African organisations had much larger 
memberships)” (Seekings 2000b, 60). This too was a sign of the role of a strong middle 
class orientation in the UDF. Coloureds and Indians tended to enjoy higher average 
income levels and better qualities of life than many black Africans (see Table 2.3a). 
Central UDF founding organizations such as TIC and NIC “remained an elite body, 





of the organizational and leadership core of the UDF was strongly middle class and 
among the upper socioeconomic tiers of non-white South Africans. 
These same organizations were the strongest adherents of nonviolent strategies 
throughout the 1980s. “CAHAC's methods of demanding redress of its problems never 
included violence, but instead nonviolent direct action,” though “this was not induced by 
an ideological conviction of their effectiveness” (Maseko 1997, 354–55). Civics in 
general “avoided active involvement in violent confrontation” and their approach 
“contrasted with both the strategy of armed struggle pursued by the ANC and the 
confrontational approach of many ANC supporters inside South Africa” (Seekings 2000a, 
54–55). Coloured and Indian organizations, including the NIC and TIC, strongly avoided 
violence and worked to prevent UDF affiliates from engaging in it. During the violent 
township revolts, the ANC lamented in contemporaneous internal reporting that “there is 
no ungovernability in Indian and Coloured areas: how to bring it? Are there grassroots 
structures? What is the extent of involvement in combat actions and the underground in 
general?” (ANC 1987). In separate internal documents, the ANC further reported that a 
TIC conference had advocated “strongly against youth forming self-defence units – if 
they [the youth] engage in any form of violence they would have to move out of the 
TIC.” The document further stated that these organizations “advocate nonviolence or 
underplay armed struggle…even to the extent of cautioning comrades against 
underground work/involvement [with the ANC]” (ANC 1986). Though they remained 
inactive during the more violent episodes of the 1984-1986 township revolts, these same 
organizations did not remain neutral nor did they shrink from anti-apartheid campaigns. 





groups were core contributors. “In the Defiance Campaign of 1989” which was organized 
by the UDF “it is likely that support was derived primarily from the coloured and Indian 
middle classes” as well as similarly wealthy black African members of UDF affiliates 
(Seekings 2000b, 316).  
These general descriptions of preference for nonviolent over violent methods of 
resistance among these organizations – particularly those representing coloured and 
Indian constituencies – is echoed in contemporaneous survey data. Surveys of non-white 
South Africans were rare during apartheid, particularly on subjects of political attitudes 
and behavior. However, in October 1983, just two months after the launch of the UDF, 
2,218 Indian and coloured South Africans were surveyed in a random selection process 
and completed anonymous self-administered written questionnaires developed by South 
Africa’s independent Human Sciences Research Council (De Kock 1983). Several 
questions pertained to views and support for nonviolent and violent forms of resistance to 
the state. The results indicate that occupational status and income correlated positively 
with support for methods of noncooperation such as strikes and boycotts but negatively 
with support for violence. Self-described “professionals” including doctors, attorneys, 
engineers, and various technicians were the most supportive of strikes and boycotts (see 
Figure 2.4). Skilled and semi-skilled respondents in the manufacturing or services sectors 
were also relatively more inclined to strikes and boycotts, whereas laborers and the 
unemployed were less certain of their support for such tactics. An inverse relationship 
emerges regarding views of violent strategies. Respondents in higher income and higher 
status occupations expressed the strongest opposition to the use of violence to advance 





unemployed respondents were open to the use of political violence. Responses may have 
been affected by social desirability bias given the sensitivity of the questions, but it seems 
unlikely that such bias would influence certain socioeconomic categories more than 
others. The relative differences in attitudes toward nonviolence and violence should 
reflect real preference differentials. Together, this data indicate that groups in higher 
occupational status and income correspond not only to support for nonviolent 
noncooperation but also to reduced support for violent strategies. It appears that 
individuals with higher incomes and higher status positions were more sensitive to the 
prospective losses of violent strategies and more supportive of nonviolent methods. 
 
Figure 2.4. “Would You Be Prepared to Participate in a Sit-In 










Figure 2.5. “The Use of Violence to Bring About Political Change is Wrong?” 
 
Source: Survey data from Human Sciences Research Council, 1983. Survey respondents were offered list 
of 16 different occupational options, and occupations were collapsed based on categories in enumerator 
documentation and occupational information from South African Institute of Race Relations.  
 
Beyond a preference for nonviolent strategies, many founding organizations and 
UDF leaders actively sought to reduce the use of violence by UDF affiliates or in 
prominent UDF areas. Albertina Sisulu, a copresident of the UDF, explained that 
“restraining mass militancy was part of the motivation for founding the Front” (Marx 
1992, 134). More specifically, nonviolent action was sometimes coordinated with a view 
to limiting unrest. Boycotts and other forms of noncooperation “were advocated in part to 
restrain people from resorting to violence against the state” (Seekings 2000b, 151) as 
much as they were for pressuring political and economic elites. In 1984 during the initial 
township revolts, supporters of more extreme tactics within the UDF in Soweto, 
including the local youth congress, urged leaders to recreate the conditions that led to 
violent clashes in the Vaal. Prominent UDF leaders and the Soweto Civic Association 





brief consumer boycott during Christmas was organized by the UDF so as to avoid more 
“revolutionary protests” that might lead to violence (Seekings 2000b, 129). When severe 
repression of protesters in Sekhukhuneland in northeastern Transvaal in 1985 resulted in 
deaths of prominent locals, suggestions of more militant actions were suppressed or 
ignored by UDF leaders: “Precisely which affiliates had lobbied the UDF [for violent 
tactics] remains obscure, and there is no evidence of any discussion of violent 
alternatives. The UDF’s stance reflected internal pressures rather than a clear assessment 
of possible alternatives [like violence]” (Seekings 2000b, 182). 
Activists from the period also recounted in interviews how the focus on 
nonviolence seemed partly motivated by the economic interests of many leaders and 
leading organizations in the UDF. A regional leader of the United Democratic Front in 
who was simultaneously an underground member of the ANC recalled in interviews that 
among the UDF, members’ economic standing influenced their disinclination toward 
more confrontational strategies. It was “the objective realities that determine someone’s 
thinking. It is like, guys getting better salary, surely their attitudes will be different. 
They’ve got something to lose. There will be people who because of their social and 
economic conditions would not be as committed… Some of them even have houses. 
Surely they will not be as involved. They have something to lose if this system is 
destroyed” (UDF activist 2020). One former member of the Congress of South African 
Students (COSAS) similarly explained that the relative wealth and occupational status of 
some leading activists appeared to shape their views of different resistance methods. 
“There were people that were, in an existential sense, they were so rooted in conditions of 





not debate about this or that means [i.e., dissident methods]. Then there were those who 
had material comfort and they were just frustrated with skin color issues.... Your 
positionality [sic] affects the kind of decisions being made” (COSAS activist 2020). This 
inclination to use methods that could compel change without dismantling the economic 
system were a strong narrative within debates among leading UDF organizations and 
leadership. “The middle-class nationalists in the UDF were basically fighting to establish 
their place in the socioeconomic system, not to destroy the system” (Kessel 2000, 78). 
Their occupational and socioeconomic status both empowered them to engage in 
impactful noncooperation, but it also made them averse to the losses that more 
widespread violence could trigger. 
Other possible reasons for the focus on nonviolence and active efforts to reduce 
more disruptive agitation and violence appear less convincing. One argument advanced is 
that social organizations may have viewed violence or support for violent groups like MK 
as more likely to face violent repression (Cherry 2013; Houston 2010; Lodge 2009; 
Seekings 2000b). However, the UDF and its allies were not spared legal or violent 
repression because of their emphasis on nonviolence. Within a year of its founding, most 
of its leadership had been arrested and put on trial for treason. Some regional UDF 
leaders were killed, as were figures in the labor movement. The Congress of South 
African Trade Union’s offices were bombed in 1987. During states of emergency in 1985 
through 1987, roughly 20,000 UDF members were detained, and the organization was 
ultimately banned in 1988 (R. H. Davies, O’Meara, and Dlamini 1988; Marx 1992). Still, 
remaining UDF leaders and those released from detention formed a new nonviolent entity 





in 1989. Ultimately, they reassumed the UDF brand when it was later unbanned. Most 
leaders and leading organizations in the UDF faced substantial repression from the 
moment they were formed. The focus on nonviolence provided them minimal protection 
from legal or physical consequences of repression, yet the commitment to mass 
nonviolent methods remained unchanged. 
Another possible counterargument posits that social organizations that affiliated 
with and supported the UDF were not exactly committing to nonviolence but merely one 
strain of effort within a broader, coordinated effort. The ANC explicitly adopted a 
component of “mass mobilization” in its four-pronged strategy, and in 1979 it resolved to 
create an above-ground popular front in South Africa (Barrell 1993). For that matter, both 
organizations were strongly aligned ideologically. Many of the social organizations that 
founded the UDF were sympathetic to the ANC and shared its support for the “Freedom 
Charter” document that called for non-racial democracy in South Africa, which was first 
created by the ANC in 1955. Was the UDF merely one element of the ANC’s campaign 
against the apartheid government, a complement to MK, its military wing? In reality, the 
UDF and MK were fairly distinct. Top leaders in the ANC were surprised when the UDF 
was announced in 1983 (Seekings 2000, 47–48). Communications between the ANC and 
UDF were also minimal and irregular until 1988. Despite its more expansive four-
pronged strategy, the ANC remained highly focused on armed struggle – to a fault, some 
argue (Barrell 1993). One exhaustive effort to interview various leading activists, MK 
members, and ANC officials during the early 1990s to chart the development of ANC 
strategy concluded that the UDF was autonomous of the ANC and MK: “What is clear is 





independent, innovative minds who are coming up with the same requirement [for a 
front, as the ANC did in internal documents in 1979]” (Narsoo 1990; see also Wood 
2000, 141). That the UDF was autonomous of the MK while simultaneously adhering to 
the same ideological principles of the Freedom Charter also suggests that ideological 
differences were not responsible for the different dissident strategies employed by these 
groups. 
During the 1970s and increasingly during the 1980s, there were many foreign 
governments and other transnational actors that became involved in South Africa’s anti-
apartheid campaigns. Some of this support, particularly international boycotts, 
divestments, and sanctions, sought to directly pressure the government to pursue more 
democratic reforms. However, many international actors also provided funding to 
dissident groups. Previous research has argued that such funding may influence how 
dissidents behave, specifically that they will moderate their behavior in order to attract 
and retain such fund support (Haines 1984). However, the availability of external support 
did not appear to be a strong consideration for activists working to challenge and 
overthrow the apartheid regime in Pretoria. The UDF benefited from a large and steady 
stream of funding from foreign governments. By 1987, the nonviolent UDF had an 
annual budget of nearly $1 million, the majority of which was donated by European 
governments (Marx 1992, 139–40). The ANC received direct financial support as well. 
The Swedish International Development Agency provided $12 million to the ANC, much 
of which went to housing, feeding, and providing political education for MK cadres. It 
was also understood that up to a quarter of these funds would support “home front” ANC 





support that the ANC/MK received from eastern European governments and the Soviet 
Union. Neither the violent nor nonviolent campaigns against the apartheid government 
lacked for external financial support, and therefore the availability of such funding does 
not appear to have influenced the methods of dissidence adopted by the UDF, MK or 
other actors.  
In summary, many of the central organizations that founded and led the UDF 
were rooted in the non-white middle class. These groups were strongly supportive of 
nonviolent approaches to anti-government resistance, and appeared to actively work to 
reduce violent resistance.  These strategies were rooted in a preference for a challenge to 
the system of governance and a place in the political system and leadership, but not a 
revolutionary threat to prevailing economic arrangements from which they benefited. 
That they were organized availed them of effective nonviolent noncooperation strategies, 
but their level of economic interdependence with elites and the elite economic system 
disinclined them toward the losses that would attend violent strategies of resistance. 
Interdependence triggered a loss aversion mechanism that drove their adoption of 
predominantly nonviolent methods. Neither experiences with repression nor ideological 
differences can explain why these organizations focused on nonviolence over violent 
dissidence. 
 
Labor Unions: FOSATU and SAAWU 
The South African government passed the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1979 and 
allowed non-whites to register trade unions. Official recognition resulted in substantial 





1980s, two of the biggest were the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) 
and the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU). Both claimed nearly 100,000 
members by 1982 and represented many members from the automobile sector, which 
paid some of the highest wages among manufacturers (Cooper et al. 1986; Maree 1987).8 
In other words, both unions exemplified noncooperation viability, and utilized such 
leverage during strikes throughout the 1980s. FOSATU never affiliated with UDF, but it 
did cooperate in several UDF strikes and eventually became one of the biggest members 
of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), whose activism during the 
late 1980s had significant effects on political and economic elite perspectives. Though 
labor overall was a smaller component of the UDF’s base until 1987, SAAWU was the 
largest labor affiliate in the UDF at the Front’s launch in 1983.  
The unions differed in other aspects of their role in South Africa’s civil conflicts. 
While FOSATU hued closely to nonviolent and noncooperation strategies, senior and 
local representatives of SAAWU clandestinely linked with MK and provided logistical 
and informational support as well as safe houses to its cadres in South Africa (Mangashe 
2018; MK cadre 2020; SAAWU activist 2020). By contrast, until 1984 FOSATU resisted 
becoming involved in politics and expressed skepticism of both the ANC and UDF, 
despite attempts from both to court FOSATU’s support (Maharaj 1990; Marx 1992). 
Subtle differences in FOSATU’s interdependent relationship with the state and economic 
status quo may explain these different approaches. Specifically, FOSATU’s early 
political diffidence and reaction to violent events demonstrates that it was averse to 
losing gains and benefits it had previously won from employers and the state. While, 
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FOSATU and SAAWU were very similar in many respects – including size and member 
composition – their different strategies of dissidence are explained primarily by their 
differing levels of interdependence with elites. While both had high potential 
noncooperation viability, loss aversion appeared to influenced their distinct adherence to 
nonviolence. 
In the early 1980s, FOSATU faced criticism for its decision to register as a union 
with the state, which required that it provide annual updates on its organizational 
constitution and membership size and fees. In 1982 and 1983, FOSATU decided to limit 
its involvement in any demands for major political reforms, specifically those associated 
with the ANC and the Freedom Charter. In a major address titled “Where Does FOSATU 
Stand?” in 1982 the head of the union explained that the organization was committed to 
achieving non-racial democracy in South Africa. However, it expressed skepticism of 
more assertive political activism. “For worker leadership in a capitalist society, their 
everyday struggle is related to their job and therefore their wage and therefore their very 
ability to survive…. So worker leadership cannot be wasted by opportunistic and overly 
adventuristic actions” (Foster 1982). Joe Foster, the general secretary of FOSATU at the 
time, warned that the union “needs to avoid simple removal of regime without the 
protection of worker interests post-removal.” Such sentiments were not a reflection of 
timidity or an unwillingness to protest. FOSATU was active in 65 percent of all strike 
actions in 1981-1982 and 30 percent of all strikes in 1983, and FOSATU was often more 
disciplined and suffered lower strike attrition (Howe 1984). But FOSATU also appeared 
more averse to losing wage gains, employment benefits, and other improvements it had 





“FOSATU unions continue to rely on the organised [sic] strength of their members for 
support - but they do not sacrifice their members unnecessarily” (Innes 1984, emphasis in 
original). Many union members appeared to agree, with a survey of black African 
workers in Durban showing that the majority did not expect unions to be politically active 
in their communities while most preferred they focus on wages and dismissals 
(Schlemmer 1984). Political dissidence was seen as threatening economic and 
occupational losses. 
FOSATU’s stance shifted in late 1984 after the township revolts. In November of 
that year, it engaged in a work stay-away that advanced explicit political demands on the 
state. The episode was a reaction to the violent township revolts that began in the Vaal in 
September after students had protested against low school quality and high rents. 
However, FOSATU’s involvement continued to demonstrate a reticence about political 
activism and concerns about broader instability. Alec Erwin, a senior FOSATU official, 
explained at the time that part of FOSATU’s participation was driven by an interest in 
reducing political violence in the townships. “The situation in the Transvaal is in our 
view close to civil war and needed clear protest action…The stayaway was a very clear 
show of mass discontent with specific government policies” (Howe 1985). FOSATU’s 
participation in the stayaway was motivated by non-political factors as well. The 
stayaway demanded that older black Africans be allowed to enter secondary school 
programs. FOSATU saw age restrictions on secondary school enrollment as a threat to 
members’ interests since “age restrictions on students would force them onto the labour 
[sic] market during a period of high unemployment” (Freund et al. 1985). In other words, 





drive down wages. In apartheid South Africa, the decision by a non-racial union with 
black members to engage in political activism was a dangerous one, but FOSATU’s 
decision to do so seemed at least partly motivated by an interest in preventing further 
instability and accompanying threats to its economic interests. FOSATU’s position 
furnished it high nonviolent noncooperation capabilities, but loss aversion influenced its 
decisions significantly.  
Despite their strong similarities, FOSATU may have had more to protect than 
comparable unions like SAAWU. It registered with the state and participated in related 
labor institutions such as Industrial Councils. There is no detailed data available on wages 
within and across labor unions in South Africa during the 1980s, and SAAWU did have a 
presence in high-paying manufacturing sectors. Additionally, SAAWU’s near complete 
lack of documentation makes any such comparison almost impossible.9 However, other 
analyses of labor dynamics from this period state that “Coloured and Indian unions 
participated in industrial councils, which offered benefits that contributed to widening of 
the wage gap between different races” (Ndlovu and Sithole 2010, 918). FOSATU’s 
participation in these same councils, and its use of labor courts, may have generated 
higher relative incomes and benefits for its members than organizations, like SAAWU, 
that eschewed such institutions (S. D. Byrne 2011; R. H. Davies, O’Meara, and Dlamini 
1988, 336; Webster 1983). SAAWU was also more concentrated in the Eastern Cape 
region (R. H. Davies, O’Meara, and Dlamini 1988; Maree 1983), where incomes tended 
to be below national averages (Seekings and Nattrass 2005, 259–60). In an interview, a 
former activist in SAAWU also acknowledged that FOSATU likely was comprised of 
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members with higher incomes: “they had steady income, unlike us who rejected stop 
order system and registration” (SAAWU activist 2020).  
It also appears that a portion of SAAWU’s support was drawn not just from active 
factory workers. The union’s membership included African workers from other non-
factory employment, whose wages may have been relatively lower, as well as from 
unemployed inhabitants from area townships such as Mdantsane and in the Ciskei 
Bantustan (R. H. Davies, O’Meara, and Dlamini 1988, 338; Maree 1983, 38–39). 
SAAWU’s leadership “were all younger men in their 20s without any trade union 
experience” and its more politically assertive style may have been used to mobilize more 
support in the area of East London (Lodge and Nasson 1991, 72–74; Maree 1983, 42). 
The union, in general, appeared less of an effort to protect and advance the wages of 
semi-skilled members, but rather an amalgamation of factory workers and other East 
London township inhabitants, many of whom may have been under or unemployed. 
“Sometimes, honestly, we were not always good about setting up trade union structures 
in the workplace,” according to a former SAAWU activist (SAAWU activist 2020).    
FOSATU’s perspective and behaviors in 1982 through 1984 may have influenced 
its initial decision to avoid political activism and later, unlike SAAWU, to engage with 
MK/ANC. It appears it did not want to jeopardize the gains and benefits it had realized, 
whereas SAAWU and its members had less to protect by comparison. Like FOSATU, 
other major unions appear to have been similarly guarded about their position and 
advancement in South Africa’s economic system. “A CUSA [Council of Unions of South 
Africa] affiliate that showed a greater concern for ‘bread and butter’ issues was the newly 





insistence on black leadership and breaking away from CUSA” (Marx 1992, 199). The 
stronger adherence to nonviolent noncooperation during the 1980s exhibited by 
FOSATU, the National Union of Mineworkers, and others appears to have been driven as 
much by their aversion to sacrificing economic gains as it was its ability to engage in 
impactful forms of noncooperation. 
Other arguments have attributed the differences in FOSATU’s and SAAWU’s 
political activism and engagement in anti-regime dissidence to different factors. 
Specifically, some have argued that the two unions exemplified distinct ideological 
views, with FOSATU adopting a “workerist” perspective on politics. This involved a 
strong emphasis on maintaining strictly factory worker based organizations that avoided 
politics until they were sufficiently large enough to seek a stronger socialist 
transformation in the system of governance in South Africa (S. D. Byrne 2011; Maree 
1987). This contrasted with a more avowedly “Charterist” perspective of unions like 
SAAWU, which drew on the 1955 Freedom Charter, developed by the ANC-led 
Congress Alliance, that emphasized democratic nonracialism along with a socialist 
economic vision as the centerpiece of its vision for political change.  “What is obvious 
and glaring in that camp [i.e., FOSATU] is the workerist tendency,” according to a 
former SAAWU activist (SAAWU activist 2020).  
These apparent distinctions in ideological perspectives or political visions, 
however, may not have been particularly salient. In the 1980s, speeches by its officials 
and union reports did emphasize a “workerist” narrative (Foster 1982; Hindson 1987), 
but FOSATU leaders later acknowledged that these views were not driving consequential 





pragmatic and short-termist, downplaying theory as ‘esoteric,’ leading to a ‘loose and 
fuzzy’ theoretical basis” (S. Byrne and Ulrich 2016, 382). As one former FOSATU 
official recalled in discussions about workerism, “we just didn’t spend a lot of our time 
trying to think through things that we saw being not practical at that time” (S. Byrne and 
Ulrich 2016, 381). FOSATU focused on protecting and advancing the material interests 
of its members, and “workerist” ideologies were adopted but may have been less 
determinative of the actions taken. In fact, FOSATU would become a leading force in the 
creation of COSATU, a massive umbrella organization for many unions that publicly 
adopted the Freedom Charter in 1987. Eventually, the more socialist and workerist 
aspects of the Freedom Charter were abandoned during the ANC-led transition to 
democracy, even as many COSATU members took on political roles in the party and the 
government (S. Byrne and Ulrich 2016; E. J. Wood 2000). Any “workerist” tendencies 
appear to have been abandoned, another indication that they may not have proved 
especially important in shaping FOSATU’s strategies during the 1980s. 
 
Youth – Universities, COSAS, and Congresses 
Beyond the trade unions, civic associations, and the predominantly Indian or 
coloured organizations, various youth and student groups were another prominent 
organizational form in South Africa’s civil conflicts during the 1980s. Three types 
predominated. There were university-level student entities, such as the Azanian Students 
Organization (AZASO), which represented tertiary students on blacks-only university 
campuses and those admitted to “open” multi-racial universities (i.e., University of 





South African Students (COSAS) was formed in 1979 and had a national presence and 
representative branches in many towns across the country. However, due to South 
Africa’s large and growing youth population, a growing number of black South African 
youths either left secondary school, failed exams, dropped out, or never attended. Many 
of these youths formed so-called “youth congresses,” with as many as 200,000 members 
in potentially hundreds of local youth congresses operating around the country by 1987 
(Kessel 2000). I briefly discuss each of these three sets of youth organizations and their 
involvement in anti-regime resistance efforts, both violent and nonviolent. Broadly, all 
three included members in the same approximate age ranges – members of some youth 
congresses were as old as 38 (Carter 1991; Kessel 2000) – but they represented 
constituencies who had sharply differing levels of interests and prospects in the 
prevailing economic system. These differences shaped how they engaged in resistance. 
That they all existed as organizations, some including huge numbers, provided them 
potential cohesion, resilience, social capital, and nonviolent noncooperation abilities, but 
it was prospective losses that appeared to shape how these organizations engaged in 
dissidence. 
Before detailing the differences in these sets of youth organizations, it is worth 
revisiting the income and employment implications of education levels in South Africa 
during this era. Schooling had profound impacts on wage prospects. This was especially 
true for non-white South Africans on account of South African industry’s increasing 
emphasis on skills and productivity over unskilled labor during the 1970s and 1980s and 
the changing but still prevalent race-based restrictions and hurdles to employment and 





post-secondary schooling for African males increased wage earnings by 17 and 34 
percent, respectively, according to one estimate (Mwabu and Schultz 2000, 314). The 
effects of schooling on income for African females was even higher. These effects were 
far higher than inter-ethnic differences in other developing countries. Coloureds and 
Indians saw high wage increases with additional schooling as well, though not as large as 
Africans. A broader analysis of the vast differences in average wages between racial 
groups from a random survey of South African households during the post-apartheid 
transition found that 50 percent of the differences were attributable to differences in years 
of education (Mwabu and Schultz 2000). Attending school, particularly post-secondary 
education, profoundly changed black South Africans’ position within the economy. 
Moreover, black attendance at secondary and post-secondary institutions changed 
dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1980, Africans, coloureds, and Indians 
represented a fifth of all university attendees. Roughly 13 percent of university students 
were African. By 1990, blacks made up half of all university attendees, and Africans 
were one-third of the total (Moodie 1994). Life and opportunities for blacks remained 
distinctly worse, even at so-called “open” universities and more so at the many 
overcrowded and poorly resourced secondary schools throughout the country. However, 
education represented a hugely effective and increasingly accessible means of economic 
elevation and integration. It was also competitive given rising unemployment for the 
unskilled, particularly black Africans.    
The Azanian Students Organization (AZASO) was founded in 1978 to replace the 
South African Students Organization (SASO), a prominent Black Consciousness (BC) 





ideology and toward more Charterist and non-racial visions for South Africa. Eventually 
in 1986 it changed its name to the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO), 
thereby disassociating itself with BC ideology and adopting a more recognizably 
Charterist label (Cele and Koen 2003; Heffernan 2016). Despite this affinity for the core 
vision and principles of the African National Congress, AZASO was rarely involved in 
the most militant or violent forms of resistance that occurred during the anti-apartheid 
struggle. It focused on “education as a field of struggle.” Beginning with its first 
campaigns in 1980, AZASO focused its activism on university policy matters, including 
preventing quotas that would limit the number of blacks admissible to multi-racial 
universities as well as curtailing the ability of universities to arbitrarily expel students 
(Badat 1999). AZASO was also an early, active member and large affiliate of the UDF. It 
provided canvassing support for a “Million Signatures Campaign,” that ultimately was 
deemed a failure by the UDF (Badat 1999; Seekings 2000b). AZASO students still 
engaged in contentious action, and were prominent participants in the Second Defiance 
campaign marches and rallies in 1989 (Badat 1999). But the organization did not appear 
to provide direct or indirect support to MK, and within its meetings leaders often rejected 
the idea of supporting the armed struggle (Badat 1999, 322). Rather, its activism was 
largely confined to campus protests and campaigns, as well as support for UDF 
campaigns (Bot 1984). Youths, generally speaking, were a prominent participant in the 
township revolts, and AZASO was familiar with the townships through its regular 
canvassing work for the UDF, but AZASO members were not deeply involved in the 
often violent episodes that erupted in many townships in 1984-1986.10 Moreover, police 
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and army presence on university campuses was not uncommon during the state of 
emergency, but AZASO was rarely associated with violent methods of resistance here.  
Its focus on nonviolence may have been due to its members’ comparatively 
brighter economic prospects. In fact, the organization’s leaders explicitly warned 
prospective members against focusing excessively on their privileged status and 
developing skills for high-paying employment. In a printed address to incoming students 
in the fall of 1983, Joe Phaala, then the president of AZASO, advised students to avoid 
becoming “the get-rich-and-die-early lot of doctors and lawyers” and that “we essentially 
form the potentially co-optable middle class.”  
The challenge is therefore on us to decide whether we are going to be part 
of the oppressive system or part of the oppressed majority. Some people 
amongst us [i.e., black university students] wrongly assume that this is a 
challenge facing whites only, when we have all the signs before us to 
show that some black people also form an important part of the oppression 
machinery… Some of us also hang on this assumption very consciously 
out of the fear that joing [sic] hands with the very majority of our 
exploited people will mean losing our privileged positions. If we want to 
be part of the oppressed, then we must turn all privileges granted us into 
instruments of strengthening the struggle for democracy as some white 
patriots have done in the past and continue to do today (Phaala 1983). 
 
Phaala’s address reflected the unique position of non-white university students in South 
African society: individuals on the brink of privilege and income gains, but ones that 
could be reversed by challenging the prevailing economic system within which they had 
risen. This may explain a focus on the forms of resistance that AZASO emphasized: 
“passive resistance” such as mobilizing and protests as well as “strikes and boycotts,” 
typically on campuses over education policies (Phaala 1983). The focus on nonviolence 
was a way to leverage their privileged status but also avoid overthrowing the economic 
                                                                                                                                            






system in which they were rising. Still, AZASO held a strong principled ideological 
stance, drawn mostly from the ANC’s Freedom Charter. But in contrast to previous black 
university student organizations, AZASO was “by temperament much more strategically 
calculating” and “this disciplined activists to assess seriously the political and 
organisational [sic] costs and risks attached to collective actions, the possible gains, and 
to also give attention to questions of trade-offs between gains and costs” (Badat 1999, 
359). Such circumspection was reflected in another aspect of AZASO’s outlook, where 
debates over views of white students and alliances with the predominantly white National 
Union of South African Students (NUSAS) were questioned. Engagement was 
controversial, but fears about engendering militancy shaped AZASO’s decision to work 
with NUSAS. “It was argued that there was a danger of creating ‘a monster which we 
cannot control’ if initially SANSCO [AZASO] were to say ‘we are organising to fight 
whites’ and then later to declare that ‘no, we are actually fighting the system’” (Badat 
1999, 318). In general, caution was often widely shared among non-white students. At 
Rhodes University in the early 1980s debate emerged over whether black university 
students should support ongoing consumer boycotts and solidarity strikes in the Western 
Cape by boycotting exams. The debate was motivated by reports of state repression 
targeting Congress of South African Students (COSAS) for being active participants in 
the consumer boycotts. But Rhodes students were reluctant to be involved, many arguing 
“this would achieve little, and only result in students missing a year of their studies… 
This issue was debated fiercely, and late into the night. Eventually the latter position [i.e., 





AZASO’s constituency was politically excluded but also a relatively 
economically integrated group within South African society. Radical thinking and 
outgoing activism was common, and some AZASO members were detained or arrested 
for their work. AZASO was a vital affiliate of the UDF and active in many protest events, 
particularly on university campuses. But within this broader constituency a significant 
priority was placed on finishing university, and this shaped how the organization engaged 
in anti-government resistance, specifically a preference for nonviolent forms of resistance 
and a cognizance of various gains and tradeoffs of militancy. Overall, many appeared 
swayed by concerns over losing the privileges they had earned and envisioned by 
matriculating to university. This translated into a focus on nonviolence and 
noncooperation. AZASO was not a completely inactive and quiescent organization, but 
did appear disinclined to support violent methods. 
Where AZASO demonstrated a stronger adherence to nonviolence, its 
organizational counterpart at the secondary level was more apt to mix forms of resistance 
targeting the South African government. The Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS) was founded in 1979 to represent high school students’ interests in improving 
the quality of education and their involvement in politics more generally. Its activism 
began in 1980 with a series of protests and walkouts at various high schools around the 
country, and it also supported major worker strikes in 1981 and 1982. COSAS was 
among the largest voluntary organizations in South Africa and among the few with a truly 
national presence. When it joined the UDF upon the Front’s launch in 1983 it was 





Though it made no position public, COSAS was a significant resource of support 
for MK. Several leaders and founders of COSAS later left South Africa to obtain military 
training with MK and returned to the country (Carter 1991; Cherry 2010, 2018; TRC 
Commission 1999). Many COSAS members served in MK’s grenade squads, small units 
that were provided short training courses to bomb local government buildings and the 
homes of police and state officials (Barrell 1993). Some were arrested or died in 
attempted attacks (Simpson 2009). Ultimately, COSAS was banned in 1985 and hundreds 
of its members detained as the township revolt worsened, and its members joined other 
organizations or carried out work clandestinely (Marks 2001). COSAS straddled a divide 
between violent and nonviolent forms of resistance to the state.   
As the organization that represented secondary-level black students, its 
constituency featured those who had comparatively better prospects of economic gains if 
they could obtain quality training and complete school. While the South African 
government had provided increasing resources to black high schools during the 1970s 
and 1980s, it could not match the growing numbers of secondary-level or older black 
South Africans seeking to obtain a high school degree. The number of those enrolled in 
non-white secondary-level schools roughly doubled between 1980 and 1984 (Gerhart and 
Glaser 2010, 60), and the South African government sought to put an age limit on those 
who could attend to keep enrollment and costs down, an issue that became the basis of 
protest campaigns (J. Davies 1996; Hyslop 1988). Amid these conditions, failure rates for 
black students in secondary-level schools were 50 percent or higher for many years 
throughout the 1980s (Parnell and Webber 1990). This meant that COSAS represented a 





education could provide in South Africa’s skills-based economy, but that many of them 
were likely to leave school early or fail to matriculate. This may have contributed to 
COSAS’s involvement in a mixture of forms of resistance to the state.  
This mixture of strategies and interests led to adjustments to COSAS’s strategic 
focus during the 1980s. After years of increasing involvement in broader political matters 
and militancy, most observable through COSAS solidarity school boycotts during worker 
strikes in 1980-1982 as well as a rising membership base comprised of youth who had 
left school or were unemployed, the organization redoubled its attention on education 
policy in 1982 and began to use boycott tactics more sparingly (Gerhart and Glaser 2010, 
59). It also sought to limit membership to those who were enrolled in secondary school 
(COSAS activist 2020; Price 1991, 172). COSAS found that “discipline” was becoming 
an issue and “it became clear that the interests of secondary school students diverged 
substantially from those of unemployed school-leavers, to whom educational issues were 
usually irrelevant” (Gerhart and Glaser 2010, 99). COSAS branches around the country 
began to help construct alternative organizations for out-of-school and jobless youth. 
These organizations proliferated quickly, and many townships and communities became 
the sites of locally based youth congresses (i.e., Utienhage Youth Congress, Alexandra 
Youth Congress, Port Elizabeth Youth Congress, etc.). By 1987 these organizations 
included hundreds of thousands of official members. 
These youth congresses provided many of the self-described “shock troops” or 
“young warriors” of the township revolts (Lodge and Swilling 1986). Youths from the 
congresses were often involved in petrol bombing the homes of local government 





congresses became the source of militants for local self-defense units and so-called 
amabutho (the name for a regiment or military formation in Zulu) paramilitary militia. 
Their tactics and discipline were often crude and rudimentary, but many groups did 
obtain arms and grenades, some seized from the police (Cherry 2018; Gerhart and Glaser 
2010). Contemporaneous descriptions from well-established scholars styled them as 
“unemployed, virtually illiterate, the offspring of broken or scattered families, living in 
packs 100 or 200 strong in what they call ‘bases’ on the fringes of poorer squatter 
camps….They may not have a program but they do have guns and grenades” (Lodge and 
Swilling 1986). They were also the perpetrators of targeted attacks on alleged 
“collaborators” with the regime, often burning victims alive. These groups made many 
townships and communities “ungovernable,” as the ANC had called upon them to do via 
a widely circulated address by leadership in April 1985 roughly six months after the 
revolts had started.  
While doubtless there were individual members of COSAS and AZASO who 
participated in the township revolts, including its more violent episodes, the violence was 
largely led by the youth congresses. Enrollment in school created a sharp division, 
according to analysis from the period. In coverage of the township revolt, it was noted 
that “the school movement [i.e., COSAS] was more articulate…[while] the other section 
of the youth movement is provided by the youth congresses” (Lodge and Swilling 1986). 
Events of the northern Transvaal reflect these distinctions. Local COSAS and AZASO 
branches had worked to organize out-of-school youths in 1984 by mentoring the 
Sekhukhuneland Youth Congress (SEYO). As the township revolt unfolded, SEYO 





youth activist “When SEYO came, then COSAS activity died” (Kessel 2000, 104, 113). 
Relations between the youth congress and other voluntary organizations and UDF 
affiliates deteriorated as the township revolt led to widespread violence. Local leaders 
created a new organization to reestablish control over the youth congresses: The 
Sekhukhune Parents’ Crisis Committee (SPCC). According to one of its founders,  
‘The sole purpose of the SPCC was: to prevent violent activity of youth 
from penetrating in the business community.’ The SPCC was formed in 
1985 at the initiative of Sekhukhune Chamber of Commerce after 
consultations among businessmen on the proper modes of defensive 
action. Some favored a violent response to ransacking youths, whereas 
others pleaded for consultation with youth leaders” (Kessel 2000, 113). 
 
This effort by existing voluntary organizations to forestall further youth congress 
violence was emulated elsewhere. In Soweto, the National Education Crisis Committee 
(NECC) was created in 1985 to manage youths who had declared they would no longer 
return to school. In early 1987, a new organization had been founded by UDF leaders, for 
whom “reining in the youthful crusaders was to become one of their main priorities” and 
“its main function was to bring the youth into line” (Lodge and Nasson 1991, 102–3). 
After its first meeting at the University of the Western Cape, the South African Youth 
Congress (SAYCO) counted 1,200 affiliates with 500,000 signed-up members and a 
larger base of up to 2 million youths in a federated structure (Seekings 2000b, 210).  
In much the same way that the NECC stepped into a leadership vacuum in 
school politics, SAYCO hoped to regroup youth organizations and give 
direction to the insurrectionary youth constituency. While attempting to 
establish a disciplined organizational structure, SAYCO’s radicalism 
allowed it to maintain credibility among its following…In terms of formal 
alliances, however, SAYCO remained firmly within the multiclass UDF 
(Gerhart and Glaser 2010, 102–3). 
Youth were a major component of the various forms of resistance and activism 





among this constituency, as the work of AZASO, COSAS, and the youth congresses 
make clear. These should have provided necessary cohesiveness that prevented 
fragmentation and escalation, resilience to repression, and social capital to instill 
effective forms of coordinating nonviolent noncooperation activities. However, these 
groups diverged significantly in how they engaged in dissidence, with some remaining 
predominantly nonviolent while others gravitated to violent riots and armed insurgency. 
That these organizations represented youths with varying prospects and integration within 
the South African economic system appears to have shaped their divergent willingness to 
engage in militant and disruptive forms of activism, particularly political violence. 
COSAS represented a more mixed form of resistance, with strong engagement in UDF 
activities as well as support for MK and the township revolts. Its leadership attempted 
several times to refocus the organization on its primary focus of improving secondary 
education, but its variegated membership shifted its involvement in dissidence. 
Meanwhile, youth congresses represented largely excluded groups, and this seemed to 
incline them more to violent forms of resistance. Debates within AZASO and within 
COSAS over whether to adhere to nonviolence also seemed shaped by an understanding 
that more violent challenges to the state could jeopardize their positions and prospects in 
the economy. This motivated efforts to contain more radical and militant youth, first by 
establishing youth congresses, then the creation of crisis committees, and eventually a 
more federated youth congress structure.  
Two mechanisms operated to influence how these organizations engaged in 
resistance. Each represented relatively cohesive organizations, imbuing them with viable 





have used these tactics to greater effect. This potential does not explain their varying 
behavior, however. The aversion to losses that different forms of resistance implied for 
the interests within the organizations, particularly in AZASO and to a lesser extent 
COSAS, appeared to shape their engagement in South Africa’s various resistance 
campaigns. Meanwhile, lacking few prospects and little leverage due to their lack of 
interdependence with elite interests, the school leavers and unemployed youths that 
comprised the youth congresses more readily turned to political violence. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications  
This paper has sought to reevaluate the application of interdependence theory in 
shaping the adoption of forms of resistance during civil conflicts. While previous 
research has emphasized nonviolent noncooperation viability as the primary way in 
which interdependence produces nonviolent strategies, this explanation alone may not be 
entirely sufficient. That groups have organizational resources and links with political and 
economic elite interests to use noncooperation tactics such as boycotts and strikes does 
not explain whey they also avoid the adoption of strategies of violence. Rather, the 
prospect of losses associated with political violence ensures that such organizations and 
constituencies both engage in nonviolent action and avoid or seek to minimize violent 
resistance. The case of anti-government resistance in South Africa during the 1980s was 
used to empirically assess how these causal mechanisms operate to influence forms of 
resistance. It was demonstrated that pre-existing voluntary organizations that adhered 
more closely to nonviolent strategies appeared motivated in part by loss aversion: they 





within the socioeconomic system and their material interests. Indeed, some groups sought 
to minimize violent resistance by others so as to protect their economic interests.  
These findings have important implications for policy toward nonviolent anti-
regime movements and voluntary social organizations. In fact, the latter are often 
supported financially and diplomatically by developed country governments as a means 
to ensure that civil conflicts remain nonviolent when they emerge in developing 
countries. This is often described as support for civil society and the voluntary 
organizations that comprise it. It appears, though, that whether voluntary civil society 
organizations engage in violent or nonviolent forms of resistance is partly influenced by 
their level of economic integration within the prevailing society and interdependence 
with political and economic elites. In simple terms, “middle class” entities tend to be the 
most strongly motivated to adhere to nonviolent forms of resistance, whereas others may 
be relatively more inclined to mix strategies or support political violence. Given that 
support for civil society is often extended to the grassroots, and, at least rhetorically, is 
emphasized for the most marginalized constituencies so as to empower them, such 
engagement may not ensure that resistance remains nonviolent in the event that broader 
political incompatibilities produce a civil conflict. In South Africa, it is not entirely clear 
whether support for youth congresses would have produced lower levels of violence 
during the townships revolts or reduced inclination to support MK.  
These findings, however, remain limited by several factors. First, the case of 
South Africa may be unique in several ways that could limit generalizability. While 
political exclusion is common in many states, it rarely is as deeply institutionalized as it 





economy was also a mixture of a highly modern financial and commercial base among 
mostly white South Africans and a deeply poor and underdeveloped system among many 
non-whites. Together, these political and economic eccentricities may have uniquely 
shaped the interests, perspectives, and strategies of key actors and organizations in South 
Africa’s civil conflicts. This may have generated substantially strong grievances and 
incentives among excluded groups, prompting them to employ noncooperation in order to 
overturn the prevailing political arrangement. Such grievances may not be as significant 
in other contexts, and many constituencies may opt to avoid all forms of resistance – 
whether violent or nonviolent. In other words, loss aversion may dampen entirely any 
appetite for resistance among politically excluded but economically integrated 
constituencies, leaving the political status quo unchallenged. Additional process tracing 
of various nonviolent and violent anti-regime campaigns in the Philippines, Iran, Ukraine, 
or other episodes would be required to demonstrate the influence of loss aversion on 
strategy selection. Moreover, a focus on constituencies or voluntary organizations that 
opt to remain neutral would be necessary to understand factors influencing such behavior 
and whether loss aversion is a salient source of influence.11 
Lack of detailed data and the variety of forms of resistance that occurred in South 
Africa during the 1980s raise further questions as well. At times, it is difficult to 
determine how internal organizational processes of groups like the civics or unions 
influenced the perception of and support for UDF, MK, or local resistance during the 
township revolts. A reliance on first-hand accounts from histories or interviews to 
understand how whole organizations operated has obvious limits, but the unavailability of 
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details on organizations complicates an effort to generate clearer depictions of behavior at 
this level. Other cases may provide more detailed evidence on how pre-existing voluntary 
organizations reacted to and engaged with different forms of resistance during civil 
conflicts. Likewise, it appears that many organizations in South Africa either adhered to 
nonviolence through support for the UDF or COSATU, or they engaged in mixed forms 
of resistance, such as COSAS’s support for both UDF and MK. Did any adhere solely to 
violence? Is this a consequence of South Africa’s rare experience of simultaneous armed 
and unarmed conflicts? Or are their unique pathways by which pre-existing voluntary 
organizations mobilize into or establish armed insurgent groups that preclude engagement 
with nonviolence? Is a more engaged political wing needed to manage the separate 
efforts of armed insurgency and mass nonviolent strategies? Moreover, what is the 
relationship between the violent episodes of the township revolts, many of which were 
akin to riots or highly localized political violence, and more organized and country-wide 
armed insurgent campaigns? Do these represent distinct forms of political violence with 
different determinants or separate steps on a pathway toward more organized armed 
resistance? Comparison across cases or more detailed data may help answer such 
questions. 
There was a remarkable consistency in the preferred strategies of the 
predominantly nonviolent UDF and its major affiliates as well as the ANC’s emphasis of 
armed struggle through MK. In other contexts, dissident groups may be more prone to 
shift strategies as they consider the reaction of governments and other dissident actors to 
various protest events or campaigns. The UDF remained nonviolent from its founding in 





government reforms to influx control, the creation of the COSATU federation of unions, 
and mass detentions and bannings in 1987-1988. For its part, MK shifted from a focus on 
bombing major infrastructure to guerilla attacks when the township revolts revealed 
potential greater potential support within townships. Different dynamics may have 
prompted different behaviors, and the theory advanced here may point to some possible 
evolutions. Had the South African government pursued a different track vis-à-vis 
economic and labor relations policy, putting in place more stringent restrictions and 
limits on opportunities for the “black middle class,” the mechanism of loss aversion may 
have been less active and many dissidents less inclined to avoid violence. Had MK been a 
more effective insurgency, causing more frequent and more costly damage to South 
Africa’s state institutions and economy, it is possible that the interdependent relationships 
that linked many civics, unions, and other civil society groups with economic elite 
interests would have been severed. The influence of loss aversion and restraint on broader 
support for armed struggle may have diminished as a consequence. Alternatively, had the 
campaign against the government continued for much longer, perhaps deep into the 
1990s had hardline factions in the National Party managed to maintain an on resistance to 
democratization, it is possible that such continued recalcitrance by the government may 
have signaled to predominantly nonviolent groups that the future of the economy and 
their position therein was less certain. As a consequence, they would have had less to lose 
from adopting a more disruptive set of strategies. Such evolving circumstances between 
the government and dissident actors may explain escalation from nonviolent to violent 
strategies in the civil wars in Syria in 2011, to cite one example. While South Africa 





interdependence and the causal mechanism of loss aversion does accommodate potential 
shifts in how dissidents adopt or mix nonviolent and violent strategies. Additional 
theorizing on how dynamics between state and nonstate forces alter the nature of 
interdependence or loss aversion and what relevant thresholds would prompt dissidents to 
switch to violence are necessary, but theory might accommodate more dynamic 
interaction and relational components to explain changes in behavior during the course of 
a dissident campaign or civil conflict.  
Lastly, while the discussion in this paper has focused on how interdependence and 
its accompany causal mechanisms influence the form of resistance during civil conflict 
how interdependence affects the origins of civil conflict has been left aside. Perhaps 
interdependence introduces unique types of threats or signals that trigger civil conflicts 
that by their very structure remain nonviolent. Understanding how interdependence 
influences how civil conflicts first emerge may further clarify the dynamic process of 






Chapter 4: Civil Society Roots and The Intensity of Civil Wars 
 
Abstract: Do the pre-conflict organizational roots of armed nonstate 
actors influence the level of subsequent violence during civil wars? This 
paper theorizes that armed nonstate actors with origins in civil society 
organizations such as student groups, labor unions, religious entities, or 
advocacy organizations have informational and legitimacy advantages that 
reduce their reliance on coercive violence against civilians and their 
vulnerability to government detection and attack. Statistical analysis of 
cumulative battle-related deaths and civilian victimizations across armed 
instrastate conflicts from 1989 through 2017 provides negligible support 
for these propositions. Armed nonstate actors with roots in civil society 
target civilians at similar rates to other armed nonstate groups. Deaths 
resulting from battles with state security forces are also largely unchanged. 
Civil society origins do not appear to influence the intensity of civil wars.  
 
Do the origins of armed rebel groups influence how violent civil wars are? Some 
armed intrastate conflicts feature frequent combat, targeting of civilians, and significant 
fatality totals. For instance, civil wars in Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Colombia involved thousands and even tens of thousands of battle-related deaths. By 
comparison, previous armed insurgencies in Mali and Nicaragua resulted in just hundreds 
of dead. Was the violence in these civil wars different because they were fought by 
different types of insurgents? 
Even countries that experience multiple simultaneous armed civil conflicts see 
substantial differences in the death tolls associated with each armed insurgent group. In 
Algeria during the 1990s, for example, the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armée) rebel group 
was notorious for its operational aggressiveness and its targeting of civilians. Sometimes 
dozens or hundreds would die during single engagements by the GIA. Fatality counts 
resulting from operations by the AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut), which was active 
during the same period, were a fraction of those committed by the GIA (Hafez 2000). 





deaths and civilian victimizations. Why was it so much less violent than the GIA? The 
GIA was founded by groups of Islamist militants returning from the war against Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan. The AIS emerged from a domestic Algerian Islamist movement 
known for earthquake relief and providing social services to poor neighborhoods in 
Algiers before it campaigned during the country’s first multi-party elections in 1990 and 
1991 (Hafez 2000; Mortimer 1991). Given that both groups fought against the same 
government in the same country at the same time, structural factors cannot explain their 
differing approaches. Did the contrasting origins of these two armed organizations shape 
how they operated during Algeria’s ensuing civil war? 
Previous research on armed conflict dynamics has attributed variation in their 
intensity to assorted factors. Some have emphasized the role of structural and macro-level 
variables (Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lacina 2006), others focus on conflict 
processes (Balcells 2010; Kalyvas 2006; Kaplan 2017; Lawrence 2010; Pearlman 2011; 
R. M. Wood, Kathman, and Gent 2012), and some emphasize group- or meso-level 
characteristics (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Staniland 2014; 
Weinstein 2007; Worsnop 2017). Among these many factors, two challenges for armed 
nonstate actors are recurrent: the need to consolidate control of populated territory and 
the management of information about rebel positions, personnel, and operations. The 
resolution of both is contingent on how armed nonstate actors establish relationships with 
noncombatant populations. Whether they are resolved greatly influences the extent to 
which armed rebels target civilians with coercive violence and their vulnerability during 





The analysis here investigates whether organizational origins of armed militant 
groups provide advantages in resolving these challenges. Specifically, it argues that civil 
society organizations have extensive experience working with grassroots actors, 
providing local services, and accessing bottom-up channels of information on citizen 
preferences. Armed groups with roots in civil society can leverage these advantages to 
switch more rapidly and effectively from the use of coercive violence against civilians to 
governance tactics to consolidate control over territory. Their superior local connections 
and ability to build grassroots knowledge also allow them to build a “shield of secrecy” 
in which civilians are less likely to provide government forces information about their 
movements and location. By leveraging these advantages, overall levels of violence, both 
in terms of battle-related deaths during engagements with state armed forces and the 
perpetration of one-sided civilian victimizations by armed nonstate actors, is reduced.  
These propositions and analysis contribute both to academic scholarship on the 
dynamics of civil conflict and to policy interests. First, it complements an increasing 
focus on group-level attributes and rebel governance in civil conflict dynamics (J. M. 
Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020; Cederman and Gleditsch 2009; D. E. Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013; K. G. Cunningham and Loyle 2020). Second, it 
investigates the implications of broad-based policy assumptions about the peacebuilding 
contributions of civil society, albeit within a unique context – armed rebel groups (Barnes 
2006; Paffenholz 2009; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; Tocci 2013).  
This paper is written in five parts. In the first section, I review existing research 
on civil conflict dynamics and identify two challenges that influence the intensity and 





why armed groups formed from civil society organizations are better positioned to 
resolve these challenges and therefore employ coercive violence and fall victim to 
government attack less frequently, resulting in less severe conflicts. Third, I explain my 
large-N analytic approach and the source of data therein. The fourth section reviews the 
modeling results and various validity and robustness checks. Finally, I review the broader 
policy and research implications of the findings.  
 
Literature Review: The Challenges for Armed Insurgents 
This section draws on existing scholarly work on civil war dynamics to identify 
two common and interrelated challenges that armed nonstate actors face. How and 
whether these challenges are resolved can affect the extent of fatalities and severity of 
civil wars, both in terms of deaths resulting from battles with security forces and how 
armed nonstate actors target civilians with violence. These challenges are 1) 
consolidating control of populated territories and 2) protecting information about rebel 
positions, personnel, and operations.  
Kalyvas argues that the extent of indiscriminate violence in civil war is a function 
of whether and how well a group controls a populated territory (Kalyvas 2006). When 
armed nonstate actors first operate in a territory, they encounter an “identification 
problem:” new to a region they are unaware who is a supporter and who is a loyalist of 
the incumbent regime. This problem is exacerbated in territory that remains somewhat 
contested since government forces may still be present, creating an ongoing threat and 
emboldening noncombatant loyalists. Additionally, local civilians can exploit armed 





rivals by denouncing them as government supporters. Deprived of adequate information 
and knowledge about the local landscape and its people, rebels may be less 
discriminating in their use of violence in an effort to eliminate possible enemies and 
consolidate control. Indiscriminate violence is costly and often counterproductive since it 
can reduce willing local collaboration with their efforts, so rebels would prefer to be 
more selective in their application of violence. However, “high levels of indiscriminate 
violence emerge because no actor has the capacity to set up the sort of administrative 
infrastructure required by selective violence” to resolve the identification problem 
(Kalyvas 2006, 171). Lacking information about who are real supporters and who are 
incumbent loyalists, rebels may be more likely to engage in excessive amounts of 
violence targeting civilians.  
The emerging literature on rebel governance points to similar challenges in 
consolidating control of populated territories. Kalyvas implies that the establishment of 
effective rebel “administrative infrastructures” can generate local information and resolve 
the identification problem. And across civil wars, armed rebels have engaged in varying 
degrees of service provision, local administration, and governance of territory they 
control (Arjona 2016; Mampilly 2011). Some groups have even held local elections, 
relinquishing some authority to local civilians (K. G. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer 
2020). But the decision to establish rebel governance institutions can be costly and poses 
tradeoffs for rebels. First, without some form of governance administration, armed groups 
are vulnerable. “Rebels that fail to develop adequate institutional arrangements could face 
recalcitrant civilian populations who threaten the rebel agenda through outright hostility 





Stewart 2020, 4). Second, establishing governance institutions involves risk too, since 
armed groups may find they relinquish critical authority and control to other structures 
and leaders. “Rebels can reduce the degree of coercion [i.e., violence] by relying on local 
civilian authorities who already possess legitimacy but in so doing sacrifice oversight and 
direct control” (Mampilly and Stewart 2020, 10). A key factor that simplifies the 
challenge of rebel governance and consolidating control of territory then is whether the 
rebels have some pre-existing level of local legitimacy, can generate legitimacy easily, or 
are experienced in working with local sources of legitimacy while establishing rebel 
governance. With such experience and attributes, the need to employ coercive violence 
against local civilians to consolidate and exercise control of populated territory is reduced 
and establishing rebel governance is simplified. Without it, armed nonstate actors may 
more frequently fall back on coercive violence rather than cede any authority to local 
civilians or resolve the identification problem. 
A second and related challenge that armed nonstate actors face during civil 
conflicts is managing information about themselves. This too is greatly influenced by 
their relationships with local populations. All nonstate actors typically start at a 
disadvantage to the government, which has superior conventional operational capabilities 
and security institutions. This is borne out in battle-death ratios in many conflicts. For 
example, during some of the most deadly fighting in Colombia’s civil war from 1988 
through 2003, three times as many guerillas died as government forces (Restrepo, Spagat, 
and Vargas 2006).12 In Nepal, as many as five times the number of rebels were killed as 
government forces each year during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Bohara, Mitchell, 
and Nepal 2006). This vulnerability increases the importance of reducing detection by 
                                                





government forces. Indeed, the ability to manage information about their location, 
personnel, and overall organizational development has been shown to be critical to the 
transition of small inchoate networks of committed fighters into active armed nonstate 
rebels organizations (Lewis 2017). “Rebels need secrecy from the government about their 
identities, their location, and even their intent to form an organization to violently 
challenge the state” (Larson and Lewis 2018, 876–77, emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, when civilians withhold suspect information about rebels from the 
government, they extend a “shield of secrecy” that reduces rebels’ vulnerability to state 
forces’ operational advantages. The decision to withhold information by noncombatants 
can be fraught and dangerous. Effective policing by the regime can lead to pervasive 
efforts to identify rebel sympathizers, while rebels may actively target individuals to 
deter informers (Petersen 2001). Lewis (2017) has argued that local ethnic homogeneity 
and strong local kinship networks increase the likelihood of such a shield being extended. 
“Ethnicity can play a subtle role as a technology of coordination,” helping rebels manage 
and control information flow through reliably mum local networks of noncombatants 
(Lewis 2017, 1427). Managing and controlling information, then, is hugely important to 
rebels. Ethnicity may be one way to resolve the information challenge and build a “shield 
of secrecy,” but there may be alternative coordination resources or technologies. Doing 
so should influence the number of fatalities rebel groups face, rebalancing an unfavorable 
ratio of battle-deaths that are common in civil wars and potentially yielding a net 
reduction in battle deaths. 
These two challenges – how armed rebels consolidate control over populated 





influence the extent to which they use violence against civilians and are vulnerable to 
government attacks. By extension, how and whether they are resolved should influence 
the level of violence during civil wars. These are not the only factors that affect conflict 
intensity. Important structural factors include the type of prevailing political regime or 
the availability of lootable resources, conflict processes such as third-party intervention, 
and group-level attributes such as the extent of rebel cohesion and material capabilities 
should also affect the severity of civil war violence, among many other salient variables 
(Bakke 2014; Balcells 2010; Fearon 2004; Lacina 2006; Weinstein 2007; R. M. Wood, 
Kathman, and Gent 2012; Worsnop 2017). However, resolving the challenges identified 
here should have an independent effect on the level of violence in civil wars. One area 
from which they may seek resources or coordination technologies may be their pre-
conflict social roots and organizations. Other scholarly work has examined how pre-
existing community connections and political entities shape and steer the capabilities and 
behavior of rebels (J. M. Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020; Petersen 2001; Staniland 
2014). These pre-conflict resources may also influence how violence is used and its 




Theory: Roots in Civil Society, Rebel Governance, and Information Advantages  
This section of the paper explains why armed rebel groups that are founded by 
pre-existing civil society organizations (CSOs) may provide advantages that resolve the 





managing information on rebel organizations. Specifically, CSOs are often described as 
enjoying three common attributes: 1) unique access to local information, even in conflict 
contexts, 2) deep experience in providing services and basic governance at the local level; 
and 3) ability to represent and partner with other organizations from high-level forums to 
the grassroots in ways that foster legitimacy and local ownership. Extrapolating from 
these observed CSO advantages, I argue that armed rebels with roots in civil society 
should be better able to resolve the challenges of consolidating control over populated 
territory and managing information. I then offer several examples of armed nonstate 
groups leveraging these advantages. I conclude by identifying specific propositions 
implied by this discussion and potentially important conditional effects. 
A central advantage of civil society organizations is their purported proximity to 
non-elite citizen networks, even in conflict contexts. “The importance given to civil-
society actors in peacebuilding generally derives from their being representative of, or in 
touch with, 'the people’” (Orjuela 2003, 197). This proximity produces valuable 
experience and advantages for armed actors with roots in civil society. Three specific 
examples stand out. First, due to their access to the “people” CSOs often have unique 
knowledge of and abilities to access local preferences and information. Indeed, CSOs are 
often sought out in civil war contexts by actors seeking such information. For example, in 
peacekeeping efforts, counterinsurgency operations, or other interventions in fragile or 
conflict-affected areas, CSOs have been identified as essential contacts to better learn the 
local context, culture, and people that are shaping the dynamics of armed conflict (Penner 
n.d.; Stime 2017; Tocci 2013; UN Security Council 2015). Civil society organizations 





“early warning” systems: “civil society organizations, linked to local communities that 
provide them with comparative advantages in accessing open-source information on 
potential conflict, can usefully contribute to strengthening the early-warning and response 
mechanisms established at [the African] continental and regional levels” (Affa’a-Mindzie 
2012). CSOs therefore have unique access to information. A lack of knowledge or access 
to information about local preferences is a major challenge that compels armed nonstate 
actors to employ less discriminate violence as they seek to consolidate control over 
populated territories. Those armed groups that have roots in civil society may have an 
advantage in surmounting this informational shortcoming, thereby reducing their need to 
target civilians.   
Second, civil society organizations are commonly observed providing basic 
services to citizens, including financial, educational, health, dispute resolution, or public 
safety solutions that are otherwise unavailable or of insufficient quality (Boulding 2014; 
Bratton 1989; Clayton, Oakley, and Taylor 2000; Ingram 2020; Paffenholz 2009). “The 
direct provision of services to the citizens forms an important part of the activities of civil 
society associations, e.g. self-help groups. Especially [sic], in cases where the state is 
weak it becomes a basic activity to provide shelter, health or education” (Paffenholz and 
Spurk 2006, 13). As noted previously, many armed nonstate actors attempt to build 
governance structures in areas where they are seeking to establish control, often by 
providing basic services to earn trust and willing support for their agenda. Since many 
civil society organizations often have pre-existing experience in generating and 
administering basic social services, armed nonstate actors with roots in civil society 





administrative frameworks to provide such services in areas they seize. As a 
consequence, the need to rely on coercion and violence to establish and maintain control 
and authority should be reduced.  
Third, CSOs are often praised for their ability to connect with, represent, and even 
shape local-level preferences. This dynamic has been observed in conflict contexts, 
specifically civil war peace negotiations. “Civil society actors may engage in 
[negotiations] so as to contribute to creating legitimacy and ownership of the peace 
process,” according to an empirical analysis of the outcomes of various civil war peace 
processes when they include civil society groups (Kew and Wanis-St. John 2008; Nilsson 
2012, 247). They do so in a variety of ways, including representing or channeling local-
level interests of citizens into high-level political processes or by facilitating “direct 
participation by actors at the grassroots level engaging in intercommunity meetings and 
other public fora” (Nilsson 2012). In other words, civil society actors have unique skills 
in building trust and legitimacy in high-stakes political processes on account of their 
ability to access and channel information and interests into and between high-level 
political forums and the grassroots community level. This ability may resolve the tradeoff 
rebel groups face as they share power with local sources of legitimacy when building 
governance structures to consolidate control over populated territory. Powersharing 
arrangements poses tradeoffs to rebels, since it may be difficult, costly, or risky to cede 
authority to locals, but civil society organizations may be better able to generate 
legitimacy directly with locals or to network and partner with pre-existing sources of 





need to rely on violence or coercion to build local administrative frameworks or compel 
cooperation from (or eliminate) pre-existing sources of legitimacy.  
In addition to supporting armed nonstate actors efforts to consolidate control of 
populated territory, the advantages and attributes of CSOs should help armed nonstate 
actors resolve the challenge of managing information about their organizational 
development, personnel, and operations. With strong access to local information 
networks, the ability to serve local needs and govern grassroots matters, and experience 
partnering with other local sources of legitimacy, armed nonstate actors with roots in civil 
society should be able to access the shield of secrecy and reduce the ability of 
government forces to obtain information about the rebels. As a consequence, these rebels 
should be less vulnerable to government attacks. While these informational benefits may 
also enhance rebel abilities to inflict losses on government forces, given the high fatality 
ratio that armed nonstate actors face during civil wars the net result should be a reduction 
in battle-related deaths. 
 Several examples from armed intrastate conflicts in Mexico, Algeria, and El 
Salvador provide useful context for how the preceding discussion of how civil society 
attributes can resolve critical challenges that armed nonstate actors face.  
The ability to leverage grassroots connections and pre-existing reservoirs of 
legitimacy may explain why the AIS in Algeria was comparatively less violent than the 
GIA during the country’s civil wars of the 1990s. Born from the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS) movement, the AIS enjoyed ready support at its founding. It built large zones of 
control in both Western and Eastern Algeria, often in areas where it had already been 





had run for local office. In fact, the FIS did not even plan to launch a bona fide armed 
militant wing during the initial phases of its challenge to the government following a 
coup d’état that annulled FIS’s members’ victory in national elections in 1992. “The 
complacency of the FIS was perhaps based on its belief that its legitimacy in the political 
arena earned it the loyalty of [existing] armed Islamists” (Hafez 2000). Later, the AIS 
also explicitly renounced the use of violence against many targets, including civilians, 
scholars, foreigners, and others, focusing instead on “legitimate” targets in the security 
forces and state institutions (Ashour 2008). Nonetheless, the AIS still operated as a 
capable armed force. The group was “able to hold its positions in the face of the ANP 
[Algeria’s National Popular Army] strikes, and the latter was unable to destroy it” 
(Ashour 2008). The AIS was also more discerning and precise in its reliance on violence 
than its primary rival armed nonstate group, the GIA. It was even able to seize some areas 
controlled by the armed nonstate group GIA in 1996 and 1997, not through force but 
because it was seen as more legitimate than the GIA, which had relied almost entirely on 
coercive violence to control its territory (Ashour 2008). By 1997, however, the excessive 
violence of the GIA had begun to harm even the AIS’s own strategy of armed resistance 
to the government. When it finally declared a ceasefire unilaterally in 1997, an AIS 
commander gave an interview saying “there was consequently no point in continuing the 
fight against the regime, due to the waning in popular support” for any challenge to the 
government (Ashour 2008). Though it took up arms against the government, the AIS was 
more calibrated in its use of force throughout Algeria’s civil war. It relied focused on 





conflict as a civil society organization, rather than coercive violence to consolidate 
control over populated territory. 
One example where an armed nonstate actor’s roots in civil society may have 
allowed it to cultivate a “shield of secrecy” is the Zapatista militant group FLN/EZLN in 
Mexico. The FLN/EZLN was founded by an urban-based student organization that 
relocated to the Chiapas region where they had no social roots. The group was nearly 
destroyed initially when the military attacked their locations after locals informed on their 
whereabouts. It overcame these problems, however, by developing better knowledge 
about local communities. “It had become clear that, as a group that was exogenous to the 
Selva [region], the FLN would need to strike up local contacts, in contrast to past failed 
efforts…This allowed the FLN to better understand the needs of its inhabitants, and led to 
the “indigenization” of the FLN/EZLN both in terms of discourse and internal 
organizational processes” (O’Connor and Oikonomakis 2015, 386). The approach, which 
eschewed high levels of violence, was a successful one: “By 1988, the EZLN had rapidly 
expanded and exerted almost complete control over the Selva, consolidating a “safe 
territory” and using it as a base from which to expand. At this stage, the Zapatista 
militants could move openly from community to community” (O’Connor and 
Oikonomakis 2015, 393; N. Ross 2019). The result was superior protection for the FLN 
group as well as better control over territory. By drawing on civil society tactics of 
grassroots outreach and partnering with local source of legitimacy, it was able to better 
protect itself from government detection. Fewer battle deaths with state security forces 





Though they did not directly originate from civil society organizations, armed 
nonstate actors active during El Salvador’s civil war in the late 1970s through the 1980s 
did frequently leverage civil society tactics and groups. It was common for groups like 
the FPL (Fuerzas populares de liberacíon) and the ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del 
Pueblo) to build community-based campesino organizations or integrate with formalized 
nongovernmental organizations to enhance local service provision, access information on 
local civilians, and control intelligence on rebel positions and identities. For example, the 
FPL faction “encouraged residents to participate in local organizations called poder 
popular local (local popular power). The purpose of these organizations was to provide 
goods and health care to local residents as well as guerilla forces…. The FPL also 
believed that participation in such organizations would politicize residents” (E. J. Wood 
2003, 126). The ERP was even more actively integrated with various civil society 
organizations. “Under the leadership of nongovernmental organizations allied to the ERP 
– whose leaders were in some cases strategically placed ERP political officers – the 
cooperatives would form a network of overt organizations and expand ERP influence” 
(E. J. Wood 2003, 167) These connections provided real benefits for the ERP, FPL, and 
other armed nonstate aa=ctors. First and foremost, campesino cooperatives and more 
formal civil society organizations provided essential intelligence to ERP, FPL, and other 
groups. “The principal contributions of the residents of the case-study areas was ‘silence,’ 
the refusal to inform on guerrillas…. According to a ERP leader active in Tres Calles 
area in the late 1970s, campesinos consistently lied to the security forces concerning the 
degree of subversive [civil society] organizing….Silence also protected the leaders of 





2003, 126). The political sensitization and informational protection resulting from civil 
society organizing compensated for the group’s inferiority in military capabilities. The 
group’s “rural political capacity appears to have been significantly stronger than that of 
the government. The latter’s decisive advantages in numbers, training, and technology 
suggests that insurgent political capacity accounts for the ongoing military stalemate” (E. 
J. Wood 2003, 126–27).  
These networks of CSOs also provided essential information that strengthened 
rebel control of various territories in El Salvador. “Overlapping networks of military and 
political cadres and militant campesinos organized in insurgent as well as reform 
cooperatives, campesino federations, nongovernmental organizations, and the guerrilla’s 
military structure ensured a continual flow of information concerning successful 
activities” (E. J. Wood 2003, 190). With access to such information, these groups could 
be more selective in their application of violence. In fact, government informers were not 
nonexistent, and alleged informers were identified and investigated with some frequency 
(E. J. Wood 2003, 126, 155–56). At least 300 targeted disappearances occurred in rebel 
held areas, according to El Salvador’s post-conflict Truth Commission. The ERP, the 
militant faction most active in civil society organizations, was believed to a major 
perpetrator of such investigations and targeted assassinations (Betancur, Planchart, and 
Buergenthal 1993). Given the extent to which the ERP relied on civil society 
organizations for information, material support, and political sensitization, it seems more 
than likely that these networks and resources were leveraged during such investigations. 
While many persons were tragically killed as a result, the killings appeared targeted 





This history of disappearances in El Salvador highlights that fact that lower levels 
of indiscriminate violence is not the same as no coercive violence at all. It also introduces 
an important caveat about the relationship between civil society and civilian 
victimizations. As in most civil wars, armed nonstate actors will try to eliminate threats 
from suspected informers, traitors, or supporters of their enemies. To do so they will 
leverage available informational and organizational resources, including those they may 
draw from civil society roots. Indeed, Balcells has argued that civil society organizations 
may become both a key resource for identifying local supporters of an armed nonstate 
actor’s opponents or a useful shorthand for identifying a citizen’s sympathies with either 
side (i.e., membership in certain organizations implies one’s political preferences). 
During the Spanish civil war of the 1930s, there were frequent killings of an opponent’s 
local supporters by both rebels and government forces. Civil society groups facilitated 
this “sweeping the rear” of noncombatant opponents: “both trade unionists and priests 
were crucial collaborators for the militias from the left and right, respectively” (Balcells 
2011, 206). Thus, civil society may in certain circumstances increase the selective 
targeting of civilians by armed nonstate groups. Importantly, however, this is conditional 
on the local balance of supporters for rebel and incumbent forces (Balcells 2010, 2011). 
In areas that are more evenly split between opponents, armed nonstate actors and 
government forces alike have an incentive to reduce the numbers of their opponent’s 
supporters so that in a post-conflict environment there exists a majority of one’s own 
supporters to dominate political matters. Where the pre-conflict balance of power already 
heavily favored one side or another, the value of targeting noncombatant supporters of 





I incorporate Balcells’s argument into my analysis by conditioning the decision of 
an armed nonstate actor’s roots in civil society to target civilians with violence on the 
actor’s political ideology. This is admittedly a blunt and imprecise approach to 
addressing Balcell’s point. The Spanish civil war involved clearly delineated sides that 
were largely in place due to high levels of pre-conflict political partisanship. Ideology is a 
much more vast and variegated concept, and therefore may incorporate a range of 
different factors and mechanisms that influence rebel behavior. However, the existence of 
a strong ideology may reflect strong differences with perceived political rivals. It has also 
been identified as potentially important in the prospects for establishing effective rebel 
governance. As rebels seize territory and create governance institutions to consolidate 
local control, they must choose whether to integrate pre-existing institutions, such as state 
institutions and representatives, and whether to include formerly excluded populations, 
such as marginalized ethnic or other identity groups (Mampilly and Stewart 2020). A 
group’s political ideology may shape their openness to such inclusivity and integration. 
“Certain extreme forms of revolutionary ideology could lead to more exclusionary forms 
of governance” and obviate any integration or inclusion (Mampilly and Stewart 2020, 
14). This reduces the likelihood of successful adoption of governance tactics and a 
greater need to rely on violence to resolve the identification problem. A strongly 
ideological group, then, would target civilians opposed to that ideology – and leverage 
resources such as information from civil society actors to do so. By contrast, a group with 
a more flexible ideology may be less reliant on coercive violence. For example, part of 
the success of the FLN/EZLN in establishing roots in Chiapas was its ideological 





(O’Connor and Oikonomakis 2015, 386). Though the group lacked any social 
connections to the region that had fairly strong representation for both the ruling party in 
power and opposition groups,13  which Balcells might predict would lead to more 
targeting of noncombatant supporters of one’s opponents, the FLN/EZLN leveraged its 
civil society advantages to integrate pre-existing local sources of legitimacy while 
adapting its ideological position to do so. In summary, the potential effect of civil society 
roots on the use of coercive violence against civilians by an armed nonstate actor may be 
conditional on whether that actor espouses clear and strong ideological preferences.  
The preceding discussion indicates several hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between civil society and civil war intensity. First, civil wars that feature armed rebels 
composed of civil society forebears should be less intense and severe. Specifically, these 
organizations will rely more on governance tactics and less on forms of coercive civilian 
victimization to consolidate local control. They will also have information advantages 
that allow them to be more selective in their use of coercive violence. This implies that: 
Hypothesis 1a.  Armed conflicts in which nonstate armed actors are 
formed from civil society organizations should result in fewer civilian 
victimizations. 
 The effect of civil society origins on violence, however, may be conditional on 
other factors. Relatively new civil society organizations that rapidly transition into armed 
nonstate actors may lack valuable pre-existing links with other social networks, know-
how in cultivating grassroots support, or familiarity with delivering services. Thus, the 
ability to access local information, leverage pre-existing legitimacy, or to partner with 
                                                
13 Vote returns disaggregated to the regional level are inaccessible when the Zapatistas were first 
operational in Chiapas, but in the 1994 election Chiapas had the second highest vote for the opposition 
party as a proportion of votes for the incumbent PRI party among any state in Mexico. Votes for the 





and grassroots actors and local sources of legitimacy may be enhanced the longer a civil 
society organization exists prior to civil conflict onset. 
Hypothesis 1b.  The longer the period of time that armed nonstate actors 
exist as civil society organizations prior to armed conflict onset, the fewer 
civilian victimizations will occur during the armed conflict.  
 Armed nonstate actors with roots in civil society have an advantage in building 
governance frameworks, often by integrating with preexisting local forms of governance. 
This sometimes involves including otherwise alienated or marginalized groups in 
territory it controls. However, integration and inclusion may be less likely if an armed 
organization is ideologically vehement and fixated on precise visions of political or social 
transformation. Such vehemence will make the adoption of inclusive governance tactics 
over coercive violence less viable in areas under their control. Ideological civil society 
organizations may leverage their informational advantages in “sweeping the rear” efforts 
as a consequence. The violence mitigating potential of roots in civil society may therefore 
be conditional on how ideological an armed nonstate actor is. 
Hypothesis 1c.  Armed nonstate actors with roots in civil society and 
strong ideological preferences are likely to see higher levels of civilian 
victimizations during an armed intrastate conflict.  
 Beyond civilian victimizations and one-sided violence, civil society organizations 
superior ability to consolidate and control territory as wel as manage information about 
their operations should provide them a “shield of secrecy” which reduces their 
vulnerability to government attack. This should reduce their vulnerability to government 
operations that lead to high fatalities in battle-related deaths. Since most civil conflicts 
feature highly adverse fatality ratios between insurgents and government forces, the result 





Hypothesis 2a. Armed conflicts in which nonstate armed actors are 
formed from civil society organizations should result in fewer battle-
related deaths. 
 As with civilian victimizations, experience should also factor into how well armed 
nonstate actors are able to manage information about their operations and 
noncombatants’ willingness to withhold intelligence from the government. Older civil 
society organizations that have deeper roots in the population should benefit from a 
stronger and broader shield of secrecy. 
Hypothesis 2b. The longer the period of time that armed nonstate actors 
exist as civil society organizations prior to armed conflict onset, fewer 
battle-field deaths will occur during the armed conflict.  
 It is unclear what effect ideology may have on how armed nonstate actors with 
roots in civil society engage government forces. Previous research has found that 
nationalist civil conflicts are longer given that the combatants have more at stake in the 
dispute and that groups with strong ideological preferences are in general more prone to 
violent tactics (Asal et al. 2013; Fearon 2004). However, whether this interacts with an 
armed nonstate actor’s organizational form is unclear. I offer no hypothesis on the effect 
of ideology among civil society organizations specifically on battle-related deaths but do 
include it in subsequent empirical analysis.  
 
Data and Methods 
This section reviews the data, the large-N statistical technique, and model 
specifications employed for empirical analysis of the previously stated hypotheses.  
My unit of analysis is the nonstate actors that engage in armed combat with 





territorial claims. It largely comports with common definitions and thresholds used to 
define armed intrastate conflict, but I focus primarily on armed nonstate actor attributes 
(N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). I use two dependent variables in my analysis, which are 
drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). I first model the correlates of 
cumulative battle deaths in an intrastate armed conflict from the year of onset to its end 
year (when battle deaths fall below the 25 annual deaths threshold). Battle deaths are all 
deaths caused by warring parties that can be directly related to combat. This can include 
combatants from the armed nonstate group or the state security forces or civilians killed 
in the course of fighting, bombardments, or other armed engagements (Lacina and 
Gleditsch 2005; Pettersson 2019a; Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019). All intrastate 
conflicts that were active in 1988 through 2017 are used in analysis. My second 
dependent variable is cumulative civilian deaths during one-sided violence in an armed 
intrastate conflict. These civilian victimization totals include all civilians killed by 
nonstate armed actors in episodes other than combat that resulted in at least 25 fatalities. I 
use UCDP data on one-sided civilian deaths from all intrastate armed conflicts that were 
active in 1988 through 2017 (Eck and Hultman 2007; Pettersson 2019b).  
My key explanatory variable is the so-called “parent” organization of the armed 
nonstate actor involved in the conflict. Armed rebel organizations typically have 
forebears that predate a civil conflict. These come in various forms, including 
organizations of foreign fighters, groups composed of former military or security force 
agencies, or pre-existing civil society organizations such as labor unions, youth groups, 
or religious organizations. I draw on the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence 





civil society organizations (J. M. Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020). The FORGE data 
categorizes organizational forbears of rebel groups into 14 different types, four of which 
align with commonly cited civil society organizations. This includes labor unions, student 
organizations, religious organizations, and political movements that were involved in 
advocacy or lobbying but did not organize as a formal political party to contest for state 
office. I collapse these options into one dichotomous “civil society” variable that captures 
whether any type of CSOs were involved in the origins of an armed rebel group. I include 
a variable that captures the age in years of the organizational forebears of an armed 
nonstate actor prior to the onset of an armed civil conflict. FORGE includes information 
on the ideological orientation of armed nonstate groups, and I generated a dichotomous 
variable if an armed nonstate actor espoused a leftist, rightist, nationalist, or religiously-
oriented ideology at the time of conflict onset. This variable reflects whether an armed 
nonstate actor may be more inclined to engage in “sweep the rear” operations. To 
reiterate a point made earlier, ideology is a complex concept and so aggregating this 
factor into a binary variable may conceal important nuances in how it influences violence 
during civil war. For my purpose, it may help proxy for the degree of pre-existing 
partisanship at the onset of civil conflict that can influence strategic decisions about 
targeting civilians or the ability to partner with local sources of legitimacy in erecting 
local administrative frameworks to forestall the use of coercive force to govern territory. 
Other macro- and group-level variables are included in the analysis as controls. 
The duration of an armed conflict obviously has a significant impact on cumulative 
fatalities, and so the length of a conflict in years as documented in the UCDP Armed 





populous countries are more likely to feature armed conflict, and they may also 
experience more widespread battle and greater opportunity for civilian victimizations. A 
logged count of a country’s populations at the onset of armed instrastate conflict is 
included in the model. How democratic a state is may influence whether a prevailing 
political regime would lose popular support should battle deaths mount and motivate it to 
find accommodation, or it may incentivize armed rebels to pursue institutional as 
opposed to contentious methods of action (Lacina 2006). By contrast, it may incentivize 
the targeting of civilians so as to compel the government to accommodate rebel aims 
(Hultman 2012). A state’s score on the polity2 index variable from the Polity IV dataset 
is transformed into two dichotomous variables. Countries with a score of 6 or higher at 
the onset of conflict are categorized as democracies and those with a score of -5 to 5 are 
considered anocracies. Aside from serving as the base for a specific armed rebel group, 
the broader strength and depth of civil society across a country may influence violence 
during civil wars by opening opportunities for communities to resist and deflect security 
force and/or armed nonstate actor interventions (Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017). To capture 
this dynamic I draw on the Variety of Democracies (VDEM) dataset’s four-point ordinal 
variable that reflects the number of and participation in civil society organizations at the 
onset of a civil conflict. I recode the score during the year of civil conflict onset as a 
dichotomous variable that captures whether participation in civil society organizations 
was “high” or not. 
Stronger states with more well-resourced institutions may be able to better 
manage or prevent the threats posed by armed rebels (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Håvard 





of armed intrastate conflict is included as a proxy for overall state strength and is log 
transformed. GDP and population information for the year in which a conflict was 
initiated were obtained from the latest version of Gleditsch’s data (K. S. Gleditsch 2002). 
The strength of an armed rebel group, as measured by its ability to obtain arms, mobilize 
fighters, command units, and effectively engage the state’s security forces, is included. 
This data is obtained from the Nonstate Actor dataset and features five different rankings 
of rebel strength relative to state capacity: much stronger, stronger, parity, weaker, and 
much weaker (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). I collapse these into three 
categories: stronger, weaker, and parity strength. The category for “parity” is used as a 
reference. I also created a binary variable to reflect whether a rebel group was at any time 
active contemporaneously with other armed conflicts within the state where it operated. 
Such dynamics might lead to competitive mobilization of popular support through 
“outbidding” and higher levels of violence (Bloom 2004). Likewise, I created another 
dichotomous variable if there was more than one “parent organization” at the launch of 
an armed nonstate actor. Fragmentation, factionalism, or low cohesion have been 
demonstrated to lead to higher levels of violence during civil conflicts, and these may be 
more common in multi-organization coalitions (K. G. Cunningham 2013a; Lawrence 
2010; Pearlman 2011). Third-party intervention to assist rebels or the government has 
been shown to influence levels of violence and duration of conflicts (Bakke 2014; D. E. 
Cunningham 2010; Doctor and Willingham 2020; R. M. Wood, Kathman, and Gent 
2012). I control for intervention by creating a dichotomous variable from the Nonstate 
Actor dataset if any such support was received by the government or nonstate actors over 





falls below the 25 battle-deaths threshold or in which periods of ceasefires or peace are 
followed by a resumption of fighting. I include a dichotomous variable to reflect such 
conflict recurrence. Involvement in looting of natural resources or other forms of 
contraband trafficking may lead to higher levels of violence (Fearon 2004; M. L. Ross 
2004; Weinstein 2007; R. M. Wood 2014), and so a dichotomous variable was created if 
an armed nonstate actor was involved in any form of looting or trafficking according to 
the Rebel Contraband dataset (J. I. Walsh et al. 2018).  
For those conflicts that began before 1988 but continued during and after that 
year, I have only partial battle-deaths and civilian victimization data. To capture whether 
these conflicts are systematically different, I added a dummy variable to my analysis. It is 
possible as well that this variable could capture effects related to the end of the Cold War, 
which has been shown to be associated with a drop in number and character of armed 
civil conflicts (Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett 2006). Finally, to capture any other effects 
that may be linked to unobserved spatial or temporal factors, I include dummy variables 
for the geographic region of a country experiencing intrastate conflict and for the decade 
in which a conflict was initiated (the 1990s, 2000s, or 2010s).  
When merging the UCDP, FORGE, and related data for control variables, my 
dataset for battle deaths contains 185 observations – that is 185 distinct armed nonstate 
actors challenging the political or territorial status quo of a sovereign state. Of these 185, 
31 (approximately 17 percent) were launched by at least one civil society organization. 
That armed rebellions appear to be launched by civil society organizations rarely may be 





There is more limited data available for civilian victimizations. Just 73 of more 
than 200 nonstate armed organizations active since 1988 in the FORGE data set appear in 
the UCDP data on one-sided violence against civilians victims. The inclusion threshold in 
the UCDP data is 25 civilian deaths in a single incident, so it is possible that some 
nonstate armed organizations did not engage in any civilian victimizations, engaged in 
civilian victimizations but did not meet this threshold, or that some incidents were never 
captured in the newswire reports or secondary sources from which UCDP collects its 
data. Rather than exclude nonstate armed organizations that do not appear in the UCDP 
one-sided violence dataset, I include them and code their civilian victimization fatalities 
as zero. When I then merge FORGE, UCDP civilian victimization data, and control 
variable data sets, my analysis includes 186 armed nonstate organizations, of which 31 
are founded by a civil society organization.14     
The data for my outcomes of interest are both count variables: all observations are 
positive integer values truncated at 0 or 25 deaths. Count data are often modeled using 
Poisson regression, or negative binomial regression when the outcome features a high 
variance. Table 3.3 and 3.4 include cumulative battle deaths and cumulative civilian 
victimization data, and both variables appear overdispersed so negative binomial 
regression is more suitable. Previous empirical analysis of battle deaths and civilian 
victimization have also used a negative binomial procedure (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014; 
Hultman 2012). However, other studies have treated cumulative battle deaths as a 
continuous log-transformed variable and regressed using an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) technique (Lacina 2006). In my analysis, I apply both techniques for various 
                                                
14 There is one observation in the civilian victimization dataset that does not appear in the battle-related 
deaths dataset. This is the Kuki National Front’s armed conflict with India, which commenced in 1993. The 





robustness and validity checks. Descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent 
variables are available in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. 
 
Table 3.1.  Cumulative Battle Deaths By  





Min. 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Max. 
Civ. Soc. Origins 
2,759.10 
(5,670.90) 




25 137 3,322 60,674 
      
 
 
Table 3.2.  Cumulative One-Sided Deaths (Civilian Victimizations) By 





Min. 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Max. 
Civ. Soc. Origins 
221.30 
(518.43) 




0 0 197 35,126 










Table 3.3.  Descriptive Statistics, Battle-Related Deaths 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl (25) Pctl (75) Max 
 Cumulative Battle 
Deaths 185 3,354.07 7,828.76 25 144 3,045 60,674 
Civil Society As Parent 
Org 185 0.168 0.374 0 0 0 1 
Organization Age 185 3.654 5.972 0 0 4 35 
Ideology 185 0.524 0.501 0 0 1 1 
Real GDP Per Cap 185 3,518.93 4,723.58 244.45 1,030.62 3,631.46 26,861.76 
Population 185 97,569.56 241,153.10 582 6,197.80 47,285.70 1,207,740 
Democracies 185 0.222 0.416 0 0 0 1 
Anocracies 185 0.497 0.501 0 0 1 1 
Duration (Years) 185 7.243 8.844 0 1 10 29 
High Participation in 
Civil Society 185 0.205 0.405 0 0 0 1 
3rd-Party Intervention 185 0.751 0.433 0 1 1 1 
Contemporaneous 
Armed Conflicts 185 0.676 0.469 0 0 1 1 
Multiple Parent Orgs 185 0.232 0.424 0 0 0 1 
Conflict Recurrence 185 0.232 0.424 0 0 0 1 
Rebel Strength 
(0=Weak, 2=Strong) 185 0.178 0.461 0 0 0 2 
Conflict Began Before 
1988 185 0.200 0.401 0 0 0 1 









Table 3.4.  Descriptive Statistics, Civilian Victimization Fatalities 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl (25) Pctl (75) Max 
 Civilian 
Victimizations 186 590.34 2,830.77 0 0 160 35,126 
Civil Society As 
Parent Org 186 0.167 0.374 0 0 0 1 
Organization Age 186 3.661 5.956 0 0 4 35 
Ideology 186 0.527 0.501 0 0 1 1 
Real GDP Per Cap 186 3,507.11 4,713.55 244.45 1,038.18 3,628.43 26,861.76 
Population 186 102,035.50 248,092.90 582 6,204.20 47,351.60 1,207,740 
Democracies 186 0.226 0.419 0 0 0 1 
Anocracies 186 0.495 0.501 0 0 1 1 
Duration (Years) 186 9.452 12.896 0 1 11 53 
High Participation in 
Civil Society 186 0.215 0.412 0 0 0 1 
3rd-Party 
Intervention 186 0.747 0.436 0 0.2 1 1 
Conflict Recurrence 186 0.231 0.423 0 0 0 1 
Contemporaneous 
Armed Conflicts 
186 0.677 0.469 0 0 1 1 
Multiple Parent Orgs 186 0.231 0.423 0 0 0 1 
Conflict Began 
Before 1988 186 0.199 0.400 0 0 0 1 
Reb Strength 
(0=Weak, 2=Strong) 186 0.177 0.460 0 0 0 2 
Loot & Contraband 186 0.618 0.487 0 0 1 1 
 
 
Model Output and Analysis 
 This section details the results of the regression analyses of one-sided violence 
(i.e., civilian victimization) and battle-related deaths. It first reviews the model output and 
estimated coefficient values of nonstate armed actor organizational origins in civil society 
on civil war intensity. It then discusses various robustness checks and the performance of 
the modeling techniques used. I close by offering estimates of the marginal effects of 
civil society and other variables on levels of violence. Since I employ two dependent 
variables – one-sided civilian victimizations and battle-related deaths – to analyze my 





appreciable influence on the intensity of either battle deaths or civilian victimizations 
during civil wars. 
 
One-Sided Civilian Victimizations 
As discussed previously, data on civilian victimizations includes large numbers of 
zero values given that there are many armed rebel groups for which there were no 
recorded episodes of one-sided violence. To model this data more accurately, I use a 
zero-inflated negative binomial regression model (ZINBM) to account for these excess 
zeroes. This procedure generates two sets of coefficient estimates, one that models the 
probability that a given observation will produce a zero value (i.e., no civilian victims) 
and another that produces estimates of the number of civilian victimizations that the 
armed group will perpetrate during a civil war. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for 
the logit (probability of zero victimizations) and the negative binomial (NBM) modeling 
results, respectively. Figure 3.1 indicates that armed rebel groups that originate from civil 
society organizations are no more likely to entirely forgo the targeting of civilians than 
other actors. Neither does a civil society organization’s age prior to the onset of conflict 
nor whether it espoused a clear political ideology during the conflict influence the 
likelihood that it will eschew the use of one-sided violence against civilians. It seems that 
armed nonstate actors with roots in civil society are as likely as others to engage in 
targeting of civilians during armed civil conflicts, regardless of their age or ideology. 
This suggests that there are may be no normative factors inherent to civil society that 





considerations may influence whether armed nonstate groups consider one-sided 
violence.  
Figure 3.2 features coefficient values that estimate the count of civilian victims 
perpetrated by armed nonstate groups. Several of the coefficients are statistically 
significant and in the hypothesized direction, but as discussed below the combined effects 
of these coefficients largely offset one another. An armed nonstate actor’s pre-conflict 
organizational roots in civil society is associated with a reduction in the number of 
civilian victimizations perpetrated by that armed group. A group’s age, however, does not 
appear to be influential. As expected, the ideology of civil society forebears of armed 
groups also influences the targeting of civilians with violence. If the armed nonstate actor 
rooted in civil society also had a clearly espoused political ideology, there is a substantial 
increase in the number of civilian victimizations associated with the group. In fact, it 
greatly outweighs the potential violence mitigating impact of civil society roots; the 
coefficient value of the interaction term is double the absolute value of the civil society 
coefficient. Therefore, when activated together, civil society organizations with a strong 
ideology appear to engage in more civilian victimizations than armed nonstate actors with 
roots in other types of pre-conflict organizations. The model and data provide provisional 







Figure 3.1. Coefficient Estimates & 95% CIs,  
Probability of Zero Civilian Victimizations (Logit Model) 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Coefficient Estimates & 95% CIs, 








The uncertainty around coefficient estimates in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are quite high. 
This could be due to the small sample size and the use of interaction terms, or it may be 
an indication of some source of bias. A matrix of pearson correlation coefficients across 
all observations indicates no strong relationships between variables. The correlation 
between whether an armed nonstate group was formed by a civil society organization and 
whether it espoused a strong political ideology is just 0.13. Correlation coefficients are 
similarly low across most variables. Collinearity does not appear to be producing biased 
or inefficient estimates. 
To further investigate the results in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are, I ran several 
additional model specifications. A simplified model including just the explanatory 
variables of interest and the regional and temporal controls largely comports with the 
estimates from Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The null results may be driven by several 
observations with particularly high counts of civilian victimizations. A plot of fitted 
counts of victimizations against observed counts does suggest that the model produces 
increasing levels of residuals when civilian victimizations surpass roughly 500 deaths, for 
which there are 28 observations. To account for potential skewed results due to these 
high-count observations, I reran the model excluding these 28 observations. The results 
remain largely the same, though the value of the ideology variable flips and becomes 
negatie and statistically significant. Still, the net effect of civil society, ideology, and their 
interaction term appears to largely cancel each other out. 
I then regressed several transformations of the count of civilian victimizations on 
various model specifications using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique. First, I 





Figure 3.1, and the results remain similar. Next, I regressed all non-zero victimization 
values using OLS robust standard errors and the specification in Figure 3.2. The civil 
society variable remains negative and statistically significant but at a reduced confidence 
level (p-value < 0.10), while the interaction term for ideology and CSOs is no longer 
statistically significant. These results may be an artifact of the reduction in degrees of 
freedom from the exclusion of zero values. These model results provide no indication that 
the results in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are invalid. Along with these model results, a pearson 
correlation matrix and these additional model output is available in an appendix. 
The estimated coefficient values for many control variables in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
are consistent with previous findings and seem logical. Democracies are more likely to 
experience civilian victimizations by armed nonstate groups, but the comparatively lower 
sensitivity to civilian deaths leads to no increased probability of civilian victimizations in 
anocracies. Conflicts between nonstate actors and state security forces that are more 
evenly matched experience more civilian victimizations as armed nonstate actors 
potentially attempt operations other than combat to erode support for their opponent. 
More developed and wealthier countries feature fewer civilian victimizations. Longer 
conflicts have more civilian victimizations. These estimates are as expected, further 
suggesting the results in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are fairly reliable. 
What is the calculated effect of the civil society variables on the numbers of 
civilian victimizations in civil wars according to these models? Figure 3.3 displays the 
mean counts of victims and levels of uncertainty using the model specification from 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 while simulating one-unit shifts in key explanatory variables (i.e., 





a continuous variable, I simulate a one standard deviation increase in this variable for 
each observation. Table 3.5 includes the precise calculated marginal effect in these 
variables of interest as displayed in Figure 3.3. This is the difference in the mean of all 
observations across each model simulation. 
The calculated effects of the civil society and other variables of interest appear 
negligible. This is due primarily to the uncertainty around the estimates, which render the 
estimated marginal effects not statistically significant. However, it is noteworthy that, in 
contrast to the civil society variable’s negative coefficient estimate in Figure 3.2, the 
calculated marginal effect of civil society origins is an increase in civilian victimizations. 
As discussed previously, this somewhat unexpected outcome is due to the role of the 
interaction between civil society origins and ideology. For those armed nonstate actors 
that espouse some sort of political ideology – which is roughly two-thirds of all groups 
included in the dataset here – the effect of roots in civil society activates both the 
coefficient for the civil society variable and the civil society/ideology interaction term. 
Even though the civil society variable is negative, together with the interaction term the 
net effect is an increase in civilian victimizations. For armed nonstate actors with no clear 
political ideology, origins in civil society should reduce civilian victimizations, but such 
groups are rare. In the end, it appears that civil society origins, organizational age, and 
ideology bear no clear association with civilian victimizations in civil wars, given the 
uncertainty around the marginal effects estimates. There is no support for hypotheses 









Table 3.5. Mean Predicted Civilian Victimizations, 95% Confidence Intervals, and  










Civil Society Origins 1,072.27 314.40 1,830.13 + 233 
(Not Sig.) No Civil Society Origins 839.47 381.18 1,297.75 
CSO & Org Age 862.92 401.82 1,324.02 
– 260 
(Not Sig.) CSO & Org Age +  
Std Dev(Org Age) 
603.14 271.31 934.98 
CSO & No Ideology 641.38 269.76 1,012.99 
+ 313 
(Not Sig.) 
CSO & Ideology 954.29 457.90 1,450.68 
     
Note: For interaction terms, only a one-unit shift in the organizational age or ideology is calculated. The 
civil society variable is left at the observed value. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Calculated Marginal Effect of Simulated One-Unit Changes in Variables 








In contrast to the available data on civilian victimizations, there are no 
observations of armed instrastate conflict with zero battle-related fatalities. The zero-
inflated modeling technique is not necessary. However, data on battle-related deaths 
remains highly overdispersed, and so I use a negative binomial regression (NBM) 
technique to model counts of deaths complemented by additional OLS regression 
analysis. The same specification of variables is used to model both battle deaths and 
civilian victimizations. Plots of NBM model coefficient estimates are displayed in Figure 
3.4. 
Figure 3.4. Coefficient Estimates & 95% CIs, 
Count of Battle Deaths (Negative Binomial Model) 
 
While the model results provide some initial support for my hypotheses regarding 





civilian victimization data there is no detectable statistically significant marginal effect of 
civil society origins on battle deaths. The coefficient estimate for the civil society 
variable is negative and highly significant in Figure 3.4, but the ideology variable and the 
relevant interaction term are positive and largely nullify any effect of civil society 
origins. Table 3.6 displays the simulated effects of one-unit change in civil society 
origins, organizational age, and ideology. Civil society is associated with an increase in 
the average number of battle deaths, though the calculated marginal effect is not 
statistically significant. Any reduction in deaths due to the negative value of the civil 
society variable in Figure 3.4 is undone by its interaction with ideology. In fact, the role 
of ideology on battle deaths is substantial. When armed nonstate actors espouse a clear 
political ideology, civil wars experience on average an increase of roughly 2,800 battle 
deaths. The data and modeling technique provide no support for H2a and H2b: an armed 
nonostate group’s origins in civil society, even for more established and older 






Table 3.6. Mean Predicted Battle Deaths, 95% Confidence Intervals, and  
Marginal Effects of Simulated One-Unit Differences in Variables of Interest  










Civil Society Origins 3,814.80 2,944.37 4,685.23 
+ 277 
No Civil Society Origins 3,538.61 2,853.68 4,223.54 
Org Age 3,626.82 2,916.54 4,337.09 
– 1,101 
Org Age +  
Std Dev(Org Age) 
2,525.79 2,030.60 3,020.99 
No Ideology 1,628.0 1,257.49 1,998.55 
+ 2,823 
Ideology 4,450.70 3,584.50 5,316.89 
     
Note: Only a one-unit shift in the civil society variable is calculated. The rebel strength variable is left at 
the observed value. 
 
Figure 3.5. Calculated Marginal Effect of Simulated  







I employed several alternate specifications to further probe any relationship 
between civil society and battle-related deaths and to assess the robustness of the model 
results in Figure 3.4. First, I ran a more simple specification that excluded interaction 
terms to determine whether some aspect of collinearity was biasing the results. This did 
not alter the statistical significance of the civil society variable. I then logarithmically 
transformed the battle-deaths data and used OLS regression and the specification in 
Figure 4. This produced fairly similar results to the NBM technique. In fact, the OLS 
technique reduces the significance of some key variables: while Figure 4 indicates that 
armed nonstate actors rooted in civil society and that hold strong political ideologies are 
associated with an increase in battle deaths, the OLS results produce an estimate that is 
not significantly different from zero. The use of robust standard error OLS estimation 
also produced similar results. There are a few civil wars that were particularly deadly. 
Only 12 of the 185 observations had battle fatalities over 10,000, and some of these 
featured multiples of these amount. I reran the NBM model using the full specification in 
Figure 4 but excluded observations with more than 10,000 battle deaths. The results are 
largely stable, with both the civil society and organizational age estimates remaining 
unchanged and statistically insignificant. 
As a final effort, I reran the NBM model with several interaction terms to 
determine whether the effect of an armed group’s origins in civil society was conditional 
on other factors. Given its strong influence on battle deaths, I interacted a civil war’s 
duration with the civil society variable, but this did not produce a meaningful change in 
the modeling results. I then interacted civil society origins with rebel strength, since the 





different results. There appears to be no support for hypotheses 2a and 2b: neither civil 
society origins nor an organization’s pre-conflict age influence the number of battle 
deaths that occur during civil war. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 This paper examined the relationship between armed rebel groups’ origins in civil 
society and the intensity of violence in ensuing civil wars. It theorized that civil society 
organizations’ unique experience working on-the-ground with local populations provides it 
benefits in accessing and protecting information and establishing rebel governance 
institutions. These advantages were argued to reduce armed groups’ use of coercive violence 
as they consolidate control of territory and reduce their vulnerability to government 
detection. Large-N statistical analysis of armed intrastate conflicts from 1988 through 2017 
provided no empirical support for the propositions advanced. Armed nonstate actor origins in 
civil society are not associated with substantial reductions in the targeting of unarmed 
civilians during civil wars. However, there is some evidence that a group’s ideology does 
influence battle deaths. When an armed nonstate actor espouses a clear political ideology, 
average battle-related deaths increase by over 2,800.  
 The paper and its findings contribute to broader scholarship in several ways. Research 
on civil war and armed nonstate actors has increasingly emphasized the role that territorial 
control, rebel governance, and information networks play in civil war dynamics. Previous 
analysis has often investigated how other factors, particularly ethnicity, may influence how 
these challenges are resolved. The argument here explores alternative resources that armed 
nonstate groups can employ to resolve these challenges and enhance their performance and 





implications of common assumptions about civil society organizations when considered in 
civil war contexts. The results do not suggest that there is a clear association between civil 
society origins and violence during civil war, but there may be other important factors that 
influence how armed nonstate actors are able to resolve the “identification problem,” switch 
to governance tactics, and manage information about their operations in ways that do 
influence battle fatalities and civilian victimizations. The paper also drew from common 
assumptions about the strengths of civil society to identify potentially surprising implications 
when considered in the context of civil wars. While civil society groups are often praised for 
their “peacebuilding” roles, the attributes for which they are praised could arguably serve a 
different purpose during armed insurgencies. While the results of the analysis here suggest 
there is no relationship between civil society origins and how deadly armed intrastate 
conflicts are, the role that civil society resources might play in rebellion may warrant careful 
consideration about engaging such groups in highly fragile and high-grievance contexts.  
Additional research would help tease out any potential relationships between 
organizational origins and civil war intensity. The analysis here is limited due to high levels 
of aggregation. Many previous studies have analyzed factors that influence deaths at more 
precise geographic levels (i.e., province or municipality) and more exact temporal units (i.e., 
year or month). Organizational origins are time invariant, and so there are limits to the extent 
that they can be linked to discrete changes in violence over time periods or across locations 
within a single civil war. For lengthy civil wars, it can stretch plausibility that pre-conflict 
factors influence violence 5-10 years later, though many studies have analyzed how pre-
conflict social resources shape the behavior of armed insurgents (Arjona 2016; Petersen 





dynamic interaction between insurgent groups and the state (and possibly other insurgent 
organizations). The “ideology” variable was used as a rough way to capture inherent 
divisions that may shape this interaction, but analysis could also be further refined by looking 
at violence during more discrete units of time, the initiators of violent episodes, and the 
relevant tactics used to better unpack such iterative exchanges and their influence on the use 
of violence. Additionally, the concept of civil society could be decomposed to analyze 
whether different kinds of civil society sub-types produce different civil war dynamics. 
Armed nonstate actors appear to partner with civil society organizations in civil wars, as 
examples in the Spanish civil war and El Salvador’s conflict make clear. The origins of such 
partnerships and their relationship with civil war intensity and other conflict dynamics would 
also be valuable to better understand. More in-depth analysis of specific cases of civil society 
behavior during civil wars could supplement the large-N approach used here. Several 
mechanisms were advanced by which civil society origins influence civilian victimizations 
and battle deaths: informational advantages, governance capabilities, and post-conflict 
mobilization opportunities. Analysis of specific armed groups is necessary to more precisely 
identify whether these mechanisms influence the use of violence against civilians and 
operations against government forces. Whether groups with more sophisticated and effective 
governance structures should increase the selective use of violence against civilians. With 
regards to battle deaths, evidence that groups that actively work to cultivate a “shield of 
secrecy” complicate government efforts to obtain actionable intelligence on armed nonstate 
groups could identify how armed nonostate actors successfully manage their operational 






Chapter 5: Summary of Findings, Policy Implications, and 
Research Avenues 
 
Strong U.S. government engagement with civil society groups in developing 
countries appears set to continue into the near term. There are no doubt significant 
differences between the focus of their efforts and scope of engagement, but both the 
Trump administration and the presidential campaign of Joe Biden have embraced civil 
society organizations as key on-the-ground allies in such contexts, including to stem 
political violence. The Trump administration identified civil society as critical to its 
Strategic Prevention Project (State Department/USAID 2019). Meanwhile, one of 
candidate Biden’s recurring foreign policy commitments upon his assumption of office, 
first made in mid 2019 and reaffirmed in April 2020, is to convene a Summit for 
Democracy. The summit would aim to galvanize “significant new country commitments 
in three areas: fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, and advancing 
human rights in their own nations and abroad” (Biden 2020). Among the central partners 
to advance this agenda are civil society groups: “The Summit for Democracy will also 
include civil society organizations from around the world that stand on the frontlines in 
defense of democracy.” Likewise, the Global Fragility Act, crafted in the House of 
Representatives and signed into law in December 2019, obligates the State Department 
and U.S. Agency for International Development to lay out 10-year engagement strategies 
in countries at risk of instability, including outbreaks of political violence. The legislation 
requires such engagement to include civil society actors both in the formulation of 





What can the next administration expect from this kind of engagement with 
regards to civil conflict and political violence? And what considerations should it be 
mindful of as it shapes specific interventions and programs? Together, the papers and 
their findings suggest that policymakers moderate their expectations regarding the role of 
civil society in civil conflict onset and methods of dissidence. While these papers are 
limited by certain methodological shortcomings, they suggest that most policy 
assumptions about civil society’s violence prevention or mitigation qualities lack a clear 
empirical basis. In addition to their policy implications, the papers also contribute to 
academic scholarship on the role of civil society in civil conflicts, strategy adoption in 
nonviolent protest campaigns, and how organizational resources influence the use of 
violence during civil wars.  
A central finding from the first paper in this dissertation indicates that countries 
with more formalized and established civil society sectors appear to exhibit a reduced 
likelihood of experiencing armed conflict onset. The relative reduction in armed conflict 
risks that attend such civil society conditions may be as high as major improvements in 
poverty alleviation (i.e., large increases in GDP per capita). This finding provides some 
support for advocates of civil society engagement as a method for reducing armed 
conflict onset. However, these positive implications are limited by at least three factors. 
First, while important, it provides only imprecise direction to policymakers. The finding 
is drawn from a variable operating at a high level of abstraction, lumping all 
organizations into one state-level aggregate, and it essentially uses age as a proxy for 
maturity and depth. This offers only vague guidelines on how to distinguish between 





formalized. That said, this is the level of analysis at which policymaker assumptions 
operate. The results are a useful flag that policymakers not overlook older organizations 
when directing their financial and diplomatic support to civil society. This is particularly 
important given increasing calls among advocates of U.S. engagement with civil society 
to emphasize other constituencies. A recurring criticism of U.S. policy toward civil 
society groups is that it is often directed at well-established organizations as opposed to 
newer, emerging activist networks. “Funding mainly goes to large, high-profile NGOs, 
whereas those on the front lines of change have minimal access to resources,” according 
to one policy analysis that advocated for a shift in emphasis to “building movements” in 
fragile state contexts (Stephan 2016, 4; see also Branch and Mampilly 2015 and Youngs 
2017, 2020). However, in terms of preventing instability or reducing political violence, 
there is real value in reinforcing the well-established civil society organizations in fragile 
and developing countries.  
Second, why older and more established civil society organizations lead to lower 
risks of armed civil conflict onset requires some further in-depth examination. Are older 
civil society organizations leveraging stronger competencies in advocacy and lobbying 
work and therefore avoiding rebellion because it is unnecessary? Are they actively 
working to undermine would-be armed rebel groups and leaders to protect themselves 
from the wider disruptions of civil war? Are they less aggrieved overall? Evidence from 
the analysis of South Africa’s civil conflict does suggest that more well-established 
organizations do work to try and undermine groups that rely on violent strategies out of 
an aversion to losses that attend widespread violence. However, South Africa’s civil 





cases of how and why mature civil society networks forestall political violence onset in 
high-risk contexts where no contention takes place is needed to identify other possible 
causal mechanisms at work. In the meantime, the findings here provide evidence that 
more well-established civil society networks are associated with lower likelihoods of 
armed conflict onset, but do not offer precise explanations for these relationships that 
policymaker can leverage as they set priorities or make choices about engagements on the 
ground in fragile contexts. 
Third, the paper’s other findings offer very little support for the many 
assumptions on which U.S. policy engagement with civil society is based. Many other 
macro-level attributes of civil society, including participation by citizens in CSOs, how 
diverse that participation is, and the size of CSOs demonstrate no clear influence on civil 
war occurrence. Moreover, when they do become involved in armed insurgencies, civil 
society actors appear no less violent than other groups, per the findings in the third paper. 
This undercuts core assumptions underlying U.S. policy toward civil society – 
assumptions that are often expressed in sweeping terms as critical structural determinants 
of stability and peace – and suggests that policymakers need to recalibrate their 
expectations about civil society, civil conflicts, and political violence. Simply increasing 
membership in CSOs, scaling up their size, or bridging their connections with other 
identity groups may not mitigate political violence. The results offer a mixed assessment 
on the relationship between civil society and civil conflicts. The existence of older and 
more well-established organizations is associated with a lower probability of armed 
intrastate conflict onset, but most other factors have no relationship with political 





engagement programs, it does not find a strong evidentiary basis for the assumptions on 
which this support is based. Policymakers should be more circumspect in their 
expectations about the relationship between civil society, instability, and political 
violence.  
Many promoters of donor support for civil society organizations frame such 
efforts with a stronger emphasis on CSOs relationship with mass nonviolent anti-regime 
campaigns. Funding and technical assistance support for established civil society 
organizations and for newer actors is advanced as a critical means to assist various 
campaigns for reform in developing countries, including large-scale efforts to displace 
undemocratic regimes (Boulding 2010; Stephan, Lakhani, and Naviwala 2015). As 
President Obama remarked in May 2011 during an official address on his 
administration’s policy toward the Middle East and North Africa amid the ongoing Arab 
Spring revolutions, “we intend to provide assistance to civil society, including those that 
may not be officially sanctioned, and who speak uncomfortable truths…. For the fact is, 
real reform does not come at the ballot box alone” (White House 2011). There may be 
two possible advantages to such support. First, for those seeking to advance democratic 
reforms in countries where incumbent regimes may exercise some authoritarian 
tendencies, support for civil society groups may be an important avenue for realizing 
such changes. From the perspective of governments where such donor funding and 
training for civil society groups is directed, the purpose of such support is sometimes 
interpreted as an unsubtle effort at regime change (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). 
Second, by supporting the mobilizing structures that underlay mass nonviolent 





to unfold as a nonviolent movement as opposed to a armed insurgency. Potential violence 
is prevented by shaping the method that is adopted if and when civil conflict does 
emerge. 
 The analysis here finds only meager support for such views. In general, there 
appears to be no strong relationship between various attributes of civil society and the 
onset of mass nonviolent campaigns. Higher levels of participation, greater diversity 
among participants, and the size and scope of civil society organizations are not 
associated with the emergence of mass anti-regime or secessionist campaigns. To the 
extent that U.S. material and diplomatic support for civil society is aiming to increase 
these attributes, the result may not necessarily be an increase in the likelihood of a 
nonviolent campaign occurrence.15 Governments in Russia, China, and elsewhere that are 
worried about the implications of more numerous and participatory civil society 
organizations for the stability of their political arrangements may be somewhat assuaged 
by these results as well. That said, these findings may be limited by the available data and 
the simplicity of the variables used to capture complex dynamics. The data has a low 
level of precision – most variables are dichotomous – and so may overlook important 
nuances. Additionally, by lumping many different types of organizations together, it may 
be missing important drivers of causal heterogeneity. For instance, the role of labor 
unions and networks of church groups in countries where nonviolent campaigns emerged 
may be cancelled out by large numbers of chambers of commerce and elite-captured 
organizations in another even if the extent and degree of civil society as well as other 
relevant structural factors are similar. This is supposition, but it cannot be discounted. 
                                                
15 In practice, it is also debatable whether support for civil society groups inclines them to adopt more 
confrontational approaches to incumbent regimes or incentivizes them to adopt more quiescent demands 





Still, policymakers often speak in sweeping ways about the importance of civil society in 
protest movements. The evidence here does not show that such broad-based assumptions 
are accurate.  
Even if funding to help broaden participation in civil society groups and enhance 
their organizational structures may not increase the likelihood of mass nonviolent 
campaign onsets, could it at least ensure that civil society organizations are more likely to 
adhere to nonviolence if civil conflict is triggered by some other event or factor? While 
some previous scholarship has argued that the availability of external funding prompts 
dissident groups to adopt more moderate rhetorical and dissident methods to ensure 
future streams of support (Bush 2015; Haines 1984), others have also found evidence that 
foreign financial support for domestic activists is frequently associated with higher levels 
of violent protests (Murdie and Bhasin 2011). In South Africa, both the ANC/MK and the 
UDF received substantial external assistance, and so it does not appear that it 
significantly influenced whether groups engaged primarily in violent or nonviolent 
strategies. It is not clear that the extension of foreign funding for dissident groups affords 
funders substantial leverage over how these groups behave. In general, the negligible 
relationship between pre-existing civil society organizations and mass nonviolence as 
well as the questionable influence of foreign funding on how civil society actors behave 
reinforces the need to think carefully about engagement with civil society groups. 
The evidence from South Africa does indicate that more established civil society 
groups, particularly those with interests that overlap with political and economic elites, 
may be more likely to engage in mass nonviolence than adopt violent alternatives. MK 





questionably executed, but it did launch a range of sophisticated attacks against high-
value military and economic targets. Its occasional targeting of civilians was not 
necessarily unpopular with the non-white population at large, and it never lacked for 
individual recruits. Even after Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, the 
preparations for one of its boldest operations – Operation Vula – continued for months 
before it was uncovered. And yet large numbers of active voluntary organizations in 
South Africa stuck with the nonviolent UDF throughout the decade of conflict. Rather 
than direct their organizational resources to support MK, these groups often discouraged 
or sought to reign in members or peer organizations from engaging in violence, though 
with varying degrees of success. These groups’ comparatively advantageous position in 
society deterred them from adopting methods that could sow wider disruption, disruption 
that would undermine their own economic stakes and future prospects. Their 
interdependence with aspects of the economic status quo influenced their preference for 
nonviolent forms of disruption to challenge the political status quo. Policymakers seeking 
to ensure that civil conflicts remain nonviolent could seek to ensure that similar such 
organizations are sufficiently supported. Such efforts may not increase the likelihood of a 
nonviolent challenge to the political status quo will occur, but it may reduce the 
probability that violence will be adopted should a civil conflict occur. 
Civil society organizations are often praised for their ability to network with and 
channel the views of “the people,” their delivery of basic services and representation at 
the grassroots and community level, and their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens more 
generally. However, advocates of civil society should be mindful that these are all 





seize and hold territory as well as operate with reduced risks of government detection. In 
the rare instances that civil society groups have laid the organizational basis for an armed 
challenge to a sovereign state, however, there appears no real change in the level of 
coercive violence that these groups use against unarmed civilians nor in the deaths 
associated with battles with security forces. For donors and program implementers 
seeking to work in fragile and conflict affected contexts, there should be circumspection 
about how actors on the ground are treated and what they are valued for, lest groups with 
valuable resources for insurgency be inadvertently supported. Likewise, examining the 
pre-conflict organizational resources that newly formed armed insurgent groups bring to 
a conflict may provide some indications about how they will wield violence and their 
prospects against government forces.  
In addition to the policy insights they provide, these papers also contribute to 
several ongoing academic debates about civil society and civil conflict, mass nonviolent 
campaigns, and the organizational origins of armed insurgencies. The first and second 
paper attempt to integrate separate research tracks that have examined how pre-existing 
social organizations relate to armed insurgency and mass nonviolent campaigns. In doing 
so, these papers demonstrated the shortcomings of previous explanations about the 
adoption of mass nonviolent methods, particularly the purported inherent participation 
advantages of nonviolence or tendencies of pre-existing organizations to gravitate toward 
nonviolent strategies. Rather, the papers emphasize how cost vulnerabilities of pre-
existing civil society organizations influence method of dissidence, and specifically that 
interdependent relationship with political and economic elites activate not only an ability 





often overlooked in nonviolent action scholarship. The third paper identified unique ways 
in which organizational origins may resolve informational disadvantages that influence 
how armed insurgent groups employ violence to consolidate control over territory and 
how vulnerable they are to attack. It integrated emerging scholarship related to rebel 
governance and rebel origins with commonly lauded attributes of civil society to test how 
CSOs may resolve these challenges. In doing so, it pointed out how the roots of armed 
rebels may influence their ability to build administrative structures and their access to 
noncombatant informational networks and preferences. Previous research has often 
identified ethnicity, specifically ethnic homogeneity, as important for resolving these 
challenges. My paper attempted to point to other sources of resolutions for armed 
insurgent groups. Additional research into these aspects could further contribute to 
ongoing debates about conflict dynamics, the adoption of nonviolent tactics, and violence 
during civil wars.  
The role of civil society organizations in civil conflict would benefit from further 
investigation. As noted in the preceding essays, better data on organizational types, 
participation, and forms would support a better understanding of their contributions to 
conflict onset and methods of dissidence. This should include better delineation between 
underemphasized political tracks, such as organizations that opt for more conventional 
and institutional political channels to advance change during civil conflict and those that 
remain aggrieved but choose to remain neutral and take no action at all. These options 
pose challenges for observation. But in analyses of previous civil conflict episodes, 
including South Africa during the 1980s, these behaviors remain often overlooked 





in civil war and how they draw on pre-conflict connections to influence the use of 
violence would offer a strong complement to the final essay. It would also fit well within 
the growing literature on rebel governance and organizational factors in conflict 
dynamics.  
To better understand the specific role of donor support for civil society 
organizations, it would also be productive to review the form and extent of material and 
political support that the U.S. or other donor governments have previously extended to 
civil society actors in the years leading up to recent civil wars. For example, Mali was a 
recipient of extensive economic and political support prior to the onset of its civil war in 
2011. A review of the organizations that did receive support, what that support aimed to 
achieve, how it was used, what organizations did not receive support, and other 
engagements may shed light on whether and how specific civil society support programs 
can influence civil conflicts and their dynamics. Likewise, other conflicts may provide 
rich contexts for such inductive research. 
Commitments to and belief in the role of civil society organizations as key actors 
in the prevention and reduction of political violence is likely to persist among U.S. 
policymakers as well as in other developed country governments. These essays have 
offered an initial assessment of these dynamics, but there remains a range of paths for 
further inquiry. Such research is unlikely to have continued relevance to policy, whether 
from the perspective of donor country interests or for the many persons experiencing the 






















Repressed GDP PC 
Neighboring 
Conflict Pop. Dem. Anoc. 
NVA in 
Region 
CSO Participation 1                       
Sustained CSOs 0.46 1                     
Inclusive CSOs 0.25 0.29 1                   
Large CSOs 0.33 0.3 0.15 1                 
CSO Consultation 0.63 0.59 0.36 0.37 1               
CSO Repressed -0.55 -0.62 -0.36 -0.39 -0.74 1             
GDP PC 0.15 0.13 -0.03 0.11 0.17 -0.17 1           
Neighboring 
Conflict -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.21 0.18 -0.11 1         
Population 0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.36 1       
Democracy 0.53 0.58 0.32 0.32 0.7 -0.73 0.13 -0.21 0 1     
Anocracy -0.12 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 -0.33 1   









 Dependent variable: 
  














 CSO Participation -0.090 0.402 0.187 -0.662 0.772* 0.172 
 (0.930) (0.862) (0.275) (0.665) (0.460) (1.043) 
       Sustained CSO Participation -0.447 0.042 -0.615*** 0.053 -0.566*** -0.396 
 (0.307) (0.440) (0.201) (0.461) (0.194) (0.422) 
       CSO Inclusivity (Gender) -0.281 0.862* 0.007 0.834 0.037 0.774 
 (0.253) (0.514) (0.190) (0.515) (0.188) (0.478) 
       Large CSOs Predominate 1.022* 0.207 0.252 0.236 0.439 0.304 
 (0.542) (0.724) (0.365) (0.708) (0.388) (0.761) 
CSOs Consulted on Policy -0.150 -0.220 -0.333* -0.305 -0.351** -0.757* 
 (0.266) (0.385) (0.181) (0.404) (0.176) (0.399) 
       Gov Represses CSOs 0.125 -0.209 0.042 -0.214 -0.042 0.023 
 (0.146) (0.218) (0.096) (0.227) (0.090) (0.199) 
       GDP Per Cap (log) -0.307* -0.028 -0.287** 0.070 -0.224** 0.003 
 (0.163) (0.257) (0.112) (0.264) (0.111) (0.254) 
       Population (log) 0.369*** 0.342*** 0.303*** 0.309** 0.308*** 0.282** 
 (0.089) (0.131) (0.061) (0.135) (0.061) (0.128) 
       Democracy 0.100 -2.589*** 0.367 -2.590***   
 (0.428) (0.821) (0.282) (0.849)   
       Anocracy 0.496 -0.186 0.715*** -0.187   
 (0.310) (0.443) (0.216) (0.459)   
Armed Conflict in Bordering 
States 0.086 0.015 0.081 0.089 0.120 0.080 
 (0.104) (0.164) (0.075) (0.168) (0.074) (0.163) 
Nvlt Campaign in Region 0.480 1.163*** 0.372 1.140*** 0.312 1.113*** 
 (0.375) (0.265) (0.260) (0.273) (0.258) (0.264) 
       Years Since Nvlt 
Termination 0.110 -0.053 0.040 -0.041 0.024 -0.079 
 (0.096) (0.093) (0.045) (0.094) (0.045) (0.086) 
       Years Since Armed Conflict 
Termination 0.010 0.068 -0.084
** 0.084 -0.082** 0.070 
 (0.045) (0.052) (0.040) (0.054) (0.040) (0.052) 
       Years Since Nvlt 
Termination (Sq) -0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       Years Since Nvlt 
Termination (Sq) -0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.0001 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Participation: 
Large CSOs (Interaction) -1.277 -2.781   -1.548 -2.308 
 (1.929) (2.340)   (1.009) (2.403) 





Constant -5.525*** -7.022*** -3.419*** -7.559*** -3.554*** -7.439*** 
 (1.672) (2.495) (1.143) (2.599) (1.143) (2.413) 
 Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,338.210 1,338.210 1,976.569 1,976.569 2,038.935 2,038.935 





 Dependent variable: 
  






 CSO Participation 0.251 -0.664 
 (0.275) (0.674) 
   Sustained CSO Participation -0.657*** -0.020 
 (0.201) (0.451) 
   CSO Inclusivity (Gender) -0.047 1.309* 
 (0.272) (0.719) 
   Large CSOs Predominate 0.076 1.424 
 (0.625) (1.707) 
   CSOs Consulted on Policy -0.329* -0.203 
 (0.178) (0.393) 
   Gov Represses CSOs 0.077 -0.159 
 (0.096) (0.221) 
   Democracy 0.338 -2.533*** 
 (0.281) (0.845) 
   Anocracy 0.738*** -0.207 
 (0.215) (0.458) 
   Armed Conflict in Bordering States 0.249*** 0.232 
 (0.069) (0.147) 
   Nvlt Campaign in Region 0.414 1.194*** 
 (0.257) (0.270) 
   Years Since Nvlt 
Termination 0.054 -0.032 
 (0.044) (0.093) 
   Years Since Armed Conflict Termination -0.050 0.094* 
 (0.041) (0.053) 
   Years Since Nvlt 
Termination (Sq) -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   Years Since Armed Conflict 
Termination (Sq) -0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
   Participation: 





 (0.740) (1.829) 
   Constant -3.297*** -5.026*** 
 (0.484) (1.077) 
    Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,008.499 2,008.499 





 Dependent variable: 
  
 



















 CSO Participation 0.106 -0.607     
 (0.243) (0.651)     
       Sustained CSO Participation   -0.658
*** 0.049   
   (0.197) (0.456)   
       CSO Inclusivity (Gender)     -0.167 0.824 
     (0.179) (0.515) 
       GDP Per Cap (log) -0.323*** 0.087 -0.295*** 0.086 -0.319*** 0.067 
 (0.109) (0.257) (0.111) (0.256) (0.108) (0.262) 
       Population (log) 0.322*** 0.339*** 0.304*** 0.328** 0.326*** 0.293** 
 (0.059) (0.131) (0.061) (0.128) (0.059) (0.129) 
       Democracy -0.219 -2.308*** 0.135 -2.525*** -0.160 -2.686*** 
 (0.235) (0.636) (0.244) (0.714) (0.227) (0.625) 
       Anocracy 0.483** -0.008 0.619*** -0.016 0.514*** -0.126 
 (0.193) (0.410) (0.205) (0.432) (0.194) (0.410) 
Armed Conflict in Bordering 
States 0.099 0.065 0.092 0.081 0.092 0.094 
 (0.074) (0.168) (0.075) (0.166) (0.074) (0.167) 
Nvlt Campaign in Region 0.348 1.109*** 0.360 1.119*** 0.348 1.122*** 
 (0.260) (0.270) (0.260) (0.271) (0.259) (0.273) 
Years Since Nvlt 
Termination 0.021 -0.042 0.036 -0.038 0.021 -0.021 
 (0.043) (0.090) (0.044) (0.089) (0.043) (0.092) 
Years Since Armed 
Conflict Termination -0.078
* 0.089* -0.083** 0.087 -0.076* 0.084 
 (0.040) (0.053) (0.040) (0.054) (0.040) (0.053) 
Years Since Armed Conflict 
Termination (Sq) -0.001 -0.003 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years Since Nvlt 
Termination (Sq) -0.0002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.0002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
       Constant -3.345*** -7.906*** -3.316*** -7.854*** -3.286*** -8.013*** 





Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,039.383 2,039.383 1,967.099 1,967.099 2,036.745 2,036.745 




 Dependent variable: 
  
 
Just Structure  
Variable 
Just CSO Repression 
Variable 















 Large CSOs Predominate 0.110 0.522     
 (0.362) (0.678)     
       Gov Represses CSOs   0.106 -0.151   
   (0.083) (0.199)   
       CSOs Consulted on Policy     -0.349
** -0.181 
     (0.157) (0.367) 
       GDP Per Cap (log) -0.321*** 0.086 -0.309*** 0.064 -0.303*** 0.092 
 (0.109) (0.259) (0.109) (0.259) (0.109) (0.258) 
       Population (log) 0.325*** 0.331** 0.322*** 0.337*** 0.328*** 0.337*** 
 (0.059) (0.131) (0.059) (0.128) (0.059) (0.129) 
       Democracy -0.169 -2.348*** -0.010 -2.871*** 0.071 -2.317*** 
 (0.233) (0.648) (0.265) (0.765) (0.252) (0.753) 
       Anocracy 0.490** -0.027 0.582*** -0.174 0.582*** 0.029 
 (0.193) (0.409) (0.206) (0.451) (0.196) (0.427) 
       Armed Conflict in Bordering 
States 0.098 0.077 0.092 0.085 0.086 0.071 
 (0.074) (0.167) (0.074) (0.164) (0.074) (0.166) 
Nvlt Campaign in Region 0.351 1.106*** 0.353 1.115*** 0.361 1.108*** 
 (0.260) (0.270) (0.259) (0.270) (0.259) (0.271) 
       Years Since Nvlt 
Termination 0.022 -0.046 0.026 -0.041 0.027 -0.040 
 (0.044) (0.089) (0.044) (0.090) (0.045) (0.090) 
Years Since Armed 
Conflict Termination -0.078
* 0.090* -0.079** 0.092* -0.079** 0.087 
 (0.040) (0.053) (0.040) (0.054) (0.040) (0.054) 
       Years Since Armed Conflict 
Termination (Sq) -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       Years Since Nvlt 
Termination (Sq) -0.0003 0.002 -0.0003 0.002 -0.0003 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
       Participation: 
Large CSOs (Interaction) -0.281 -1.808     
 (0.550) (1.514)     
       Constant -3.410*** -7.992*** -3.727*** -7.343*** -3.383*** -7.892*** 
 (1.057) (2.465) (1.089) (2.524) (1.048) (2.448) 





Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,042.326 2,042.326 2,038.256 2,038.256 2,035.239 2,035.239 




 Dependent variable: 
  
 
Just Participation  
No regime type 
Just Sustained 
CSO No regime type 
Just Inclusivity 
No regime type 
Just Structure  




















**       
 (0.234) (0.617)       
         Sustained CSO 
Participation   -0.622
*** -0.815**     
   (0.181) (0.392)     
         CSO Inclusivity 
(Gender)     -0.115 0.473   
     (0.176) (0.475)   
         Large CSOs 
Predominate       0.124 -0.182 
       (0.360) (0.691) 
         GDP Per Cap 
(log) -0.288
*** -0.131 -0.232** -0.112 -0.281*** -0.257 -0.279*** -0.149 
 (0.105) (0.238) (0.108) (0.243) (0.104) (0.238) (0.105) (0.236) 
         Population (log) 0.314*** 0.304** 0.305*** 0.288** 0.315*** 0.280** 0.318*** 0.307** 
 (0.059) (0.124) (0.061) (0.121) (0.059) (0.121) (0.059) (0.123) 
         Armed Conflict 
in Bordering 
States 
0.133* 0.095 0.121 0.086 0.128* 0.121 0.133* 0.102 
 (0.073) (0.160) (0.074) (0.159) (0.073) (0.158) (0.072) (0.161) 
         Nvlt Campaign 
in Region 0.318 1.122
*** 0.315 1.116*** 0.313 1.149*** 0.314 1.127*** 
 (0.257) (0.261) (0.258) (0.260) (0.257) (0.262) (0.257) (0.261) 
         Years Since Nvlt 
Termination 0.012 -0.087 0.030 -0.062 0.013 -0.068 0.014 -0.089 
 (0.043) (0.083) (0.044) (0.085) (0.043) (0.081) (0.043) (0.080) 




-0.075* 0.075 -0.079** 0.082 -0.073* 0.074 -0.075* 0.072 




-0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         Years Since Nvlt 





 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Participation: 
Large CSOs 
(Interaction)       
-0.413 -3.079** 
       (0.534) (1.487) 
         Constant -3.550*** -6.582*** -3.599*** -6.394*** -3.495*** -5.986*** -3.648*** -6.457*** 
 (1.049) (2.207) (1.082) (2.237) (1.047) (2.209) (1.053) (2.194) 
          Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 2,110.160 2,110.160 2,033.689 2,033.689 2,114.421 2,114.421 2,112.377 2,112.377 




















Part. in  
Civ Soc  
GDP 








Pre-1988 Loot Interven. 
Reb CSO 1                               
Org Age 0.14 1                             
Org Ideology 0.14 0.12 1                           
Part. in Civ Soc -0.08 0.09 0.19 1                         
GDP Per Cap 0.09 -0.01 0.33 0.12 1                       
Population -0.08 0.18 0.17 0.59 -0.09 1                     
Duration 0.03 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.23 1                   
Democratic -0.03 0.19 0.22 0.53 0.29 0.54 0.3 1                 
Anocratic -0.1 -0.2 -0.24 -0.16 -0.14 -0.28 -0.39 -0.53 1               
Rebel Strength -0.02 -0.17 -0.22 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 -0.24 -0.21 0.18 1             
Reb is Coalition 0.16 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 0.09 0.12 1           
Simul. Conflicts 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.12 -0.08 0.21 0.19 0.15 0 -0.08 0.05 1         
Recurrence 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.34 0.2 -0.32 -0.21 -0.06 0.11 1       
Pre 1988 Conflict 0.1 0 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.52 0.32 -0.42 -0.16 0.01 0.03 0.3 1     
Loot, Contraband -0.01 0.11 0.24 0.23 0.13 0.2 0.39 0.28 -0.18 -0.16 0.01 0.15 0.3 0.2 1   







Robustness Checks: Negative Binomial Models, DV = Battle Related Deaths 
  Main Model No Interaction Terms Deaths < 10k 
Predictors Log-Mean CI p 
Log-
Mean CI p 
Log-
Mean CI p 
(Intercept) 5.79 2.31 – 9.27 0.001 5.85 2.24 – 9.45 0.001 8.77 5.80 –
 11.75 
<0.001 
civsoc -2.30 -3.65 – -
0.94 
0.001 -0.09 -0.71 –
 0.54 
0.789 -1.67 -2.84 – -
0.49 
0.005 
org_age -0.06 -0.10 – -
0.02 
0.004 -0.06 -0.10 – -
0.03 
0.001 -0.03 -0.07 –
 0.01 
0.205 
ideology 0.83 0.18 – 1.48 0.013 1.06 0.41 – 1.71 0.001 0.18 -0.43 –
 0.79 
0.568 
rgdppc [log] 0.14 -0.22 –
 0.49 
0.446 0.09 -0.27 –
 0.46 
0.619 -0.18 -0.48 –
 0.12 
0.248 
pop [log] 0.05 -0.14 –
 0.24 
0.600 0.06 -0.13 –
 0.25 
0.507 -0.18 -0.37 –
 0.00 
0.051 
log_duration 0.57 0.32 – 0.82 <0.001 0.57 0.32 – 0.83 <0.001 0.53 0.32 – 0.74 <0.001 
dem -0.43 -1.23 –
 0.36 
0.288 -0.37 -1.17 –
 0.42 
0.361 -0.72 -1.55 –
 0.11 
0.090 
anoc -0.19 -0.81 –
 0.43 
0.544 -0.18 -0.82 –
 0.45 
0.572 -0.26 -0.77 –
 0.24 
0.307 
rebstrength2 [stronger] -2.37 -3.65 – -
1.09 
<0.001 -2.23 -3.54 – -
0.92 
0.001 -1.72 -2.89 – -
0.54 
0.004 
rebstrength2 [weaker] -0.96 -1.67 – -
0.24 
0.009 -0.87 -1.60 – -
0.14 
0.020 -0.56 -1.19 –
 0.07 
0.083 
civsoc_prtcpt -0.15 -0.83 –
 0.52 
0.655 -0.14 -0.82 –
 0.55 
0.692 0.13 -0.52 –
 0.78 
0.701 
coalition 0.68 0.16 – 1.20 0.011 0.54 0.01 – 1.07 0.045 0.40 -0.10 –
 0.91 
0.118 
simul_conflicts2 -0.28 -0.74 –
 0.18 
0.231 -0.20 -0.66 –
 0.27 
0.410 0.32 -0.12 –
 0.76 
0.150 
recur 0.65 0.05 – 1.24 0.033 0.55 -0.04 –
 1.15 
0.069 0.25 -0.29 –
 0.80 
0.360 
pre1988_conflict2 -0.50 -1.24 –
 0.24 
0.188 -0.44 -1.19 –
 0.31 
0.252 -1.03 -1.60 – -
0.45 
<0.001 
loot3 0.38 -0.11 –
 0.88 
0.127 0.35 -0.16 –
 0.85 
0.175 0.32 -0.18 –
 0.82 
0.207 
intervention 0.57 0.01 – 1.13 0.045 0.50 -0.07 –
 1.08 
0.085 0.70 0.22 – 1.17 0.004 





2.34 2.37  0.38 
geo2 -1.21 -2.20 – -
0.22 
0.017 -1.10 -2.10 – -
0.09 
0.032 0.06 -0.86 –
 0.98 
0.898 
geo34 -0.97 -1.91 – -
0.03 
0.044 -0.89 -1.86 –
 0.08 
0.072 -0.06 -0.94 –
 0.82 
0.893 
geo57 -1.03 -1.72 – -
0.34 
0.004 -1.10 -1.79 – -
0.40 
0.002 0.15 -0.54 –
 0.83 
0.670 
geo69 -1.06 -2.08 – -
0.05 
0.041 -1.06 -2.11 – -
0.02 
0.045 0.51 -0.51 –
 1.52 
0.329 
nineties 0.27 -0.63 –
 1.17 
0.562 0.21 -0.72 –
 1.14 
0.659 0.65 -0.13 –
 1.44 
0.104 
aughts -0.50 -1.33 –
 0.33 
0.236 -0.56 -1.41 –
 0.29 
0.195 0.15 -0.59 –
 0.90 
0.684 
civsoc * org_age -0.01 -0.10 –
 0.07 
0.758    -0.04 -0.11 –
 0.03 
0.263 
civsoc * ideology 2.57 1.14 – 4.01 <0.001    1.95 0.67 – 3.23 0.003 
Observations 185 185  172 
R2 conditional / 
R2 marginal 
NA / 0.710 NA / 0.691 NA / 0.607 
 
 
Robustness Checks: Negative Binomial Models, DV = Battle Related Deaths 
 
  Civ Soc:Duration (Interaction) Civ Soc:Reb Strength (Interaction) 
Predictors Log-Mean CI p Log-Mean CI p 
(Intercept) 5.75 2.25 – 9.26 0.001 5.87 2.42 – 9.32 0.001 
civsoc -2.29 -3.65 – -0.94 0.001 -3.18 -4.92 – -1.44 <0.001 
org_age -0.06 -0.10 – -0.02 0.004 -0.06 -0.10 – -0.02 0.003 
ideology 0.81 0.13 – 1.49 0.019 0.80 0.15 – 1.45 0.016 
rgdppc [log] 0.14 -0.22 – 0.49 0.445 0.16 -0.20 – 0.51 0.388 
pop [log] 0.05 -0.14 – 0.24 0.585 0.05 -0.14 – 0.23 0.621 
log_duration 0.57 0.32 – 0.82 <0.001 0.59 0.34 – 0.84 <0.001 
dem -0.42 -1.23 – 0.38 0.305 -0.46 -1.25 – 0.34 0.259 
anoc -0.20 -0.82 – 0.43 0.534 -0.24 -0.86 – 0.38 0.451 





rebstrength2 [weaker] -0.97 -1.70 – -0.24 0.009 -1.09 -1.85 – -0.34 0.005 
civsoc_prtcpt -0.16 -0.85 – 0.52 0.640 -0.13 -0.80 – 0.55 0.710 
coalition 0.69 0.15 – 1.22 0.012 0.64 0.10 – 1.18 0.020 
simul_conflicts2 -0.29 -0.77 – 0.18 0.230 -0.29 -0.75 – 0.18 0.226 
recur 0.64 0.04 – 1.24 0.037 0.65 0.05 – 1.24 0.033 
pre1988_conflict2 -0.49 -1.25 – 0.28 0.212 -0.51 -1.25 – 0.24 0.183 
loot3 0.39 -0.11 – 0.88 0.126 0.35 -0.14 – 0.85 0.162 
intervention 0.57 0.01 – 1.13 0.045 0.53 -0.04 – 1.09 0.068 
geo1 -4.21 -6.09 – -2.34 <0.001 -4.23 -6.08 – -2.38 <0.001 
geo2 -1.21 -2.20 – -0.22 0.016 -1.16 -2.17 – -0.16 0.023 
geo34 -0.94 -1.94 – 0.06 0.064 -0.99 -1.93 – -0.05 0.039 
geo57 -1.03 -1.72 – -0.34 0.003 -1.03 -1.72 – -0.35 0.003 
geo69 -1.07 -2.10 – -0.05 0.040 -1.04 -2.06 – -0.02 0.045 
nineties 0.29 -0.66 – 1.24 0.549 0.30 -0.60 – 1.20 0.519 
aughts -0.48 -1.35 – 0.39 0.284 -0.51 -1.33 – 0.32 0.230 
civsoc * org_age -0.01 -0.10 – 0.08 0.823 -0.03 -0.11 – 0.06 0.557 
civsoc * ideology 2.62 1.05 – 4.20 0.001 2.08 0.37 – 3.79 0.017 
civsoc * log_duration -0.05 -0.63 – 0.53 0.877    
rebstrength2 [stronger] * 
civsoc 
   1.34 -2.27 – 4.95 0.467 
rebstrength2 [weaker] * 
civsoc 
   1.48 -0.72 – 3.69 0.187 
Observations 185 185 
















Robustness Checks: OLS Models Output, DV = Battle Deaths (Log) 
 
  Robust SEs Duration Interaction 
Reb Strength 
Interaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GDP Per Cap (log) -0.064 -0.107 -0.065 -0.034 
 (0.198) (0.208) (0.200) (0.203) 
     Pop (log) -0.039 -0.105 -0.039 -0.039 
 (0.109) (0.114) (0.109) (0.110) 
     Duration in Yrs (log) 0.666*** 0.694*** 0.667*** 0.669*** 
 (0.148) (0.155) (0.152) (0.149) 
     Democracy -0.705 -0.708 -0.705 -0.726 
 (0.460) (0.483) (0.462) (0.462) 
     Anocracy -0.294 -0.311 -0.295 -0.311 
 (0.345) (0.362) (0.347) (0.347) 
     Rebels Stronger -1.379* -1.479* -1.377* -1.642* 
 (0.768) (0.807) (0.771) (0.839) 
     Rebels Weaker -0.780* -0.810* -0.781* -0.936** 
 (0.406) (0.426) (0.407) (0.437) 
     Rebel Origins in Civil Society -1.117 -1.018 -1.111 -1.891* 
 (0.825) (0.867) (0.836) (1.132) 
     Org Age -0.028 -0.025 -0.028 -0.029 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
     Org Ideology 0.493 0.586 0.491 0.458 
 (0.367) (0.385) (0.370) (0.369) 
     Participation in Civ Soc High -0.048 -0.078 -0.049 -0.041 
 (0.397) (0.417) (0.399) (0.399) 
     Reb Org Is Coalition 0.473 0.429 0.474 0.417 
 (0.302) (0.318) (0.304) (0.309) 
     Multiple Conflicts 0.208 0.346 0.208 0.245 
 (0.284) (0.298) (0.285) (0.289) 
     Conflict Recurrence 0.371 0.315 0.372 0.366 
 (0.330) (0.347) (0.332) (0.331) 
     Conflict Onset Pre-1988 -0.709* -0.786* -0.707* -0.693* 
 (0.397) (0.417) (0.400) (0.399) 
     Rebs Loot, Contraband 0.502* 0.474 0.502* 0.488* 
 (0.287) (0.302) (0.288) (0.289) 
     3rd-Party Intervention 0.714** 0.838** 0.713** 0.648** 
 (0.318) (0.334) (0.319) (0.325) 





 (1.171) (1.230) (1.175) (1.180) 
     Geo2 -0.166 -0.138 -0.165 -0.120 
 (0.560) (0.588) (0.562) (0.567) 
     Geo34 -0.322 -0.345 -0.318 -0.349 
 (0.598) (0.629) (0.605) (0.607) 
     Geo57 -0.718 -0.681 -0.716 -0.712 
 (0.435) (0.457) (0.437) (0.439) 
     Geo69 -0.155 0.069 -0.156 -0.150 
 (0.618) (0.649) (0.620) (0.627) 
     Nineties 0.892* 0.905* 0.893* 0.943* 
 (0.501) (0.526) (0.503) (0.506) 
     Aughts 0.438 0.483 0.439 0.461 
 (0.516) (0.542) (0.518) (0.519) 
     Civ Soc:Org Age (Interaction) -0.036 -0.044 -0.036 -0.045 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049) 
     Civ Soc:Org Ideology 
(Interaction) 1.631
* 1.392 1.645* 1.192 
 (0.866) (0.910) (0.915) (0.963) 
     Duration:Civ Soc 
(Interaction)   -0.015  
   (0.313)  
     Reb Stronger:Civ Soc 
(Interaction)    1.996 
    (2.236) 
     Reb Weaker: Civ Soc 
(Interaction)    1.297 
    (1.299) 
     Constant 5.740*** 6.461*** 5.749*** 5.683*** 
 (1.937) (2.035) (1.952) (1.955) 
      Observations 185 185 185 185 
R2 0.407  0.407 0.411 
Adjusted R2 0.309  0.304 0.305 
Residual Std. Error 1.582 (df = 158) 1.438 (df = 158) 1.587 (df = 157) 1.586 (df = 156) 
F Statistic 4.162
*** (df = 26; 
158)  
3.983*** (df = 27; 
157) 3.886
*** (df = 28; 156) 







Robustness Checks: Zero-Inflated Neg Binomial Models, DV = Civilian Victimizations 
 
  Main Model Simple Model 
Model Excluding High-Value 
Outcomes  
(Deaths > 500) 
Predictors Log-Mean CI p 
Log-
Mean CI p Log-Mean CI p 
(Intercept) 13.85 7.97 –
 19.73 
<0.001 7.51 6.57 –
 8.45 
<0.001 2.91 -2.42 – 8.25 0.284 
rgdppc [log] -0.60 -1.12 – -
0.08 
0.024    -0.01 -0.46 – 0.44 0.959 
pop [log] -0.06 -0.36 –
 0.25 
0.719    0.33 0.09 – 0.57 0.007 
log_duration 0.30 -0.03 –
 0.63 
0.071    0.27 0.10 – 0.45 0.002 
dem -1.21 -2.28 – -
0.14 
0.026    -0.01 -1.03 – 1.01 0.987 
anoc -1.70 -2.70 – -
0.70 
0.001    -0.52 -1.25 – 0.22 0.171 
rebstrength2 [stronger] -0.61 -2.24 –
 1.02 
0.464    -0.70 -1.90 – 0.51 0.258 
rebstrength2 [weaker] -1.88 -2.96 – -
0.80 
0.001    -0.28 -1.17 – 0.62 0.545 
civsoc -3.51 -5.95 – -
1.07 
0.005 -2.73 -5.31 – -
0.15 
0.038 -1.76 -3.39 – -
0.13 
0.034 
civsoc_prtcpt 1.23 0.16 –
 2.30 
0.024    0.41 -0.50 – 1.31 0.381 
org_age -0.05 -0.11 –
 0.01 
0.103 -0.13 -0.20 – -
0.06 
<0.001 0.04 -0.00 – 0.08 0.081 
ideology 0.25 -0.72 –
 1.22 
0.615 0.95 0.07 –
 1.83 
0.034 -1.42 -2.20 – -
0.64 
<0.001 
coalition 0.08 -0.87 –
 1.03 
0.866    0.95 0.18 – 1.72 0.016 
simul_conflicts2 -1.84 -2.64 – -
1.05 
<0.001    -0.73 -1.44 – -
0.02 
0.044 
recur 0.44 -0.46 –
 1.34 
0.338    -0.00 -0.43 – 0.43 0.998 
pre1988_conflict2 -1.11 -2.65 –
 0.43 
0.157    -1.32 -2.33 – -
0.31 
0.010 
loot3 1.42 0.41 –
 2.43 
0.006    -0.49 -1.14 – 0.15 0.133 
intervention 0.11 -0.89 –
 1.11 
0.831    1.54 0.83 – 2.26 <0.001 
geo34 0.28 -1.17 –
 1.73 
0.707 -1.85 -2.90 – -
0.80 





geo2 0.77 -1.33 –
 2.87 
0.473 -2.90 -4.32 – -
1.49 
<0.001 0.75 -0.79 – 2.29 0.342 
geo57 -0.60 -1.57 –
 0.37 
0.224 -1.15 -2.09 – -
0.21 
0.017 -0.47 -1.54 – 0.60 0.386 
geo69 1.13 -0.79 –
 3.06 
0.250 -0.33 -2.02 –
 1.37 
0.706 -1.93 -3.63 – -
0.23 
0.026 
nineties -0.61 -1.91 –
 0.68 
0.353 0.11 -0.72 –
 0.93 
0.797 -0.52 -1.34 – 0.30 0.212 
aughts -0.44 -1.89 –
 1.01 
0.551 -1.06 -2.12 – -
0.00 
0.050 -1.26 -2.20 – -
0.32 
0.008 
civsoc * org_age -0.08 -0.27 –
 0.10 
0.386 0.21 -0.16 –
 0.57 
0.264 -0.27 -0.39 – -
0.15 
<0.001 
civsoc * ideology 4.19 1.55 –
 6.82 
0.002 1.70 -1.69 –
 5.09 
0.327 2.91 1.05 – 4.77 0.002 
Zero-Inflated Model 
(Intercept) 5.47 -0.31 –
 11.25 
0.064 1.29 0.38 –
 2.21 
0.005 10.83 3.06 – 18.60 0.006 
rgdppc [log] -0.02 -0.57 –
 0.53 
0.938    -0.44 -1.17 – 0.28 0.232 
pop [log] -0.25 -0.59 –
 0.08 
0.142    -0.20 -0.65 – 0.25 0.381 
log_duration -0.60 -1.07 – -
0.12 
0.013    -0.22 -0.80 – 0.37 0.468 
dem -1.53 -3.00 – -
0.07 
0.041    -2.88 -5.13 – -
0.63 
0.012 
anoc -0.22 -1.38 –
 0.93 
0.708    -1.37 -3.01 – 0.26 0.100 
rebstrength2 [stronger] -1.97 -4.27 –
 0.32 
0.091    -1.86 -4.91 – 1.18 0.230 
rebstrength2 [weaker] 1.03 -0.27 –
 2.33 
0.120    0.46 -1.22 – 2.13 0.592 
civsoc -0.68 -3.56 –
 2.21 
0.646 0.16 -2.26 –
 2.59 
0.894 -2.44 -5.66 – 0.78 0.138 
civsoc_prtcpt 0.93 -0.36 –
 2.23 
0.158    1.10 -0.78 – 2.98 0.250 
org_age 0.01 -0.07 –
 0.10 
0.800 -0.02 -0.10 –
 0.06 
0.579 0.03 -0.08 – 0.14 0.592 
ideology -0.10 -1.36 –
 1.17 
0.882 -0.65 -1.55 –
 0.26 
0.162 -0.50 -2.12 – 1.12 0.544 
coalition 0.49 -0.51 –
 1.48 
0.338    1.59 0.01 – 3.17 0.049 
simul_conflicts2 0.19 -0.76 –
 1.15 





recur -0.26 -1.24 –
 0.72 
0.601    -0.11 -1.40 – 1.19 0.872 
pre1988_conflict2 1.66 -0.03 –
 3.36 
0.055    2.63 0.41 – 4.85 0.020 
loot3 -2.36 -3.43 – -
1.29 
<0.001    -2.22 -3.54 – -
0.90 
0.001 
intervention -0.75 -1.87 –
 0.37 
0.190    -1.74 -3.29 – -
0.18 
0.029 
geo34 0.59 -1.19 –
 2.38 
0.516 0.03 -1.08 –
 1.14 
0.964 1.03 -1.25 – 3.31 0.376 
geo2 1.48 -0.30 –
 3.25 
0.103 1.56 0.28 –
 2.84 
0.017 1.54 -0.65 – 3.73 0.168 
geo57 0.60 -0.68 –
 1.87 
0.361 -0.13 -1.05 –
 0.78 
0.775 -0.07 -1.91 – 1.77 0.941 
geo69 1.33 -0.67 –
 3.33 
0.193 0.81 -0.54 –
 2.16 
0.238 1.69 -1.55 – 4.93 0.308 
nineties -0.88 -2.28 –
 0.52 
0.217 -0.73 -1.51 –
 0.05 
0.065 -0.64 -2.40 – 1.12 0.475 
aughts -0.89 -2.43 –
 0.65 
0.258 -0.70 -1.65 –
 0.26 
0.153 -0.88 -2.81 – 1.06 0.374 
civsoc * org_age -0.02 -0.20 –
 0.16 
0.809 0.07 -0.08 –
 0.21 
0.348 -0.24 -0.53 – 0.06 0.120 
civsoc * ideology 0.63 -2.62 –
 3.89 
0.703 -0.36 -2.92 –
 2.20 
0.784 2.26 -1.47 – 6.00 0.234 
Observations 186 186 158 
R2 conditional / 
R2 marginal 
NA / 0.592 NA / 0.504 NA / 0.499 




Robustness Checks: OLS Output, DV = Civilian Victimizations  
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 binary_deaths log_cum_deaths 
 OLS OLS robust 
   linear 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 log(rgdppc) 0.022 -0.628 -0.276 -0.823** -0.309 
 (0.048) (0.387) (0.295) (0.400) (0.307) 
      log(pop) -0.038 -0.023 0.303* -0.076 0.350* 
 (0.029) (0.203) (0.179) (0.210) (0.187) 
      log_duration -0.104** 0.413* 0.819*** 0.492** 0.915*** 
 (0.040) (0.214) (0.247) (0.221) (0.258) 





dem -0.259** -0.749 1.343* -0.527 1.534* 
 (0.126) (0.845) (0.777) (0.874) (0.811) 
      anoc -0.049 -0.937 -0.022 -1.161* 0.071 
 (0.092) (0.583) (0.567) (0.603) (0.592) 
      rebstrength2stronger -0.281 -0.294 1.468 -0.647 1.496 
 (0.208) (1.092) (1.281) (1.130) (1.336) 
      rebstrength2weaker 0.143 -1.392** -1.454** -1.515** -1.555** 
 (0.110) (0.651) (0.677) (0.674) (0.706) 
      civsoc 0.014 -2.975 -0.888 -3.122* -0.809 
 (0.222) (1.822) (1.366) (1.885) (1.426) 
      org_age 0.003 -0.042 -0.038 -0.038 -0.032 
 (0.007) (0.038) (0.043) (0.039) (0.044) 
      ideology -0.023 -0.170 -0.016 -0.243 -0.145 
 (0.100) (0.592) (0.612) (0.612) (0.639) 
      civsoc_prtcpt 0.120 1.032 -0.590 0.855 -0.690 
 (0.110) (0.753) (0.675) (0.779) (0.705) 
      coalition 0.069 0.516 -0.221 0.662 -0.137 
 (0.082) (0.589) (0.502) (0.610) (0.524) 
      simul_conflicts2 0.065 -1.660*** -0.851* -1.535*** -0.832* 
 (0.076) (0.519) (0.467) (0.537) (0.487) 
      recur -0.040 0.518 0.386 0.548 0.374 
 (0.088) (0.521) (0.544) (0.539) (0.568) 
      pre1988_conflict2 0.240* -0.964 -1.714** -0.957 -1.829** 
 (0.138) (0.908) (0.851) (0.939) (0.888) 
      loot3 -0.360*** 0.862 2.226*** 0.615 2.275*** 
 (0.077) (0.674) (0.475) (0.697) (0.496) 
      intervention -0.089 0.081 0.451 0.271 0.530 
 (0.086) (0.584) (0.527) (0.604) (0.550) 
      geo34 0.052 1.167 -0.290 1.587 -0.018 
 (0.147) (1.077) (0.908) (1.114) (0.947) 
      geo2 0.202 0.890 -1.115 1.648 -1.066 
 (0.142) (1.410) (0.873) (1.459) (0.911) 
      geo57 0.108 -0.019 -1.038 0.251 -1.044 
 (0.112) (0.729) (0.690) (0.754) (0.720) 
      geo69 0.146 1.004 -0.858 1.041 -0.687 
 (0.155) (1.399) (0.956) (1.447) (0.997) 
      nineties -0.185 -0.284 1.120 -0.177 1.401* 
 (0.117) (0.760) (0.720) (0.786) (0.751) 
      aughts -0.198 -0.560 0.904 -0.213 1.222 
 (0.126) (0.860) (0.774) (0.890) (0.807) 





civsoc:org_age 0.012 -0.048 -0.045 -0.071 -0.057 
 (0.013) (0.144) (0.080) (0.149) (0.083) 
      civsoc:ideology -0.097 3.099 1.252 3.033 1.016 
 (0.233) (1.917) (1.433) (1.983) (1.495) 
      Constant 1.187** 12.348*** 0.264 14.088*** -0.367 
 (0.472) (4.126) (2.905) (4.268) (3.031) 
       Observations 186 70 186 70 186 
R2 0.327 0.528 0.356   
Adjusted R2 0.222 0.260 0.256   
Residual Std. Error 0.428 (df = 160) 1.373 (df = 44) 2.637 (df = 160) 0.999 (df = 44) 
2.516 (df = 
160) 
F Statistic 3.113
*** (df = 25; 
160) 
1.968** (df = 25; 
44) 
3.545*** (df = 25; 
160)   
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